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Abstract 
Psychotherapy represents a diverse and controversial field. It is characterised by 
an excessive proliferation of various psychotherapeutic approaches accompanied 
by the sectarian attitudes of a majority of psychotherapists. In response to these, 
the psychotherapy integration movement was established. Within this movement 
three ways of psychotherapy integration have emerged, namely, theoretical 
integration, common factors approach and technical eclecticism. Methodological 
issues of theoretical integration are the focus of interest in this thesis. The current 
methodological recommendations in this area seem to be very limited. A specific 
method of assimilative integration has been proposed and the necessity of the 
existence of metatheoretical congruence between theories to be integrated has 
been emphasised. Both of these recommendations are in need of further 
elaboration and extension. In order to clarifY some of these methodological 
issues, the current "state of the art" of theoretical integration is explored by 
comparatively analysing existing integrative theories. In this way, their 
similarities and differences are revealed with the unveiling of some aspects of the 
integrative assimilation that was used in their creation. On the basis of these 
findings some guidelines for future theoretical integration are proposed that 
might prompt fimher theoretical and empirical research in this area. 
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Introduction 
Psychotherapy is a special enterprise. It was born more than a hundred years ago, 
in the second half of the 19th century as an officially accepted medical method of 
mind-healing (Cushman, 1992). Until then, people who suffered from mental 
illnesses were either confided to the mental asylums where they were constrained 
and tortured, or, if they were wealthy, they could count on the procedures of 
medical nerve specialists that included "rest in bed, isolation, feeding-up, 
massage, and electricity in a strictly regulated manner" (Kessler, 1992; p.7). 
Hence medicine treated "maladies of mind" (Kessler, 1992) exclusively by 
physical and pharmacological methods. It took Freud to come to the scene with 
his theory of unconscious conflicts resulting from repressed sexual impulses, for 
psychotherapy as a "talking cure II (Wachtel, 1997) to become recognised 
(Cushman, 1992). From that time on, psychotherapy has grown rapidly to 
become a very diverse and controversial field (Arkowitz, 1992; Cushman, 1992). 
In my opinion, controversies of psychotherapy stem from the dialectical tension 
between theory and practice. These two enterprises are tightly interwoven within 
the field of psychotherapy. However, theory seems to be somewhat "slow" to 
catch up with diverse demands of practical work. The only means that "theory" 
has used so far to address various problems encountered in practice, has been 
increased pluralism. It has been frequently stated that there are currently around 
INTRODUCTION 2 
400 different psychotherapies (Arkowitz, 1992). Such bewildering diversification 
has also resulted from rivalry among psychotherapy orientations (Goldfried & 
Norcross, 1995). This has been a prevailing theory development approach dating 
back to Freud and it certainly contributed to increased chasms between particular 
orientations. Indeed, it obscured a constructive communication among therapists 
by creating various systems of knowledge that used idiosyncratic languages. 
However, demands of practice and findings from empirical research started 
replacing this attitude of "battling siblings" (Goldfried & Norcross, 1995) with an 
atmosphere of reciprocal understanding and curiosity about what other 
approaches can offer in tenns of assessment and treatment. This change resulted 
in the establishment of a psychotherapy integration movement at the beginning of 
1980s. Psychotherapy integration has been aimed at decreasing theoretical 
pluralism with a parallel increase in treatment effectiveness. This movement 
recruited some of the most prominent therapists from various approaches under 
its wing. They have attacked problems of psychotherapy integration from several 
angles. This has resulted in the creation of three generally accepted ways of 
psychotherapy integration: theoretical integration, the common factors approach 
and technical eclecticism (Stricker & Gold, 1996). 
It is theoretical integration, the most sophisticated and the most ambitious mode 
of psychotherapy integration, that this thesis is about to explore. Theoretical 
integration is defined as a mean of creating novel psychotherapy systems from 
the selected aspects of various psychotherapy approaches. It is believed that this 
will result in more sound theoretical models that will also prove to be more 
practically effective. So far, some integrative models have been created in this 
mrumer though a clear methodology of theoretical integration has not yet been 
established. TIlere have been some isolated attempts (e.g., Neimeyer, 1993; 
Sail'an & Messer, 1997) to provide guidelines for theoretical integration, but they 
have been presented in a typical top-down mrumer, without paying much 
attention to what is the current "state of the art" in this field. 
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It is my opinion that this way of imposing integrative mles can be significantly 
enriched by exploring currently existing integrative attempts. Ifwe are to provide 
a good "modus operandi" for theoretical integration, we need to learn from 
integrative models that claim to be developed by this method of psychotherapy 
integration. It is believed that this bottom-up manner of investigation will 
produce some guidelines that will be more practical and easier to employ. In 
order to produce this outcome, some selected integrative theories will be 
subjected to comparative analysis, which is aimed at elucidating their 
commonalities and differences. On the basis of these findings, some guidelines 
for fhture theoretical integration will be proposed. 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first three chapters provide 
necessary background information and lay the ground for the following four 
chapters. These chapters present the selected theories within a fonTI that makes 
their comparative analysis possible. The final chapter includes the results of the 
comparative analysis. Guidelines for future theoretical integration are then 
presented. 
Chapter one will explore psychotherapy integration in generat Furthermore, it, 
will present the historical background and the current status of three approaches 
to psychotherapy integration with a particular emphasis on theoretical 
integration. 
Chapter two will provide the rationale for the comparative analysis of the 
selected integrative theories, relying on two postmo~ernist critiques of 
psychotherapy integration. Moreover, it will argue the necessity that this 
comparative analysis is done in the form of the Comprehensive Comparative 
Framework (CF) proposed by Ford & Urban (1998). 
Chapter three will present CF thoroughly, emphasising the content of its main 
elements: guiding assumptions, conceptual, propositional and procedural models. 
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Chapters four, five, six and seven will include presentations of four selected 
theories in the form of CF with their guiding assumptions, conceptual, 
propositional and procedural models uncovered. 
These chapters will lead to the final Chapter in which the results of the 
comparative analysis in the form of revealed similarities and differences of the 
selected integrative theories will be presented. On the basis of these, the current 
IIstate of the art" in the field of theoretical integration will be elucidated and some 
guidelines for further theoretical integration will be proposed. 
Chapter 1. 
PSYCHOTHERAPY INTEGRATION 
1.1. Introduction 
The openness of psychotherapists to learn from the natural and social sciences 
and philosophy, theology, the arts and literature, has been prominent throughout 
the entire history of psychotherapy (Stricker & Gold, 1996). However, on the 
other hand, very rarely, psychotherapists of different orientations would have 
listened to each other in an accepting manner, finding conceptualisations from 
the rival theories plausible (Arkowitz, 1992; Goldfried & Newman, 1992; 1995; 
Stricker & Gold, 1996). It was as Larson (1980) described a "dogma eat dogma" 
enviromnent where "theory preciousness" (Miller, 1992) of their own approach 
was the only common standpoint of the majority of psychotherapists. However, 
as Stricker & Gold (1996) pointed out, "this isolationism has been contradicted 
by a small, but growing, group of scholars and clinicians who have been able to 
cross sectarian lines" (p.47). 
At first, these attempts were isolated, but over the years they become more 
frequent, capturing the interests of many health professionals (Goldfried & 
Norcross, 1996). In this way, at the beginning of the 1980s, psychotherapy 
integration had become a movement raised from, as Norcross & Newman (1992) 
Chapter 1 - PSYCHOTHERAPY INTEGRATION 6 
have found, several interacting and mutually reinforcing factors. The first is the 
development of some 400 different psychotherapies (Arkowitz, 1992; Karasu, 
1986; Gold, 1996; Norcross & Goldfried, 1992). This proliferation, accompanied 
by already existing isolationism, caused fragmentation of knowledge and 
confusion. At the same time, psychotherapists had become increasingly aware 
that no approach could match the needs of all clients. Furthennore, the 
involvement of the U.S. federal government and insurance companies· in 
psychotherapeutic services created an atmosphere of growing pressure for 
pragmatism, accountability and consensus. This fostered the attitude of having 
different therapies !!hang together" rather than "hang separately" (Mahoney, 
1984). Related to these pressures had been the rising interests in short-tenn, 
problem-focused psychotherapies. This caused therapists of rival orientations to 
start sharing a more common focus and to use any appropriate work regardless of 
its origins. Moreover, the increasing opportunities for therapists to observe and 
experiment with various psychotherapeutic approaches have become prominent 
with the establishment of specialised clinics for the treatment of the ·specific 
disorders. In addition to this a number of specific treatment manuals have been 
produced, maldng available clearly described therapy procedures. As Norcross & 
Newman (1992) pointed out, "in behavioural tenns, these developments may 
have induced an infonnal version of'theoretical exposure': previously feared and 
mllmown therapies were approached gradually, anxiety dissipated, and the 
previously feared therapies were integrated into the clinical repertoire!! (p.9). 
A fmiher factor in the promotion of psychotherapy integration has been a 
phenomenon called a Ifdodo bird verdict", As a result of considerable 
psychotherapy outcome research, the typical conclusion has been that there are 
few significant differences in outcome among different psychotherapies and 
hence, no one psychotherapy approach has been shown to be therapeutically 
superior. Luborsky, Singer, and Luborsky (1975) were first to use a phrase from 
the dodo bird in Alice in Wonderland that "everybody has won and all must have 
prizes If in order to describe this phenomenon. Although, this finding has been 
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frequently criticised in the literature because of the unspecificity of outcome 
measurement and the poor integrity of treatments (e.g., Barlow, 1994; Beutler, 
1991; Fisher, 1995; Kazdin & Bass, 1989), it has elicited a growing awareness 
and appreciation of the common factors that exist in all forms of therapy 
(Goldfried & Norcross, 1995). All of these factors laid the ground for a final and 
critical impetus to psychotherapy integration, which was the fonnation of the 
interdisciplinary Society for the Exploration of Psychotherapy Integration 
(SEPI), in 1983 (GoldfTied & Newman, 1992). SEPI has a function of providing 
a context for professionals coming from different approaches to share their ideas 
about psychotherapy integration. This professional network holds yearly 
conferences and publishes quarterly a "Journal of Psychotherapy Integration". 
Although the psychotherapy integration movement has existed for nearly twenty 
years, the question "what is psychotherapy integration?" still waits to be 
answered. As Arkowitz (1992) emphasised, it is far easier to say what 
psychotherapy integration is not. It is certainly not devotion to one particular 
psychotherapy approach, but an attempt "to look beyond the confines of single-
school approaches in order to see what can be learned from other perspectives" 
(Arkowitz, 1992; p. 262). Moreover, it is characterised by an openness to various 
ways of integrating diverse theories and techniques. Therefore, "psychotherapy 
integration" serves as an umbrella term under which various routes to integration 
take place. Although this movement started as an attempt to overcome an 
extensive proliferation of therapies, pluralistic tendencies have been inevitably 
encountered. However, these tendencies are not undesirable because an 
enviromnent of "infonned pluralism" (Norcross & Newman, 1992) is necessary 
to prevent premature unification; "we are in no position to judge, once and for 
all, which single theory, single technique, or single unification is best" (p.5). 
In attempts to integrate the many theories and techniques, various strategies are 
employed. However, there are three generally accepted ways of psychotherapy 
integration, namely, technical eclecticism, the common factors approach and 
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theoretical integration (Arkowitz, 1992; Stricker & Gold, 1996). All three 
approaches are characterised by pursuing the goal of increasing therapeutic 
effectiveness and applicability by looking beyond the limits of single-school 
approaches. Yet, they differ significantly in their proposed means of meeting this. 
goal. 
Hence, technical eclecticism strives to find out the best therapeutic techniques 
on the basis of therapeutic outcome, whereas the common factors approach 
involves the search for curative elements that are common to various therapies. 
Theoretical integration is the most sophisticated and the most ambitious mode 
of psychotherapy integration. It is aimed at integrating different modes of 
psychotherapy into new models of psychotherapy, which will be more effective 
and better conceptualised than the original ones. In the following sections each of 
these approaches will be described and their historical development will be 
presented. The section on theoretical integration will be most extensive given 
that it is the main focus ofthis thesis. 
1.2. Technical eclecticism 
Eclecticism is a strategy of choosing whatever seems best from a variety of 
options. Eclectically oriented psychotherapists select from among different 
psychotherapy techniques on the basis of what they think will be most 
appropriate for the particular client or problem (Arlcowitz, 1992). Therefore, 
regardless of theoretical differences between psychotherapy approaches, various 
techniques can be applied to the same person. For this reason, technical 
eclecticism can be regarded as the least theoretical of the three approaches of 
psychotherapy integration (Norcross & Newman, 1992). However, as will be 
seen from the following sections and from the claims of its main proponents (e.g. 
Lazanls, Beutler & Norcross, 1992) it should not be considered as either 
atheoretical or antitheoretical. 
Chapter 1 - PSYCHOTHERAPY INTEGRATION 9 
In contrast to theorctical integration and the COlmnon factors approach, an 
eclectic approach was not really achievable until the 1970s. This is because 
psychotherapy at these times was dominated by psychoanalytic and client-
centred approaches in which techniques were not clearly described (Arkowitz, 
1992). These two approaches were applied singly to any person and any problem, 
leaving no space for a potential eclectic mix of different techniques. However, in 
the 1960s and 1970s behaviour therapy made its greatest impact on 
psychotherapy. This therapy is characterised by many clearly described 
techniques and strategies with an emphasis on choosing the best techniques for 
the particular problems. For this reason Arkowitz (1992) considered it as a fonn 
of "limited eclecticism" which stimulated interest in further eclectic 
81nalgamation of techniques coming from a wide range of psychotherapy 
approaches. 
Furthermore, the increased awareness of some psychotherapists that the 
approaches in which they had been originally trained, have limited efficiency, led 
them to include in their treatment packages techniques from other approaches 
(Arkowitz, 1992). Eclecticism became their orientation of choice; this was shown 
in the surveys of the psychotherapists' theoretical orientations of that time (e.g. 
Garfield & Kurtz, 1976; Kelly, 1961; Norcross & Prochaska, 1983 in Arkowitz, 
1992). However, this initial eclecticism was idiosyncratic because there was no 
information about how therapists practised and on which criteria they based their 
selection. The entire process was guided by the personal preferences and 
professional skills of therapists. For this reason, Eysenck (1970 in Arkowitz, 
1992), a keen criticiser of eclecticism, described it as a chaotic and unreliable 
approach, lacldng an underlying rationale and empirical support 
However, since 1980, as Arkowitz (1992) pointed out, a nUlnber of books and 
articles have appeared striving to develop more systematically oriented 
eclecticism. This coincided with the more prolific psychotherapy outcome 
research especially in the field of behaviour therapy. The question asked by Paul 
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(1969 in Arkowitz, 1992) became relevant to psychotherapy research in general: 
"What treatment, by whom, is most effective for this individual with that specific 
problem, under which set of circumstances, and how does it come about?!! (p.44). 
This directed the attention of psychotherapists to the possibility of finding the. 
appropriate match between techniques and clients' problems in addition to 
highlighting some other variables that may affect psychotherapy outcome. 
Inevitably, this question became the foundation of later eclectic approaches 
among which the most prominent are the technical eclecticism of Atnold Laza:ms 
(1997) and the systematic eclectic psychotherapy of Larry Beutler (1992). 
The concept of technical eclecticism was first introduced by Lazarus in 1967 
(Arkowitz, 1992). He argued that therapists are free to use different techniques, 
irrespective of which approach they come from, if there is empirical support for 
their effectiveness. His insistence on empirical data had the purpose of 
overcoming eclecticism based on "personal preferences, inadequate training and 
idiosyncratic familiarity" (Lazarus & Messer, 1991; p.l47). The eclectic 
approach that he proposes is called multimodal therapy. It is based on tIthe 
assumption that most psychological problems are multifaceted, multidetennined, 
and multilayered If (Lazarus, 2000; p.93). In order to grasp such complexity 
therapists need to perfonn a thorough assessment of seven parameters or 
"modalities H : behaviour, affect, sensation, imagery, cognition, interpersonal 
relationships, and biological processes (Lazarus, 1997; 2000). The convenient 
acronym "BASIC LD." is made of first letters of these parameters with HD" 
including all medical and biological factors (Lazarus, 1997; 2000). Using this 
assessment method therapists are less likely to leave some important areas 
tmattended. Furthermore, on the basis of the assessment [mdings the multimodal 
therapist creates a modality profile for each client that outlines the excesses and 
deficits in each modality of BASIC ID. In tenns of treatment strategies it is 
mostly behavioural and cognitive strategies that are used in multimodal therapy 
(At'kowitz, 1992). In my opinion, this results fl'om the extensive empirical 
investigation these therapies were submitted to, which is in line with Lazarus' 
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emphasis on using data-proved rather than theory-based therapeutic techniques. 
However, despite this de-emphasis on theory, Lazarus still ac1mowledges that 
therapists cannot be entirely atheoretical and that his approach rests on social 
learning theory with some influences from general systems theory and 
communications theory (Lazarus & Messer, 1991). 
Although multimodal therapy has been very influential in the field of technical 
eclecticism, it has some limitations. These include its very restricted empirical 
research and almost unchanged conceptualisation since 1976 (Beutler, Consoli, 
& Williams, 1995). Given the extensive scientific development in the areas of 
personality, cognition and emotion it is hard to believe that the BASIC J.D. can 
encompass all complexities of human existence as Lazarus (1989) claims. 
Furthermore, environmental variables such as social, cultural, and political 
events are not presented in this eclectic model. Finally, as Beutler et al (1995) 
claim "multimodal therapy does not provide explicit guidelines for determining 
the treatments of choice and does not generate specific client markers for 
different treatments" (p.275). 
It is these particular lacks of multi modal therapy that systematic eclectic 
psychotherapy strives to overcome. Systematic eclectic psychotherapy (s.e.p.) is 
a psychosocial approach that emphasises the significance of the matChing of 
technique to person and problem (Beutler et al., 1995). This matching rests on 
specific research-based guidelines that determine which procedures should be 
used for a particular client and which should be left out because they Calmot meet 
the client's needs. In order to create such a "goodness of fit" between clients and 
techniques, Beutler et al. (1995) systemise the variables they regard important for 
matching. These'variables include a broad array of client variables, treatment 
variables and client-treatment interaction variables in additi?n to therapist and 
client characteristics (Arkowitz, 1992). Apart from this eclectic tendency, s.e.p. 
is also oriented toward bringing together techniques and strategies from various 
schools of psychotherapy. 
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The main advantage of this approach compared with multimodal therapy is that it 
is based on extensive empirical research (Arkowitz, 1992) .. This sheds new light 
on some variables that have been completely omitted in the previous studies on 
psychotherapy outcome. For instance, it was empirically shown that some client 
characteristics such as flproblem complexity, motivational distress/problem 
severity, resistance potential and coping stylefl (Beutler et al. 1995; p.278) have a 
great impact on psychotherapy outcome. Moreover, when these variables are 
taken into consideration prior to the implementation of psychotherapy 
techniques, it is more likely that matching between client and technique will 
occur. In conclusion, s.e.p. is more research based than multimodal therapy. 
1.3. Common factors approach 
This approach represents the search for the common curative aspects that 
different psychotherapy schools may share. Therefore, the emphasis is on finding 
similarities across different psychotherapies (Arkowitz, 1992; Hubble, Duncan & 
Miller, 1999). The major belief of the proponents of this approach is that 
psychotherapy diversity is merely a superficial feature. Hence, all 
psychotherapies are based on some common, fundamental similarities, the 
discovery of which may lead to better theories of change and more efficient 
therapeutic strategies (Garfield, 1992). Consequently, the focus of 
psychotherapists was moved from the theoretical stances of individual models of 
psychotherapy toward searching for a metaview of therapy (Garfield, 1992). As 
Hubble et al. (1999) pointed out "efforts were made to identify pantheoretical 
elements that made the various treatments effective" (p. 6). 
The search for common factors is based on findings from some extensive studies 
of psychotherapy outcome, which showed that there is no absolute winner among 
psychotherapies and that the most prominent therapies are equally effective 
(Arkowitz, 1992; Garfield, 1992; Hubble et aI, 1999). This Dodo-bird 
phenomenon led to the extensive investigation of factors that may strongly relate 
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to the positive outcome of therapy. However, the search for these factors started 
very early in the history of psychotherapy. In 1936, Rosenzweig published an 
article in which he argued that elements that all therapies have in common count 
more than their particular theoretical conceptualisations. He highlighted the 
significance of the therapist's ability to instigate hope in clients. Furthermore, he 
emphasised the therapist's. ability to educate the client in how to extend hislher 
world and self-views. Consequently, Rosenzweig can be regarded as the first 
therapist who saw the therapeutic relationship as important for positive 
therapeutic outcome, the notion that has been recognised for long time and 
further investigated in the current literature under the name "therapeutic alliance" 
(e.g. Safran & Muran, 1998; 2000). 
One of the most prominent authors in this area is Jerome Frank, whose first book 
Persuasion and Healing, published in 1961, laid the foundations for the common 
factors approach (Arkowitz, 1992). In this book Frank identified some processes 
that he regarded essential for positive change in clients. They included ftarousing 
hope, causing emotional arousal, encouraging changed activity outside of the 
session, and encouraging new ways of understanding oneself and one's problems 
through interpretations and corrective emotional experience" (Arkowitz, 1992; p. 
277). In a further two editions of this book (1973; Frank & Frank, 1991) these 
elements were further explored, resulting in the identification of four features 
characteristic of all efficient therapies. They are a) warm and safe therapeutic 
relationship that provides b) a healing setting, together with c) existence of a 
rational scheme that offers the client a reasonable explanation of hislher 
problems in addition to d) procedures that involve both clients and therapists 
working together in order to rescue the clients' mental health (Frank & Frank, 
1991). As can be seen, one of the central themes of Frank's work is a strong 
emphasis on the positive commonalties of the therapeutic relationship. As 
Lambert (1992) proposed, these relationship factors account for 30% of the 
successful therapeutic variance. This supports aU previous statements about the 
significance of the therapeutic relationship. 
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Yet, Lambert (1992) emphasised other COlmnon factors. He highlighted the 
significance of clientlextratherapeutic factors that account for 40% of outcome 
variance. This claim turned the focus of psychotherapy investigation from 
therapist's and technique variables toward the client's strengths and 
environmental variables (e.g. social support, accidental events) (Hubble et aI., 
1999). This resulted in research the findings of which were recently compiled in 
"How clients make therapy work" (Bohart & Tallman, 1999). 
Interestingly, Lambert (1992) significantly undermined the influence of 
model/technique factors. According to his findings, which were not based on 
strict statistical analysis but nevertheless had an extensive research base, these 
factors accounted only for 15% of improvement in therapy. Furthermore, he 
grouped placebo, hope and expectancy in separate groups of factors though they 
can be broadly regarded as client's factors. They account for the same amount 
(15%) of variance as model/techniques factors. As can be seen, among "the big 
four" (Hubble et aI., 1999) relationship and clientlextratherapeutic factors are the 
1110St significant, whilst theoretical and practical propositions play a far less 
noteworthy role in creating positive change in clients. Certainly, these assigned 
percentages still need to be empirically confmned. However, the proposed four 
factors are undeniably the most important features in producing positive 
therapeutic outcome. 
Apart from the extensive investigation of these common factors, research in this 
area of psychotherapy integration led to the establishment of the transtheoretical 
model by Prochaska, DiClemente & Norcross (1992). This model is striving to 
explain "cOlmnon paths to change!! (prochaska, 1999; p.227). It includes three 
different strategies: "(1) identification of levels of change; (2) specification of 
stages of change, and (3) selection and use of processes of change" (Ford & 
Urban, 1998; p. 486). Levels of change represent symptoms that need to be 
identified in order to employ efficient treatment strategies. They can be placed in 
five groups that include for example maladaptive cognitions, family conflicts or 
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intrapersonal conflicts. However, the identification of the client's problems is not 
sufficient for successful treatment choice. Therapists need to consider in which 
stage of change a client is, as change is "a process that unfolds over time" 
(Prochaska, 1999; p. 228). The authors proposed six change stages: 
precontemplation, contemplation, preparation, action, maintenance, and 
tennination (Prochaska et al., 1992; Prochaska, 1999). They claimed that 
depending on in which change stage a client is, different change processes, that 
actually refer to intervention strategies, can be employed. For example, if the 
client is in the contemplation stage (thinking about making change but not taleing 
any actions) then strategies such as consciousness raising or enviromnental 
reevaluation, that increase his/her motivation to become active in the process of 
change, are efficient in moving a client to the action stage. Empirical evaluation 
of this model is extensive and ongoing especially in addressing mental health 
problems such as alcohol and other addictions, smoldng, and obesity (Prochaska, 
1999). The results have been very promising especially in terms of the model's 
broad applicability. Prochaska (1999) emphasises this quality of his 
transtheoretical model by claiming that it IIprovides innovative programs that can 
reach more people, retain more people, and affect a much grater percentage of 
troubled populations tl (p.252). 
1.4. Theoretical integration 
Theoretical integration involves lithe synthesis of novel models of personality 
functioning, psychopathology, and psychological change out of the concepts and 
propositions of two or more traditional systems" (Stricker & Gold, 1996, p.50). 
Apart from aiming at providing a synthesis of diverse models of 
psychopathology and psychotherapy, Dobson (1988 in Ford & Urban, 1998) 
proposes an additional goal of theoretical integration in this area. He claims that 
theorists who are developing integrative theories need to provide overarching 
models which will account for "all biological, psychological, behavioural, social, 
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and environmental aspects of human living, development and change" (Ford & 
Urban, 1998; p.499). This is certainly a very ambitious task and it can be 
questioned whether such overinclusive models can be developed at this stage of 
our psychological knowledge. Nevertheless, it still counts as a main goal of 
theoretical integration. 
However, the first attempts at theoretical integration were not that ambitious at 
all. They were intended to show that certain parallels could be drawn between 
psychotherapy approaches that are usually regarded as non-congruent. For 
instance, the very first work in this area, was an address that French delivered at 
the 1932 meeting of the American Psychiatric Association (Goldfried & 
Newman, 1992). He argued that similarities can be found between repression, 
that is a typical psychoanalytic phenomenon, and extinction that comes from 
Pavlovian conditioning theory. This proposition caused very mixed reactions 
ranging from the harsh dismissive opinions to the more accepting comments that 
emphasised the significance of convergence between approaches (Goldfried & 
Newman, 1992). It can be said that the early history of theoretical integration was 
characterised by such a way of responding. There were always these individual 
voices which strove to show that rapprochement was possible which led to mixed 
reactions from other scientists. However, this atmosphere did not proved to be 
fruitful for thorough and extensive investigation in this area (Arkowitz, 1992; 
Goldfried & Newman, 1992) and hence, psychoanalysis and behaviourism 
(behaviour therapy emerged later) stayed firmly on their own grounds. 
Then, in 1950, one of the most influential works in this area was published. It is 
Dollard and Miller's classical work entitled. Personality and Psychotherapy 
(Goldfried & Norcross, 1995). It was aimed at enriching psychoanalytic concepts 
and propositions with some concepts and propositions coming from learning 
theory. For instance, they emphasised the value of modelling and the use of 
hierarchically arranged tasks (Goldfried & Newman, 1992). Moreover, they 
highlighted the importance of helping clients to gain self-control and coping 
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skills in addition to giving between-sessionassigmnents that assured the 
generalisation of in-session change. As can be seen, this work was a successful 
pioneering attempt to enhance psychoanalysis with findings from learning theory 
and was very much ahead of its time, given that it took another 20 years for 
behaviour therapy to fully develop. 
In the following years, as behaviour therapy was developing its full identity and 
psychoanalysis experienced diversification within the field with the development 
of object-relations therapy and self-psychology, there was a growing interest in 
reconciliation of these two approaches. One of the most influential works that 
come from this era is London's book The Modes and Morals of Psychotherapy 
published in 1964 (Goldfried & Norcross, 1995). Here, London, a behaviourist 
himself, proposed a clear demarcation line between therapies that are insight-
oriented and therapies that are action-oriented, arguing that action-oriented 
therapies (Le., behaviour therapy) are undeniably successful at producing 
positive changes in clients' behaviour but they leave out completely clients' 
thinking that insight therapies (e.g., psychoanalysis) are striving to explore and 
change. Consequently, therapies that would unite insight and action could be 
more efficient than these individual orientations. Some empirical research 
which came out in the seventies (e.g. Bide, 1970; Bide & Brinkley-Bide, 1974; 
Feather & Rhodes, 1972; Murray, 1976 and Silverman, 1974 in Arkowitz, 1992) 
confinned this proposition by demonstrating how II insight-oriented therapies 
might enhance behaviour change and how behaviour change could, in turn, 
facilitate cognitive changes" (Arkowitz, 1992; p. 267). 
The first successful attempt at integrating psychoanalysis with behaviour therapy 
was presented in a Wachtel's book Psychoanalysis and Behavior therapy: 
Toward Integration, published in 1977. This is regarded as a seminal work, that 
still inspires researchers in this area, especially now that some new chapters have 
been added further clarifYing the nature of this integrative model (Wachtel, 
1997). Wachtel's work is not only important in terms of representing a first 
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successful effort at theoretical integration, but also in terms of tackling the 
procedural issues of this type of integration. For instance, he proposed that 
integrationists need to be fully aware of differences between psychoanalysis and 
behaviour therapy (Wachtel, 1997). Furthermore, they need to distinguish which 
elements of these two approaches can be incorporated, avoiding the elements that 
are incommensurable. For this reason, he integrated the elements of interpersonal 
psychoanalytic approaches and behavioural approaches, claiming that integration 
will fail in the case of the orthodox Freudian psychoanalysis and operant 
behaviour therapy because of their basic incompatibilities. 
In order to extensively explore these proposed issues Arkowitz & Messer (1984 
in Arkowitz, 1992) published a book Psychoanalytic Therapy and Behavior 
Therapy: Is Integration Possible? in which they gave opportunity to experts 
belonging to different schools of psychotherapy to discuss the entitled question. 
Opinions varied significantly, ranging from harsh critiques of the entire proposal 
for psychotherapy integration to accepting views in which the authors tried to 
provide some guidelines that would improve future integration (Arkowitz, 1992). 
The most interesting propositions came from Schacht (1984 in Arkowitz, 1992) 
who argued that the major source of conflict in this area is that "different writers 
have often referred to theoretical integration at different levels and units of 
analysis" (Arkowitz, 1992; p. 270). Therefore, under the umbrella of theoretical 
integration, many models were built which were not based on integration of 
theories but on integration of either techniques, metatheoretical assumptions or 
methods of evaluation. For this reason, Schacht (1984 in Arkowitz, 1992) 
proposed five different models of integration. The first model is basic given that 
it involves just a simple translation of concepts. A complementary model is more 
complex. It is based on the assumption that different psychotherapy techniques 
can be used with the same client in order to address his/her various problems. A 
synergistic model adds a new quality to the previous one by claiming that when 
two therapies are applied to the same problem they should produce outcomes 
superior to either therapy alone. In an emergent model different techniques are 
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amalgamated in order to produce a novel synthesis. The most ambitimls model is 
theoretical integration in which theories and metatheories of different approaches 
are integrated in a new theory of human behaviour. In addition to Schacht's 
propositions, Wachtel (1984 in Arkowitz, 1992) argued that theoretical 
integration was not supposed to be based on the similarities of melding theories 
but on their different strengths and contributions. Hence, integrationists should 
create such a theoretical framework which will allow the incorporation of all of 
these differences whilst staying coherent and plausible. These assumptions still 
represent the broadly accepted guidelines in this area. 
During the 1980s, theoretical integration gained more credibility given that apart 
from psychoanalytic-behaviour integration, new issues emerged (Arkowitz, 
1992). For instance, the first critiques of theoretical integration, aimed at fmding 
a unified theory, appeared (Arkowitz, 1992; Goldfried & Norcross, 1995). 
Furthermore, interests in theoretical integration statted to extend to the other 
approaches, such as for example fatnily and humanistic therapies (Arkowitz, 
1992). In the 1990s this was further improvcd by the development of integrative 
theories that, as well as psychotherapy theories, also incorporated psychological 
theories and models (Goldfried & Norcross, 1995). Currently there are nine 
prominent integrative psychotherapies, which are regarded as developed through 
theoretical integration (Gold, 1995). Their brief description will be provided in 
the following sections. 
1.4.1. Cyclical psychodynamics (CP) 
This is the first developed theoretical integration, which includes concepts and 
methods of interpersonal psychoanalysis, family systems theory, socialleaming 
theory and behaviour therapy. It is a brainchild of Paul Wachtel who was 
originally trained in psychoanalysis. However, dissatisfied with its limitations, he 
reached for behaviour and system therapies, especially their therapeutic 
techniques in order to enrich psychoanalysis. Hence, Wachtel (1997) proposes 
that unconscious motives, fantasies and conflicts still represent major factors in 
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creating psychopathology. However, the relationship between these factors and 
psychopathology is not of a simple linear nature. This is because these 
unconscious factors are not regarded as independent but dependent variables 
affected by a person's ongoing social interactions. Therefore, rather than being 
independent components of the person's inner world they are shaped and 
. remodelled by the environment. Moreover, Wachtel advocates a developmentally 
oriented understanding of the client. Indeed, a person is continuously caught up 
in the same dysfunctional behavioural pattern where past internal conflicts and 
interpersonal binds are being recreated. In order to break this vicious circle any 
methods, especially system and behaviour techniques, might be employed. 
1.4.2. Cognitive-analytic theory (CA T) 
This therapy represents theoretical integration of psychoanalytic object-relations 
theory and concepts and clinical methods derived from cognitive therapy. The 
major proposition of CAT is that conscious and unconscious functionings are 
interactive (Ryle, 1993). Hence, conscious functions such as planning, decision 
making and interpersonal judgement which result in behaviour patterns are 
structured and determined by unconscious representations of the self in 
relationship to the other internalised persons. When the person acquires the 
dysfunctional object and self-related unconscious patterns, these in tum result in 
dysfunctional thoughts, behaviour and relatedness. Moreover, the person is 
unable to change her/his cognition and behaviour, which then in tum strengthens 
problematic unconscious patterns. Therefore, CAT emphasises the circular nature 
of pathological processes. Therapy is aimed at producing changes in cognition 
and behaviour (as any traditional cognitive-behaviour therapy) and at stimulating 
new learning in order to change unconscious object-relational structures. 
1.4.3. Behavioural psychotherapy 
This integrative model is aimed at integrating concepts derived from behaviour 
and psychoanalytic therapies (Fensterheim, 1993). The psychological totality of 
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the client is divided into three levels, where Level 1 is behaviourally defined, 
Level 3 is psychodynamically defmed and Level 2 represents the level of 
obstacles and is conceptualised from both positions. Though this model 
acknowledges a psychodynamic level, the client's difficulties and assessment are 
mostly formulated at Levell only. This is because behavioural psychotherapy is 
guided by the law of parsimony, which proposes that if there are two hypotheses 
competing to explain one phenomenon the simpler should be preferred. Since 
behavioural formulations and interventions are simpler and easier, the 
behavioural level is employed for both assessment and therapy. Only in the case 
when the client is not able to benefit from work at this level, dynamic factors 
such as defences have been explored and related to the dysfunctional behaviour. 
1.4.4. System-process cognitive therapy 
This ambitious model represents an integration of Bowlby's attachment theory 
with concepts derived from cognitive and developmental psychology (Guidano, 
1987). Therefore, people are continually engaged in organisation and revision of 
their experience into coherently organised self-constructs. The self-construct is a 
dynamic structure that integrates the totality of people's development and 
functioning. It begins with self-recognition in infancy and early childhood and 
continuously evolves along the life-span. It yields self-identity, which maintains 
internal personal coherence in terms of sustaining stable self-perceptions and 
self-evaluations despite the changes in the environment. The development of 
self-construct is primarily determined by the nature of relationships with 
significant others as has been illustrated by Bowlby's attachment theory. If there 
are early disturbances in attachment experience the self-construct might become 
distorted and inflexible which will prevent the person from assimilating 
experiences effectively leading to dysfunctional cognition and behaviour. 
Therapy is aimed at modification of the client's overt ideas and behaviour and 
changes in deep tacit structures relevant to the clients' sense of self, significant 
others and the world. 
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1.4.5. The active self model 
This theory is organised around a novel theory of personality which says that the 
maj or concern for any person is to malce every effort to regulate and to retain a 
particular self-image (Andrews, 1993). This self-image is mostly dictated by 
early experiences. If these early encounters are of such a nature that contributes 
to the development of self-image that is exaggerated or deviant then 
psychological disturbance might occur. Hence, the person who suffers in this 
way actively structures his/her cognition, motivational and emotional life and 
social interactions in ways that are meant to confirm and maintain a pathological 
self-image. The assessment is oriented toward determining the ways in which the 
client engages in these negative self-confirmations. Therapeutic work is aimed at 
meeting two goals. The first goal is to increase the client's awareness of 
dysfunctional self-confirmatory acts whereas the second is to help the client to 
engage in novel ways of experiencing and relating to others which then in turn 
might lead to creating a more flexible self-image. Any therapy, which might 
assist in meeting these goals, can be used. 
1.4.6. Process-experiential psychotherapy 
This model is aimed at integrating concepts from cognitive and Gestalt therapy 
with emphasis on a therapeutic alliance from client-centered therapy (Greenberg, 
Rice, & Elliot, 1993). The major concern of therapeutic work is to overcome and 
resolve experiential blockages, which might occur on conscious and unconscious 
levels. They represent the expressions of cognitive and emotional disturbances 
that have been accumulated through interpersonal events. Therefore, it is not just 
dysfunctional cognitions but also distortions and inhibitions in emotional life that 
contributes to the development of psychopathology. Therapeutic work is based 
on establishing an accepting and empathic therapy relationship, which helps in 
motivating the client to engage in gestalt exercises and methods of cognitive 
restructuring. These techniques are aimed at creating increased awareness of 
experiential blockages. Consequently, the client is then involved in experimental 
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therapeutic situations in which he/she can abandon dysfunctional and acquire 
productive psychological skills. 
1.4. 7. In terpersonal-cognitive-experiential psychotherapy 
This therapy represents an amalgam of cognitive, interpersonal and experiential 
therapies (Reeve, lnck, & Safran, 1993). It is primarily concerned with the 
client's ongoing relationships, which naturally reflect the client's interpersonal 
schemas. These schemas are defmed as a "generalized representation of self-
other relations" (Reeve, Inck, & Safran, 1993, p. 114). It reflects the individual's 
unique view of reality and herlhis place and role within that reality. The 
maladaptive interpersonal schemas are manifested clinically by repetitive 
patterns of dysfunctional interpersonal behaviour, emotional disturbances and 
dysfunctional, negative cognitions. In order to overcome these problems various 
cognitive and experiential techniques have been used. They are aimed at 
increasing the client's awareness about their involvement in the maladaptive 
interpersonal cycles. 
1.4.8. Self-management therapy 
This is the most ambitious attempt at theory integration. It claims that biological, 
psychodynamic, humanistic, cognitive, behavioural and developmental 
approaches are just microtheories that partially explain human functioning and 
psychopathology (Kanfer, & Schefft, 1988). Therefore, there is a need for 
metatheory that can linle and integrate all of them. Kanfer & Schefft (1988) 
propose the system model of human functioning which emphasises the 
interaction of various enviromnental, psychological and biological variables that 
results in a particular state or behaviour at a given time. However, the person is 
not just a passive recipient of different influences but a dynamic system with 
feedback and feedforward processes. Hence, when behaviour disorder occurs it is 
a result of dysfunctional self-regulatory processes. Therapeutic work represents a 
mixture of cognitive and behavioural techniques with emphasis on creating 
Chapter 1 - PSYCHOTHERAPY INTEGRATION 24 
therapeutic alliance. Moreover this approach claims to be open to any other 
technique or strategy regardless of its origin. 
1.4.9. Constructivist approaches 
This still developing approach assembles components that have evolved from 
different theoretic antecedents such as behaviour, cognitive and personal 
construct theories. However, the major factors that linle them are their 
epistemological arid metaphysical assumptions, called constructivism (Neimeyer 
& Mahoney, 1995; Ford & Urban, 1998). According to this philosophy people 
function as self-organising and self-constructing systems. This major proposition 
is applicable to the subcomponents of the person such as for instance the human 
knowing system. This system, which includes cognitive, emotional and motoric 
aspects, is able to construct and then protect its own psychological organisation. 
Besides having a self-maintenance function, the system can generate processes 
that are able to assimilate new infonnation and therefore help the system to cope 
with disturbances arising from exchanges with environment. The major function 
of a human knowing system is to construct meanings that can guide the person's 
action because people are intentional, goal-directed and purposive beings. 
Moreover, humans are dynamic systems and therefore change processes are 
emphasised. Therefore, disorder and disequilibrimn are inevitable components of 
progressive development. But when people become stuck in the same useless 
process of creating constructs that are no longer ,:,iable than regressive 
development might occur, which can result in psychological disturbances. As can 
be seen the underlying philosophy and conceptualisation of human functioning 
are well defined in constructivist psychotherapy. However, when it comes to the 
point of describing exact interventions, authors become very obscure and 
unwilling to reveal them. The only clear proposition is the emphasis on the 
power and importance of the therapeutic relationship. 
As can be seen from this general presentation of different integratiVe 
psychotherapy theories, theoretical integration is a very lively and diverse 
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enterprise. According to Arkowitz (1992) these theories should be regarded as 
"evolving fi-ameworks" for integration that stay open to changes that involve the 
incorporation of the novel elements. However, though theoretical diversity and 
conceptual richness characterise these approaches, the main issue has not been 
addressed yet. As was emphasised previously theoretical integration is aimed at 
producing novel integrative models of psychotherapy that are more effective than 
individual models. Yet, apart from a few attempts of some authors (e.g. 
Greenberg & Watson, 1998; Paivio & Bahr, 1998; Paivio & Greenberg, 1995), 
psychotherapy outcome research in this area still stays very undeveloped. 
Therefore, as Arkowitz (1992) pointed out "we do not know if their promise of 
greater effectiveness is real" (p.274). This lack of well-controlled outcome 
studies, certainly decreases the scientific and practical credibility of integrative 
therapies and should be considered as the area in urgent need of research. 
Nevertheless, in my opinion, while we wait for the critical mass of empirical 
evaluations to be accomplished, we can do more theoretical investigation in 
tenus of comparatively analysing existing theories. The rationale for such an 
analysis will be provided in the following chapter. 
Chapter 2. 
RATIONALE 
Psychotherapy integration was initiated by the growing dissatisfaction among 
psychotherapists with staying exclusively in a single-school camp. In addition, 
the proliferation of different psychotherapy approaches with an accumulation of 
lmowledge that was not systemically organised, proved to be a very important 
factor in the development of psychotherapy integration. Integration seemed to be 
a good solution for overcoming these pluralistic tendencies within 
psychotherapy. However, as Mahoney (1993) pointed out "integration ... 
involves a unification that appeals to ideas of wholeness" (p.1). Hence, the idea 
of unification is based on the assumption that whatever differences exist in the 
psychotherapy theories, it is the same underlying phenomena that theorists and 
researchers are exploring. Therefore, this "unificationist dream" implies that it is 
possible to discover a valid model of psychotherapy that unifies all fragmentary 
views (Neimeyer, 1993). However, a pattern of the development of 
psychotherapy integration has not been unificationist at all. It is characterised by 
diversification and tensions between the main approaches (Mahoney, 1993). 
The continuing dialogue about the relative merits of technical eclecticism and 
theoretical integration is a good example of continuing dilelmnas about what is 
the best path toward psychotherapy integration (Mahoney, 1993). This inevitably 
has led to a debate about the supremacy of technique over theory. Technical 
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eclectics have proposed that scientifically proven effectiveness of therapeutic 
techniques is the sole sufficient selection criterion for using the technique in 
practice. As long as the therapist is certain about the technique's effectiveness, he 
is free to use it and combine it with others in whatever way, in order to find the 
appropriate approach of meeting the clients' needs. Consequently, theory does 
not matter and theoretical differences cannot be an obstacle for selecting different 
techniques and applying them in practice (Lazarus & Messer, 1991). However, 
on the other hand, the proponents of theoretical integration have argued that 
technique selections are not independent from theoretical issues and that "goal of 
psychotherapy integration should be fundamentally conceptual and only 
secondarily procedural" (Mahoney, 1993; p.6). This debate is sti11live1y and has 
been presented after the appearance of two modern handbooks of psychotherapy 
integration (Norcross & Goldfried, 1992; Stricker & Gold, 1993), but before the 
1110st recent publications (e.g. Carere-Comes, 1999; in press). The resolution has 
not been reached yet. However, my own position leans toward the theoretical 
integration ideas that state that techniques cannot be cleanly removed from 
theory and that therapists CalIDot be "atheoretical" throughout the entire 
therapeutic process but should rely in their work on selected theories. 
Furthermore, theoretical integration preslllnably involves the development of 
new concepts alld propositions on the basis of integrating ideas from various 
approaches, that in turn affect therapeutic techniques and strategies. Theories 
developed in such a manner presumably wil1lead to a better understanding of 
clients' problems and better effectiveness. In summary, theoretical integration in 
my opinion is a valuable integrative approach and hence, it is the focus of inquiry 
in this thesis, 
However, I think that the methodological issues of theoretical integration are not 
well explored. Theoretical integration might be a valuable approach, but there are 
still a number of questions that should be answered such as tbr example: Which 
concepts should be integrated? When they are "integrated" does it lead to a better 
theory and better practice? Should the theories that are going to be integrated be 
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scrutinised with respect to a previous analysis of their similarities and differences 
and on the basis of that should uncomplimentary theories be discarded as "non-
integrative"? There are two crucial articles that, in my opinion try, to tackle 
these methodological issues of theoretical integration. Safran & Messer's (1997) 
and Neimeyer's (1993) articles, that can be roughly described as post-modern 
critiques of psychotherapy integration, both try to give some answers on the 
previously stated questions. They will be thoroughly analysed in the following 
sections. 
Safran & Messer (1997) criticise major trends of psychotherapy integration from 
the postmodernist perspectives of pluralism and contextualism. Pluralism 
represents a post-modern notion that there is more than one correct theory by 
which to view any phenomena. Consequently, though theories can sit at the 
extreme poles and some of them may seem more plausible than others, no theory 
can claim an absolute superiority over others. Contextualism, on the other hand, 
is based on a notion that no event can be studied as an isolated element, but only 
within its context. 
From these postmodernist world VIews come two major critiques of 
psychotherapy integration. Pluralism argues that "there is no single theoretical, 
epistemological, or methodological approach that is pre-eminent and no one, 
con"ect integrative system toward which the field of psychotherapy is evolving" 
(Safran & Messer, 1997; pJ40). Contextualism, however, views 
psychotherapeutic concepts and interventions as deeply embedded within 
particular psychotherapy systems and hence, "they tal<e on new meanings when 
extracted :5:0111 their original context and are incorporated into an eclectic 
therapy" (p.l40). Though the authors criticise all three major approaches to 
psychotherapy integration, because the specific focus of inquiry of my thesis is 
theoretical integration, in further sections I will concentrate only on the critique 
of this approach. 
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Saft'an & Messer (1997) define theoretical integration as a process of combining 
different psychotherapy theories in the attempt to create !fa superior, overarching 
conceptual framework" (p.143). It is believed that this amalgamation will lead to 
a new theoretical system of psychotherapy, which makes the most of the 
strengths of each of its elements. From both pluralistic and contextualistic 
perspectives, this definition is problematic. Pluralism argues against a search for 
overarching theory by emphasising the pluralistic nature of psychotherapy that is 
given and should be recognised as such. Furthennore, truth can be approached 
only through accepting that all theories are limited and through the continual 
"confi .. ontation of multiple, competing theories with data and with each other" 
(p.144). Contextualism, however, considers all concepts, propositions and 
strategies of any psychotherapeutic system to be deeply contextually embedded. 
Therefore, if some concepts are simply transferred into a new theoretical 
fiamework, they will inevitably lose some of their explanatory power. 
In order to overcome these pluralistic and contextualistic obstacles, Safran & 
Messer propose assimilative integration to be the valid approach to theoretical 
integration. They define it as "the incorporation of attitudes, perspectives, or 
techniques fi'om one th~rapy into another in a way that is cognizant of how 
context shapes the meaning of foreign elements" (p.145). Furthennore, this mode 
of integration will lead to integrative theories that are still grolUlded within one 
system of psychotherapy, but with an opelmess to assimilate other perspectives 
or practices. This will be a dynamic and ever-evolving process of bringing 
differences and similarities in contact with each other, which will lead to 
integration. As can be seen, Safi'an & Messer only define assimilative integration 
in very broad terms without giving any particulars about the process of 
assimi1ati on. 
A postmodel11ist critique of psychotherapy integration through a constructivist 
lens, which is presented in Neimeyer (1993), is very similar to the previous one. 
Neimeyer (1993) criticised "an implicit 'unificationistlrealist' theory of 
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knowledge" (p.13 8) on which some integrational attempts are based. The 
traditional parable of a blind man and an elephant, which is frequently cited in 
discussions of psychotherapy integration, represents for him the best reflection of 
the unificationist dream that some proponents of psychotherapy integration share. 
Like the blind man describing an elephant differently depending on which parts 
of the animal he can touch, so can different theorists and researchers "see" and 
hence, explore only some facets of the underlying phenomena. This can lead to 
the wrong certainty that one knows the entire wholeness of phenomena. 
However, contrary to the blind man and single-school oriented therapists, 
integrationists are aware of the totality of the "elephant" and they strive to create 
a full representation of it. This view, that integration will [mally result in 
achieving the metatheoretical "grail", is embedded in realist epistemology, which 
regards the reality as singular, stable and knowable. Reality exists to be 
discovered and explained through what Kelly (1955) labelled "accumulative 
fi'agmentalism", which includes the collection of neutral observations. 
However, Neimeyer (1993) sees constructivism as a valid epistemology that 
opposes the existence of neutral observations stating that our perceptual and 
information-processing systems are intrinsically biased and that "any organized 
system of lmowledge is inherently perspectival, and that any lmowledge domain 
is open to a diversity of possible meanings and alternative interpretations" 
(Neimeyer, 1993; p.139). Therefore, constructivists are more in favour of 
differentiation than amalgamation of psychotherapy. Nevertheless, though there 
are inherent tensions between a constructivist view and a unificationist model of 
psychotherapy integration that Neimeyer is fully aware of, he still thinlcs that 
constructivism can play a contributory role in the development of psychotherapy 
integration especially theoretical integration. 
In line with this, he proposes a model of theoretically progressive integrationism 
(TP 1) as a valid approach to theoretical integration. Contrary to the technical 
eclecticism, which emphasises procedural exchange between psychotherapy 
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approaches, TPI fosters a conceptual exchange between different psychotherapy 
systems but with full awareness that that exchange is impossible if the system 
epistemologies are incompatible. Therefore, TPI proposes a very cautious 
selective integration on the conceptual leveL 
The main goal of this model is to elaborate the coherent theory which both 
"explains and constrains psychotherapeutic interventions" (Neimeyer, 1993, 
p.141). In order to achieve this goal TPI ac1mowledges the importance of three 
integrative dialectics: the fIrst between psychotherapeutic theory and clinical 
, 
practice; the second between a particular psychotherapeutic approach and a 
broader scientifIc discipline; and the third between different psychotherapies. 
In the fIrst two dialectics Neimeyer emphasises the process of "cross-
feliilization ll between theory and practice. This exchange simply can enrich 
practice either by scientifIcally providing the explanation of the particular 
therapeutic strategy used in practice or by giving more explanatory depth to the 
psychotherapeutic conceptualisations of the client!sproblems. However, though 
all three dialectics are regarded as equally impOliant, Neimeyer (1993) provides 
the most thorough guidelines only for the third one. 
He starts with acknowledging a specifIc concentric organisation of all 
psychotherapies claiming that they are all organised around their hard 
metatheoretical core, which then implies formal theory. This proposition about 
the existence of the core metatheorycomes £i:om the Neimeyer's (1993) 
comparison of psychotherapies with IIwhat the philosopher of science lIme 
Lakatos (1974, p.132) has termed !research programs!, i.e., series of scientifIc 
theories that display a certain conceptual continuity across time" (p.142). This 
conceptual continuity originates from the fIrm metaphysical commitments of the 
scientists working within pmiicular research programs. They demonstrate an 
unquestioned acceptance of some abstract assumptions that are then used to 
create testable theories. These theories are regarded as refutable, but not so the 
metatheoretical assumptions on which they are based. 
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Neimeyer (1993) argues that psychotherapy theories can be understood in similar 
terms. They are also built upon mostly implicit metatheoretical assumptions that 
are not "directly open to empirical refutation: rather they are treated 'as if they 
were valid in order to generate aformal theory that is more testable but which is 
nonetheless coherent with them!! (Neimeyer, 1993; p.143). However, Neimeyer 
is not specific about what these metatheoretical assumptions are. He cites the 
work of two authors Westerman (1986) and Messer (1986) who proposed that 
metatheoretical assumptions that characterise all different psychotherapeutic 
approaches describe three complex phenomena: the nature of human existence, 
plasticity and the locus of change. It is not clear from Neimeyer's presentation 
what these phenomena are and how different psychotherapies explain them. 
Furthermore, Neimeyer (1993) proposes that such a structural organisation of 
theories in terms of formal theory that is empirically testable derived from an 
implicit metatheoretical core that is inefutable, applies not only to psychotherapy 
theories but also to the psychological theories in general. However, in the case of 
the fonner it is necessary to distinguish two more levels that are called clinical 
theory and psychotherapeutic strategies and procedures. Clinical theory provides 
the infonnation about the genesis of psychological distress and hence, the 
organisational framework for the most concrete level of psychotherapy strategies 
and procedures employed in order to decrease psychological suffering and 
increase functioning. Neimeyer (1993) represents this organisational structure in 
a form of concentric circles with metatheory being central and then fonnal 
theory, clinical theory and psychotherapy strategies and techniques spreading out 
from this central circle. 
In Neimeyer's view such an organisation of psychotherapies imposes structural 
constraints on psychotherapy integration. He claims that "within a TPI 
fhunework, high-level synthesis of any two theories of psychotherapy is only 
feasible to the extent that they share theoretical and metatheoretical 
assumptions" (pp.144-145). By describing three examples of personal construct 
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therapy having different levels of overlapping with modem obj ect relations 
therapy, traditional cognitive approaches and family therapies, Neimeyer tries to 
SUppOlt this main notion of TPI. 
In the first example of personal construct therapy and modem object relations 
therapy, an overlap occurs at the most superficial technical level. These therapies 
employ a similar therapeutic technique of leaving a client to freely elaborate on 
the views and motivations of others without therapeutic disputation. However, 
the theoretical justifications for using this strategy in personal construct and 
object relations therapy are completely different. For Neimeyer, Freudian instinct 
theory and a constructivist view· that clients are regarded as early scientists or 
nalTators that provide theoretical justification for using this strategy, are totally 
conflicting. Though these theories created similar therapeutic strategies, an 
attempt at further integration will fail because of their conceptual and 
metatheoretical incomplementarity. 
FUlthermore, the example of personal construct therapy and traditional 
approaches to cognitive therapy, demonstrates that even an overlap existing at 
the technical and clinical level is not sufficient to produce progressive theoretical 
integration. In this case both therapies use similar assessment techniques to 
assess clients' belief systems. Moreover, at the clinical level they" both emphasise 
the significance of schemas or constructs which guide the perceptions and the 
organisation of the new information. However, by employing different 
epistemologies (constructivism and realism) reflected in the different ap:proaches 
towcu'd clients, these two therapies cannot be successfully integrated. The 
cognitive approach, based on the objectivist epistemology that clients should be 
taught to COlTect their distorted thinking, fundcunentally clashes with the 
constructivist view of clients being major agents of change. Consequently, 
integration of these theories is not theoretically fruitful. 
Finally, Neimeyer (1993) sees the extensive metatheoretical overlap between 
personal construct theory and some approaches of family therapy that have been 
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based on constructivist epistemology, as a source of a possible fruitful synthesis. 
For Neimeyer, their conceptual and technical diversity combined with their 
metatheoretical compatibility represents a very promising foundation of the 
progressive theoretical integration. Furthennore, merging of behaviour and 
cognitive therapy into cognitive-behaviour therapy, represents one more example 
of this fi'uitful synthesis that has already occurred. Though characterised by 
diverse techniques and different conceptualisations, both therapies have showed 
a strong commitment to the particular metatheoretical assumptions of 
philosophical realism and logical positivism. According to Neimey~r (1993) their 
synthesis proved to be valuable, representing an ilmovative move in their 
paradigms without losing their conceptual fertility. 
In summary, the TPI model argues that "to be theoretically progressive (in the 
sense of elaborating a coherent conceptual framework), candidate theories for 
integration must display broad compatibility (but not necessarily isomorphism) at 
theoretical and especially metatheoreticallevels" (p. 151). Therefore, in order to 
achieve progressive theoretical integration it is essential to assess "the goodness 
of fit" of any two theories that are to be integrated, at core theoretical and 
metatheoretical levels. Though Neimeyer (1993) is aware that this specific 
evaluation is a difficult process, he still does not provide any directions about 
how this theoretical appraisal should be done. He is just simply convinced that 
such an evaluation is an essential prerequisite for progressive theoretical 
integration. 
As can be seen the TPI model is created in a typical top-down manner in terms of 
imposing general integrative rules on potentially integrative psychotherapies. 
There are both positive and negative sides to it. In positive terms, it advocates the 
theoretical integration that will lead to the development of coherent 
psychotherapy systems that are grounded in a broader theory of human 
personality. Moreover, it attempts to provide some basic rules for such an 
integration by claiming that only metatheoretical and theoretical compatibility 
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can lcad to a viable integration. However, as could be seen TPI fails to provide 
the method for this compatibility assessment. 
In conclusion, both articles (Neimeyer, 1993 and Safran & Messer, 1997) have in 
some way a prescriptive nature. They intend to provide some guidelines and 
directions for psychotherapy integration whilst staying committed to a 
postmodernist world view. Indeed, assimilative integration has shown some 
practical utility in being endorsed by some leading proponents of theoretical 
integration (e.g., Greenberg, Rice & Elliot, 1993; Safran, 1990a; Wachtel, 1997). 
The TPI model however, has not been widely recognised, though in my opinion 
still can be regarded useful in a sense of articulating more clearly what might be 
the constraints of theoretical integration. However, what both of these 
propositions lack is the feedback information about what is really cUlTently 
happening in the field of theoretical integration. One can be prescriptive to a 
certain amount without paying much attention to what is happening in the real 
world, but when "prescriptions" are implemented whether partially, totally or 
with a certain degree of change, one needs to consider their viability and 
potential for an improvement within a real context. It is at what this thesis is 
aimed. I believe that by analysing currently existing theories that claim to be 
developed by theoretical integration, I will be able to shed more light on the 
process of integration itself. This will lead to the establishment of some new 
"prescriptions" that will not be exclusively based on the metatheoretical 
preferences of their inventors, but also on the findings from theoretical 
investigation. In my opinion, guidelines developed in such a maImer might prove 
to be more realistic and hence, more practically achievable. 
My analysis will be based partially on some propositions suggested in Neimeyer 
(1993) and Safran & Messer (1997). First, I accept that all psychotherapy 
theories have some kind of the underlying organisational structure. Yet, the 
structure that Neimeyer (1993) proposes is poorly defined and elaborated, and 
hence, in my analysis I need to use another model. Second, it seems inevitable 
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that some amount of congruence should exist between "deeper" levels of the 
organisational structures of theories to be progressively integrated. However, this 
notion demands a further clarification because we do not know what type and 
amount of congruence is really llltegratively fertile. Third, assimilative 
integration .seems to be a realistic approach to theoretical integration. However, 
we know nothing about the real nature of this specific assimilation and how its 
employment affects theory development. 
My analysis should shed more light on these Issues. However, this notion 
inevitably leads to the question: What type of analysis should be used for this 
purpose? In my opinion it is a comparative analysis based on the Ford & Urban 
(1998) Comprehensive Comparative Framework (CF). This framework provides 
both a method of comparative analysis and the model of the organisational 
structure of psychotherapy theories. CF is originally created for the purpose of 
comparatively analysing the families of psychotherapy, whereas I am going to 
use it to compare different psychotherapy theories that belong to the one 
psychotherapy family called integrative psychotherapies. Though CF will be 
extensively presented in the following chapter, I am going to provide here its 
basic description. 
The major function to be served by CF is to "provide a context within which the 
meanings of the concepts and propositions used in various models of 
psychotherapy can be identified and compared in tenns of the generic kinds and 
organization of phenomena they represent" (Ford & Urban, 1998; p.38). 
Concepts specifY pm1icular attlibutes of biological, psychological, behavioural 
and social phenomena, whereas propositions specifY the relationships, 
interactions and influences, which characterise the organisation of these 
phenomena. 
Consequently, though Ford and Urban acknowledge obvious differences among 
psychotherapies they propose that all psychotherapies can be eligible for 
comparative analysis guided by CF, because they all have the same structural 
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organisation whether or not this is made manifest. Hence, they all start with 
guiding assumptions which are representations of particular underlying 
metaphysics and epistemology. Moreover, their concepts and propositions are 
organised within specific conceptual and propositional models. The conceptual 
model specifies levels and units of analysis and provides a content of key 
concepts. The propositional model specifies the dynamics of the stability-
maintaining and change processes. It also provides assumptions about normal 
and abnormal development. Finally, the procedural model consists of assessment 
procedures and intervention strategies and methods. 
As can be seen this organisational structure of psychotherapies (guiding 
assumptions, conceptual model, propositional model and procedural model) is 
somewhat reminiscent of the Neimeyer's structural model in which all 
psychotherapy theories consist of meta theory, formal theory, clinical theory and 
strategies and procedures. However, as will be seen in the following chapter, CF 
is far more extensive in the description of what components guiding assumptions, 
conceptual, propositional and procedural models are made and how they are 
organised. Hence, in my opinion when the selected integrative theories are 
subjected to such an extensive organisational presentation it is possible to reveal 
their differences and similarities more easily. Therefore, the present aim is to use 
CF to find out what kind of guiding assumptions are characteristic of particular 
integrative theories. Moreover, by specifying their conceptual, propositional and 
procedural models I am expecting to fmd out what major commonalties and 
differences characterise these theories and at which level these differences or 
commonalities are greater. Apart from comparing these theories with one 
another, I am going to compare them with their original theories whose 
amalgamation created them. Hence, by detennining how particular 
metatheoretical, conceptual, propositional and procedural models of integrative 
theories are related to the same components of the original theories we can see at 
which level the assimilation process took place and which concepts and 
propositions were assimilated and/or accommodated. Furthennore, by comparing 
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the guiding assumptions of the original theories we can be more explicit about 
their compatibility and whether this congruence was critical for their integration. 
For this purpose given the limited scope of this thesis, only four integrative 
theories will be subjected to CF. They are taken from the list of theoretically 
integrated systems of psychotherapy proposed by Gold (1996). In my opinion 
they represent the most prominent examples of theoretical integration. Apart 
fi'om this very subjective selection criterion, theories were selected on the basis 
of their complexity; they represent amalgamation of at least three different 
theories. The theories are: cyclical psychodynamics (Wachtel, 1997), system-
process cognitive therapy (Guidano, 1991), pro(:ess-experiential psychotherapy 
(Greenberg, Rice & Elliot, 1993) and interpersonal-cognitive-experiential 
psychotherapy (Safran, 1990a; 1990b). From their brief descriptions provided in 
the previous chapter, it can be seen that the selection of the original theories they 
are based on, includes the most prominent current psychotherapy approaches 
(psychodynamic, behavioural, cognitive, experiential and family). Furthermore, 
all of them include some psychological theories as well. This inclusion, in my 
opinion, stems fi'om the recognition of the significance of what Neimeyer (1993) 
calls a necessary "cross-fertilization" between psychotherapy and psychology. 
All these characteristics of the selected theories make their comparative analysis 
more plausible for the purpose of clarification of the process of theoretical 
integration. However, before I proceed with this analysis, it is necessary to 
provide an extensive description ofCF. This will be done in the next chapter. 
Chapter 3. 
COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK 
3.1. Introduction 
The entire idea that comparative analysis of different psychotherapy theories is a 
possible and useful enterprise comes from a Ford & Urban's (1963; 1998) belief 
that the therapies "must share some similarities because they all deal with the 
same basic phenomena - the nature of humans' being and becoming in natural, 
designed, social, and cultural contexts" (Ford & Urban, 1998; p.ix). 
Consequently, though psychotherapies differ in their way of conceptualising and 
explaining these two phenomena they still serve the same purpose and as such 
need to have the same underlying structure. 
This notion is also characteristic of some other attempts at comparative analysis 
of psychotherapies. For instance, Prochaska & Norcross (1994) propose that all 
psychotherapy systems should include theory of personality "as it leads to its 
theory of psychopathology and culminates in its theory of therapeutic processes, 
therapeutic content and therapeutic relationship" (p.2). Furthennore, Orlinsky & 
Howard (1995) conceptualise "the generic model of psychotherapy" that is aimed 
at revealing the common underlying structure of the therapeutic process. This 
model distinguishes six aspects of the therapeutic process that are characteristic 
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of any approach of psychotherapy regardless of its theoretical basis. These facets 
are: the therapeutic contract, the therapeutic operations, the therapeutic bond, 
patient and therapist's self-relatedness, in-session' impacts and post-session 
impacts. TIl0ugh describing thoroughly these two comparative attempts is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, it can be easily seen that both of them support the 
existence of some kind of common underlying structure characteristic for all 
psychotherapeutic approaches. 
From the statement that the diversity of.psychotherapy approaches is only a 
surface chaTacteristic whilst the same organisation and purpose characterise 
different psychotherapy systems, stems a belief in the possibility of developing 
integrative global theories of normal and dysfunctional human development, of 
which Ford & Urban (1998) are very much in favour. This notion of creating 
some "grand" overarching theories has been rejected by many current theorists 
(Mahoney, 1993; Neimeyer, 1993; Safran & Messer, 1997) ranging from the 
statement that this is a premature task to the statement that this is completely 
impossible. However, Ford & Urban (1998) believe that the task is difficult but 
110t impossible. Although they made this explicit only at the very end of their 
recent book, in my opinion their entire work might be seen as an attempt at 
providing a springboard for future work in this area. 
Ford & Urban's endeavour started with a book Systems of psychotherapy: A 
comparative Study published in 1963. This book was aimed at providing lIa 
comparative study of several major systems of individual verbal psychotherapy 
by analysing each one in relation to a common set of issues, in order to reveal 
major areas of agreement and disagreement about these issues" (Ford & Urban, 
1963; p. 3). These common issues are also presented in the current comparative 
framework model (Ford & Urban, 1998) in terms of emphasising concepts, 
propositions and procedures as being at the core of any psychotherapy. 
However, a comparative analysis was not based on such an extensive 
comparative model as presented in Ford & Urban (1998). Moreover, the selected 
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therapies were not analysed in terms of their guiding assumptions (metaphysics 
and epistemology) and hence, not grouped in families of psychotherapies. That 
was done in the contemporary book. For cxample, instead of analysing a family 
of humanistic approaches Ford & Urban (1963) opted for single theories such as 
Rogerian client-centred therapy. Moreover, selected theories were chosen on the 
basis of their cunent popularity, rather than scientific credibility. These 
characteristics resulted from the "state of the art" in the field of psychotherapy at 
that time. However, this statement does not undermine at all the significance of 
this pioneering comparative attempt. 
Ford & Urban's (1998) cunent title represents an extensive and improved work 
that echoes an extraordinary development of psychotherapy during the last 35 
years. The authors emphasised the changes that occurred within this time 
fhllnework. First, an extensive diversity of psychotherapy characterises this era. 
It is usually cited in the literature that there are over 400 different 
psychotherapeutic approaches with many of them representing variants of the 
major approaches (Karasu, 1986). Furthermore, psychotherapy became a 
recognised and legitimate treatment that has been widely practised by many 
mental health professionals and used by large numbers of clients. Consequently, 
this has put much pressure on the health system because people have demanded 
equal access to services, which then in turn have produced problems with 
funding. 
Therefore, on the one hand diversification within the field of psychotherapy and 
on the other hand a growing demand for psychotherapy treatment with 
consequent funding problems have emphasised even more the need for validation 
of current approaches. According to Ford & Urban (1998) tIns can be done only 
through a clear and precise specification of "what needs to be changed, how it 
needs to be changed, which procedures can systematically effect those changes, 
and how one can detennine whether the desired outcomes have been attained" 
(p.xiv). In my opinion this is an exact description of what they are uncovering in 
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their book by submitting different families of psychotherapics to comparative 
analysis based on their comparative framework (CF). 
TIle book is divided into three sections including Section I that describes a 
comparative framework (CF), Section II that identifics and analyses families of 
psychotherapies, and Section III that offers an extensive presentation of 
differences and similarities among the families with their implications. The 
present chapter will be entirely based on Section I because it explains the model 
of comparative analysis that I am going to use. 
In the following sections, a concise presentation of CF will be offered in a way 
that follows the outline presented in Ford & Urban (1998). In the frrst part I will . 
provide some background information about the development of CF. The second 
part will comprise thorough descriptions of the content of the guiding 
assumptions that include ontology, cosmology, and epistemology in addition to a 
content description of the conceptual, propositional and procedural models. In 
the last part, a comparative analysis will be described with particular emphasis on 
the questions used in identifYing the guiding assumptions, conceptual, 
propositional and procedural models of the integrative theories in this thesis. 
3.2. Organisation of Comparative Framework (CF) 
3.2.1. The background 
The major problem of any comparative analysis of different psychotherapies is 
the difficulty of comparing systems of ideas that are presented using various 
conceptual and propositional languages. Though we can say that the common 
purpose of these different systems is the investigation of how humans develop, 
change and function, they use different terminology for that purpose. Hence, this 
makes it difficult to determine whether they are talking about different 
phenomena or are just using different terms for the same phenomena. 
Furthennore, the psychotherapeutic context itself is rich with variability. Indeed, 
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a psychotherapist is striving to understand the person who is intrinsically 
changing all the time as a result of the interplay ofthe enviromnental and internal 
variables. Therefore, the psychotherapist is trying to investigate and understand 
the constantly changing person within a constantly changing context. Ford and 
Urban (1998) claim that in order to overcome theoretical diversity and practical 
variability IIsome standard way is needed to represent the meanings underlying 
each theorist's terminology so that ideas can be compared" (p.l). This means that 
one needs some kind of a model that will lead this investigation and produce 
lUlderstanding. 
The rationale for the development of such a model, Ford and Urban (1998) find 
in the existence of our own evolutionary-developed and representation-based 
information processing system. What we usually do is ignore the complexity and 
wholeness of our internal and external worlds and develop models that are 
representations of some of their consistent patterns. In this way we create 
depictions of our multifaceted realities that guide our further thoughts and 
actions. It is necessary then for these models not to be rigid but modifiable by 
further experience. Indeed, our representations are flexible and dynamic models 
utilised in various situations. 
There are four major types of models that are used constantly in everyday life for 
personal, social and professional purposes. These include iconic models, 
analogue models, symbolic models and mixed models. Each of these has its own 
characteristics in terms of the way of presenting reality. For example, iconic 
models are most specific and concrete because they look like the objects they 
represent but they are often larger or smaller than the real objects. Analogue 
models are more complex because they use one set of properties to represent 
propelties of the actual object by using specific transfonnation rules, as it is in 
maps and graphs for example. In contrast to iconic models they can be used to 
represent dynamic processes but in order to understand the meaning of analogue 
models one needs to lmow transformation rules. 
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Symbolic models differ from the two previously mentioned in tenns of using 
intrinsically meaningless symbols to represent objects, ideas or events. 
Consequently there is no similarity between the representations and what they 
represent as in the case of verbal description or mathematical fonnulae, for 
example. As in analogue models, transfonnation rules are necessary and 
interpreters need to be familiar with them. Symbolic models are widely used by 
scientists and professionals. However, as is well known neither type of models is 
sufficient to represent large and complex amounts of information. Therefore, 
models are mostly combined and they become mixed models. This facilitates 
communication and explanatory power. 
Models can range fi.·om micromodels of specific phenomena up to the most 
inclusive models called metamodels. As Ford & Urban (1998) point out "The 
greater the number, variety and organisational complexity of the phenomena or 
ideas a model encompasses, the more inclusive and removed it becomes from 
actual experience 'l (p.8). Models are linked to each other in hierarchical patterns 
with micro-models being at the bottom and mid-range models preceding macro-
models. On the top of this hierarchy there is a metamodel that is overarching. 
Consequently micromodels represent the basic components of more inclusive 
models. 
Each level of models requires analytic units appropriate to that level. For 
example, biologists study cells whereas sociologists investigate social institutions 
and these are the respective units of their analysis. Basically, each discipline has 
its own units of analysis and can be situated on a different level of model 
representation. Within psychotherapy for example, psychotherapists are mostly 
interested in the mid-range models, i.e. particular persons and this represents 
their unit of analysis. By being trained in a particular approach they might be 
biased to emphasise specific aspects of persons (e.g. thoughts, behaviour, 
interpersonal relations) but because practice demands them to be synthesisers, 
they cannot neglect other levels. For example, depressive symptomatology can 
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be caused by disturbances at different levels; the procedural model used to 
successfully treat the symptoms will vary depending whether depression is a 
result of a brain tumour (the biological organ level) or social rejection (the social 
level). However, in most cases these levels interact with each other and provide 
more complex explanation. 
As can be seen, models are essential for understanding phenomena. Therefore, 
understanding hmnan nature, that is the major objective of psychotherapy, 
requires the development of models. Ford and Urban propose that all 
psychotherapeutic approaches include some (at least implicit) metatheoretical, 
conceptual, propositional and procedural models that guide clinicians' work. 
However, in order to comparatively analyse psychotherapy models, one needs to 
create a comparative frame that will be capable of comparing the underlying 
meanings of their specific tenninologies. 
In order to construct this comparative model Ford & Urban reached for the 
specific type of analysis called requirement analysis that originates from design 
and engineering flelds. TIley regarded it useful for setting up the criteria that the 
comparative framework should meet. 
In requirement analysis, criteria for the product are identified by determining in 
advance 1) what are the functions that the product should serve, 2) what are the 
particular characteristics that the product needs to have in order to serve this 
particular purpose and fmally 3) what are the constraints it should meet. For 
example, a designer working in the truck industry should know in advance what 
purpose the truck has to serve (e.g. transport of furniture) and according to that 
he will detennine what attributes it should have (e.g. the dimensions and the 
outlook of the transpOli space) and what constraints it should meet (e.g. 
transcontinental trips). 
A similar requirement analysis is used in the process of creation of CF. First, 
Ford and Urban define two major purposes that CF should serve and then they 
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move onto describing particular characteristics that it needs to have in order to 
serve these purposes. 
CF needs to serve two purposes: 1) comparing theories of psychotherapy and 2) 
linking psychotherapy theory and human science theory. 
In terms of comparing different psychotherapies CF needs to provide "context 
within which the meanings of the concept and propositions used in various 
models of psychotherapy can be identified and compared in terms of the generic 
kinds and organisation of phenomena they represent" (p.38). In the following 
section the definitions of the terms concepts and propositions will be highlighted 
because they are seen as key components of all psychotherapies. 
Concepts represent the "what" of a model, Le. what particular entities of human 
complexity are specifically emphasised in the particular model. Given that all 
psychotherapies deal with humans, these concepts represent particular 
phenomena that are broadly labelled as biological, psychological, behavioural 
and social. Psychotherapies highlight different aspects of these phenomena and 
name them differently but nevertheless it is these core and mutual phenomena 
that all psychotherapy approaches strive to explain by proposing their specific 
concepts. 
Propositions specifY "the how or dynamics of a model" by defming the kinds of 
relationships and interactions that are important for the organisation of 
phenomena specified by the theory's concepts. The most important propositions 
are about how humans change and especially the circumstances when they do not 
change. Indeed, the explanations of the stability of their dysfunctional patte111s 
provide the rationale for the design and use of psychotherapy methods. 
Therefore, concepts and propositions should be organised in such a way as to 
provide a solid basis for creating a procedural model of the particular 
psychotherapy. By having a procedural model defined, a therapist should be able 
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to understand each client's current states. Moreover, he/she will be equipped with 
strategies and methods that would allow desirable changes to be made. 
The second purpose of CF is linking psychotherapy theory and human science 
theory. It is very important that psychotherapy concepts, propositions and data 
relate with those relevant in human sciences and vice versa. Psychotherapy 
CaIUlot be seen as an independent enterprise but rather it needs to encompass the 
findings from various human sciences that investigate the phenomena that 
psychotherapies try to change. Indeed, as will be seen in further sections, CF is 
structured by using many propositions that come from other hUlnan sciences such 
as psychology, sociology etc. 
The previous sections presented the purposes of CF. The next step to be taken is 
the identification of the characteristics of psychotherapies that need to be 
encompassed by CF. Ford and Urban (1998) propose five issues: 
1. Psychotherapies may differ in their guiding metaphysical and 
epistemological assumptions. 
2. They may differ in using different level of analysis. 
3. They may use diverse units of analysis. 
4. Their conceptual models may differ 111 terms of emphasising 
different aspect of humans. 
5. Their propositional models may include both stability-maintaining 
and change-inducing dynamics. 
In my opinion the diversity of the procedural models of different psychotherapy 
approaches should be added to this list. This is a very important issue that needs 
to be addressed in CF. 
In the following sections each of these issues will be thoroughly discussed. 
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3.2.2. Guiding assumptions 
Psychotherapy models might be regarded as models that strive to explain the 
complexity of human nature, its development and the dynamics of its change. 
Ford and Urban propose that all these models are organised around some 
metatheories that provide a theoretical framework within which conceptual, 
propositional and procedural models are developed. These metatheories include 
metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. According to Ford & Urban by 
identifYing these mostly implicit guiding assumptions it is possible to classifY the 
entire number of cunent psychotherapeutic approaches into several families of 
psychotherapy. Before I carry on with presenting this specific classification it is 
necessary to provide a brief overview of different philosophical paradigms that 
guiding assumptions consist of. 
There are two major philosophical questions. The first question "what is reality" 
represents the metaphysical problem that two disciplines, ontology and 
cosmology, are concerned with. Ontology is aimed at revealing what is reality 
made of, whereas cosmology is concerned with how it is organised. The second 
question "how do humans lmow reality and construct lmowledge" represents the 
maj or obj ective of epistemology. 
According to Ford and Urban the way each ofthese questions has been answered 
specifically affects and constrains particular models of every theory. For 
example, "key components of every theory are its concepts, which specifY the 
phenomena it seeks to explain" (p.l3) and the selection of the concepts might be 
affected by the ontological question "What is the substance of reality and of 
humans?". 111erefore, if one assumes that everything is made of the same 
substance, the resulting concepts will be different than if one assumes that there 
are two land of substances such as body and mind. In conclusion, a theory's 
conceptual model is affected by its ontological assumptions. 
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Furthermore, all theories have propositional models that determine how 
particular concepts are organised and function. However, the selection of 
propositions is guided by the cosmological question: "How is the world 
organised and how does it operate and change?". So, inevitably, a theory's 
propositional model will be shaped by underlying cosmological assumptions. 
However, ontological and cosmological assumptions are tightly related to 
epistemological ones. When the theory is concemed with humans and their 
relationship with the world, ontological and cosmological assumptions are not 
sufficient because one needs to find how humans apprehend and understand that 
reality. Therefore, a theory's guiding epistemological assmnptions are manifested 
in its procedural models. 
In the following passages each of these particular philosophical problems will be 
explained with the presentation of various views that are striving to answer these 
questions in particular ways. 
First, I shall consider various ontological assumptions about the nature of reality. 
The view that many people hold, where the world is seen as made up of two 
different phenomena: material (e.g. things that can be sensed) andnomnaterial 
(e.g. emotions, thoughts, perceptions), is called the common-sense view. This is 
the view that the psychotherapist will most fi'equently encounter working in 
everyday practice. Moreover, many philosophers hold this view to be true, 
though it is fonnally called dualism. The dualist approach is aimed at explaining 
how these two different essences, a body and a mind, that we are made of, relate 
to each other. There are three different forms of dualism that specifically explain 
the relationship between body and mind. Psychophysical parallelism proposes 
that body and mind do not relate but rather coexist in different streams with their 
own rules and conceptions. By contrast, psychophysical interactionism argues 
that mind and body are interrelated and they profoundly influence each other. 
The third view, called epiphenomenism, is the most radical claiming that mental 
phenomena do exist but they are just by-products of the body's functioning and 
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therefore non-influential as to how the person acts. The world is seen as 
governed by physical laws and umnaterial phenomena do not affect it. 
On the other hand, there are some scholars that claim that the world is made up 
of only one substance. Depending whether this substance is material or 
immaterial, there are two major views: materialism and idealism. The 
materialistic view is based on the assumptions that reality consists exclusively of 
matter and that all things and events can be reduced to the basic particles of· 
physics and hence, can be explained by physical laws. Consequently, mind itself 
is reducible to the nervous system's particles and can be explained by 
biochemical and electrical neuronal process. This specific view within the 
materialistic fi'amework is called reductive materialism. However, some scholars 
aclmowledge the specific existence of living entities and assume that additional 
laws arc essential for understanding living things. This view is called biological 
determinism. 
Idealism, by contrast, claims that human experience is the major essence of the 
world. Consequently, reality does not exist in materialistic tenns but only as an 
idea created by humans. The most recent view that is emerging among all of 
these extreme views is double aspect monism which aclmowledges the existence 
of immatelial-material but sees them as different manifestations of one 
underlying phenomenon. 
Ontological views are related to cosmological assumptions that include ideas 
about the organisation of reality in terms of its stability and change. Again, we 
start here with the common-sense view in which things are seen to happen 
because something was done or happened to produce the event or the change. 
This is, sometimes, called generative causality where the cause is anything that 
influences what happens or produces a result, whereas an effect is the outcome 
that follows the occunence of a cause. Anything that can be explained in such 
Hcause-effectH marmer is regarded as valuable lmowledge because its use might 
predict and control events. 
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Philosophers added to this simplistic approach some sophisticated ideas that, 
together with the notion of cause-effect, constitute determinism. There are two 
organisational properties, temporal contiguity or sequence and regularity or 
contingency. Temporal contiguity means a characteristic temporal patterns of 
events; events might happen simultaneously or they might precede or follow each 
other. On the other hand, regularity or contingency establishes the regular 
temporal pattern of these events, emphasising the recurrence of the same event 
pattern across different occasions. Therefore, if one event occurs first and another 
always follows, the first event is than regarded as the cause of another. The first 
event is regarded as a necessary and sufficient condition for another to occur. 
Beside this simple causality, there are also multiple causality models in which it 
is assumed that a causal event needs to be present but the effect will not happen 
without other conditions being satisfied. Given this assumption, a single cause is 
not sufficient but it is necessary for the effect to occur. The explanation of 
multicausality started with Aristotle's work centuries ago. He proposed that for 
an efficient analysis of what causes an effect, one needs to consider mUltiple 
types of causes including the material cause, the efficient cause, the formal cause, 
the final cause and the incidental cause. The material cause means the substance 
of which thing or event is made, whereas the efficient cause represents the agents 
that produced any change in the thing. The fonnal cause is determined by the 
specific organisation or configuration that the thing is supposed to assume, 
whereas the final cause presents the purpose that will be served by the proposed 
change. Finally, chance might always occur and influence the effect and, 
therefore, there is a possibility of the presence of an incidental cause. 
There are different cosmological views regarding which of these causes IS 
emphasised. For example, jormis111, assumes that the objects themselves have 
stable properties that detennine their functioning and hence this approach 
emphasises the material cause. Mechanism, however, relates different 
phenomena into cause-effect relationships and therefore combines the ideas of 
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material and efficient causes. Contextualism emphasises formal cause, proposing 
that events and contexts occur in an integrated fashion at each point of time. 
Organicism emphasises final causality by stating that living entities are 
constructed in tenns of progressing in the direction of increased complexity and 
transfOlmation. 
Furthermore, Ford and Urban (1998) cited Delprato's (1995 in Ford and Urban, 
1998) summary of the evolution of ideas about causality and organisation of the 
world in science. The first view, called substance theory, assumes that events 
happen because of having intrinsic powers and properties. The second view, 
called the mechanical view, emphasises the substances as well, but describes 
their relationships in terms of attractive and repulsive forces. A current view, 
originating frOln modem physics, is called the field theory, where events are seen 
as happening as a function of the nature and the organisation of all conditions in 
which they are embedded. The most recent view is the theory of self-organising 
systems. This will be thoroughly explained in a later section together with other 
models based on previously mentioned cosmological views. Importantly, each 
psychotherapy model is primarily based on one of these cosmological views. 
The mechanistic model emphasises the simple linear cause-effect relationship. 
This view has been dominant in science and everyday life. Complexities are seen 
as being organised of different simple properties that relate with each other by 
simple casual relationships. By revealing these simple relationships one can 
uncover the entire nature of the complexity. In this way it is possible to construct 
systems in which behaviours will be easily detennined and predictable by 
specific input information. 
On the other hand contextual models are closer to the reality of human affairs. 
These assume that the world is composed of a continuously changing 
combination of object arrangements and temporal events, none of which can ever 
occur again. Every event is a result of a unique combination of occurrences in its 
immediate context. When this is applied to human affairs we can make context-
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free generalisations very infrequently and hence people's functioning can be 
explained in terms ofperson-in-context modeL 
The organismic model opposes the application of mechanistic models to living 
systems stating that living systems are developed through differentiation of the 
already existing whole organism. Hence, the whole is not constructed from the 
linear sum of the parts as mechanistic models propose. The parts are rather 
constructed from the whole. Moreover, the change does not occur in a simple 
linear fashion, but rather in discontinuous pattems that lead to the final stage of 
maturity. 
Finally, new ideas of causality are emerging based on the advances in the natural 
sciences such as quantum theory, non-linear thermodynamics, chaos theory and 
complex dynamic systems. Here, the humans are seen as open systems that 
require constant exchange with their internal and external contexts. Moreover, in 
terms of change and stability, humans, as complex dynamic systems that 
continually create and recreate their organisation, are aiming at establishing 
equilibrium. Therefore, instead of labelling humans as passive recipients of 
envirolUl1ental influences, interactional and transactional relationships are 
emphasised. 
Furthermore, there is a proposition of so called mutual causality, which means 
that a change in any part of a dynamic system will be a function of the dynamic 
organisation of the whole system. In this view the final cause of human 
behaviour can be seen as the manifestation of the operation of the system 
dynamics. Development occurs through differentiation and elaboration of 
wholes, which is similar to organismic models. However, unlike these models, 
envirolUl1ental influences are essential for change to occur. On the other hand, 
dynamic systems are not seen as passive recipients of environmental influences 
but active mediators and modellers of the change processes at;ld their outcomes. 
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In the fInal section I shall discuss the third philosophical discipline which ideas, 
also, are part of the metatheoretical assumptions of psychotherapies. This is 
epistemology that deals with the nature of human knowledge and experience. 
Apali fi.-om knowledge alld experience, epistemology deals also with reality 
which is seen as a specific quality of things alld events that exist or occur within 
or outside of the human body, but are also independent of people's experiences 
alld Imowledge. 
In general, there are three epistemologies that differ in terms of their explanation 
of the relationship between lmowledge, experience and reality. They are called 
intuitionism, rationalism, and empiricism. 
Intuitionism is a common-sense epistemology. Knowledge is seen as a mental 
construction, but the link between this and experience is not lmown. People differ 
in how much they emphasise the significallce of intuition, though in everyday life 
the majority operate on all intuitive understanding of themselves and others. 
Rationalism emphasises the power of hum all reasoning and limits the influence 
of experience on human lmowledge. Consequently, only through adequate 
thinking based on the strictly prescribed rules of logic, can people reach valuable 
knowledge. 
On the contral'Y, empiricism assumes that reality is completely independent of 
hUmall'S experience and as such can be scientifically explained by methodologies 
of natural sciences. There are two most prominent versions including realism or 
presentationism and representationism or constructivism. Realism or 
presentationism assumes that reality exists independently and that it can be 
objectively analysed because our perceptions directly and accurately correspond 
with reality. On the other halld, constructivism aclmowledges experience as a 
source of knowledge, but also emphasises some shortcomings mostly based on 
the limitations of our sensory-perceptual system. Representationism combines 
realism and idealism, arguing that lmowledge is constructed by mental processes 
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that utilise but go beyond the· fruits of direct expenence. TIlese mental 
constructions then in tum constrain and shape future experiences. 
3.2.3.FamiJies of psychotherapies and their guiding 
assumptions 
Ford and Urban assume that all the theories arc based on some of the previously 
described metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. However, theories 
differ from each other in term of emphasising different ontological, cosmological 
and epistemological assumptions. Based on this proposition Ford and Urban 
cluster over 400 approaches in the following families of psychotherapy: 
behaviour therapies, cognitive therapies, cognitive-behaviour and skill-training 
therapies, behavioural medicinelhealth therapies, humanist therapies, traditional 
psychoanalysis, interpersonal and sociocultural therapies and, finally, eclectic 
and intcgrative therapies. 
Until Ford and Urban's comparative analysis, there had been a consensus 
grouping of current psychotherapies that was not based on a clear rationale. 
However, Ford and Urban propose that their groupings are based on the 
similarities in psychotherapies' metatheoretical assumptions though they are 
aware that development of individual psychotherapy theories is not a linear 
process independent of its context and the influence of people that perform that 
type of psychotherapy. Consequently, theories of psychotherapy evolve, starting 
with some guiding assumptions that may be changed later on and so reinforce 
development of different variations of the original theory. However, in this 
comparative analysis Ford & Urban deal with the original framework on which 
the particular theory was initially based on. 
BEHAVIOUR THERAPIES 
In tenns of ontology, behaviour therapies are based on materialism because they 
propose that the person, seen as action-performed in relationship to the 
environment, is the focus of investigation and emotions or any other so called 
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mentalistic phenomena are seen as the result of specific physiological processes. 
Mental phenomena do not exist as such because they are by-products of 
biological processes. Causality is also seen as simple cause-effect process and 
hence, a mechanistic cosmological view characterises this system of 
psychotherapy. People's behaviour can be explained by employing empirical 
research based on objective observations. 111erefore, in terms of epistemology 
this is empirical epistemology with a realist (presentationist) emphasis. 
COGNITIVE THERAPIES 
Contrary to behaviour therapies, cognitive therapies consider thoughts (mental 
phenomena) major factors in people's actions. Because thoughts are seen as the 
cause, the ontology that cognitive therapies are based on is idealism. However, in 
terms of cosmology and epistemology, cognitive therapies do not differ from 
behaviour therapies. Because they strive to explain simple linear cause-effect 
relationships, their cosmology is mechanistic. In terms of epistemology, 
empirical research is emphasised but in this case an objective analysis of 
people's self-reports is the major way of understanding individuals. As can be 
seen, this is again realist (presentationist) epistemology with the addition of the 
representationist (constructionist) version. 
COGNITIVE-BEHAVIOUR AND SKILL TRAINING THERAPIES 
For this family of psychotherapies the guiding assumptions of behaviour and 
cognitive therapies are combined. Thoughts, actions and enviromnent are all 
related and therefore this represents dualist view of psychophysical 
interactionism. In terms of cosmology and epistemology it is identical with 
cognitive therapies. 
BEHAVIOURAL MEDICINE/HEALTH THERAPIES 
This family has guiding assumptions almost identical to the previous ones. The 
only difference is that biological components are more emphasised and that 
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causality is not seen in tenus of a simple linear relationship but rather stemming 
from reciprocal relationships. 
HUMANIST THERAPIES 
The major proposition of this family of psychotherapies is that humans are 
unique entities and as such they need to be understood and treated distinctly. 
They are different because of their capacity for self-awareness and self-
knowledge and also because of their complex phenomenology and specific 
values and meanings. All of these attributes make them proactive, not just 
reactive entities. This view represents an idealistic ontology. Such a view leads 
then to humanistic therapies proposing organistic cosmology where development 
of human unique entities is through differentiation and elaboration of experience 
toward full personal realisation. In· terms of epistemology, rationalism and 
inhlitionism are emphasised because what really matters is the person's 
subjective view rather than whether it is objective or not. The person's 
subjectivity is the focus of this therapy. 
TRADITIONAL PSYCHOANALYSIS 
Traditional psychoanalysis founded by Sigmund Freud is characterised by 
idealist ontology. Though Freud acknowledged the significance of biological and 
environmental factors the major focus of intervention was seen as cognitive 
processes and hence it was idealist ontology. Like humanistic therapies 
psychoanalytic cosmology is based on an organistic model. Epistemology was 
empiricism with presentationist and representationist characteristics. 
INTERPERSONAL AND SOCIOCULTURAL THERAPIES· 
Interpersonal psychotherapies Oliginated from traditional psychoanalysis (e.g. 
object-relation or self-psychology). Moreover, there has been a development of 
feminist and subculturally oriented therapies. The major commonality among 
such vruied approaches is an emphasis on exploration of the "person in context". 
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According to these therapies, persons are characterised by specific interpersonal 
relationships, which are embedded in specific sociocultural contexts. As can be 
seen this is an interactive dualist view but with an emphasis on a mental ~r 
idealist component. In terms of cosmology, humans are seen as self-organising 
open systems where "a person's psychological patterns are described as dynamic 
and subject to continual change and elaboration. One's lifelong interpersonal and 
. psychosocial embeddeness continually produces transactions that can either help 
to stabilise these patterns or prompt them to change" (p.32). In tenns of 
epistemology, the authors differ . 
. ECLECTIC AND INTEGRATIVE THERAPIES 
In these psychotherapies, as in the previous ones, people are· seen as 
biopsychosocial entities continually engaged in relationships with their 
environment. This is psychophysical interactionism or a double aspect monism. 
In terms of cosmology it is a self-organising open system with some mechanistic 
components. Epistemology is pluralistic and valuable lmowledge can be obtained 
from any source. 
In conclusion, by grouping psychotherapies in families on the basis of their 
mutual guiding assumptions, Ford & Urban showed that psychotherapies differ 
from each other in terms of accepted metaphysical and epistemological 
assumptions. Moreover, they emphasise a link between guiding assumptions and 
models of particular psychotherapy. Indeed, they state that ontology influences 
what concepts will be proposed in the conceptual model, cosmology affects the 
explanation of stability and change processes that are described in propositional 
model whereas epistemology directs what procedures and techniques will be 
used in order to accomplish a desirable change in a client. Though Ford & Urban 
propose a unidirectional relationship between guiding assumptions and models, it 
seems that the way of revealing metaphysical and epistemological assumptions 
goes in the opposite direction. Guiding assumptions are not explicitly stated and 
only through analysing conceptual, propositional and procedural models can one 
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assume on what metaphysics and epistemology a psychotherapy approach is 
based. CF needs to recognise and name all diverse guiding assumptions that 
psychotherapies can have built-in. 
3.2.4.Leve/s of analysis 
According to Ford and Urban the person-in-context needs to be the primary level 
of analysis or unit of reference to which therapy theories are anchored. It is 
inescapably a person living in a particular milieu that psychotherapists deal with 
in practice. This is reflected in the process of psychotherapy itself. When clients 
come to the therapist they usually complain about a specific problem such as 
being anxious or depressed or experiencing problems in their marriage. However, 
they also talk about the context in which these problems take place adding a new 
dimension to their personal experience. They also strive to explain what led them 
to behave in a particular way and they might fear consequences that their 
problems may create for significant others and themselves. As can be seen not 
only that person-in-context needs to be a primary level of analysis but also any 
effective psychotherapy requires attending to at least two other levels of analysis, 
namely, a) structural and functional subsystems of the person (e.g. the nervous 
system, cognition, emotions, actions etc.) and b) environment itself: Therefore, 
CF should encompass at least three levels of analysis. 
The human system comprises structural and functional subsystems existing on 
different levels, such as the biological, psychological and behavioural. Though 
humans function as compact wholes (the principle of unitary functioning), they 
cannot be fully understood without explaining the structural and functional 
subsystems whose synchronous interaction and dynamics produce that unitary 
functioning. Therefore, CF needs to include a level of analysis one step below the 
person-in-context including all the parts of humans that psychotherapy theories 
and the human sciences emphasise. 
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On the other hand, human existence is inseparably linked to the environment. 
Continuous interactions with the environment are integral to survival. They also 
serve as facilitators of and constraints on human behaviour. Consequently, it is 
important to look at the nature of the relationship between people and 
enviromnent. 
There are two basic explanations of how behaviour and enviromnent are related. 
The Aristotelian view proposes that behaviour results from the properties of 
persons only, with the environment having no effect. The Galilean explanation, 
however, claims that properties of the persons are not sufficient for behaviour to 
occur and hence, environmental influences are necessary because behaviour 
results :fl.-om its interactions with its context. In their everyday life people use 
both explanations. For example, they might solely blame themselves for 
something bad that happened or they might search only for the "faults" in their 
contexts. They use different explanations for different situations and they also 
generalise behaviour patterns across different settings. Consequently, CF needs 
to encompass both of these views. 
FUlihermore, the nature of person-environment interactions needs to be explored. 
There are four types of person-environment interactions. The first is labelled 
action type. It views people as agents of actions imposed on their environment. 
However, the action-reaction view ac1mowledges the consequences of people's 
actions and provides a more elaborate version of the action view. The more 
sophisticated interactional view proposes that people interact with their context. 
Depending on whether behaviour is seen as controlled by the enviromnent 
(mechanistic model) or controlled by people in order to achieve a particular goal, 
one can talk about mechanistic (robot) model or pilot model. However, neither of 
these views fully captures the real dynamics of the phenomena. Therefore, Ford 
& Urban favour the 1110St complex view, the transactional. Here, people do not 
only interact with their context; they are also part of that context. Consequently, 
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both people and context are changed by influences coming from each other. This 
is sometimes called circular or mutual causality. 
In conclusion, psychotherapies can be concentrated on different levels of analysis 
and consequently emphasise different aspects of these levels. Because of that, CF 
that claims to be a tool of comparative analysis of such diverse psychotherapies 
"must represent individuals as integrated units, composed of dynamic 
organizations of structural and functional components, and embedded in and in 
continual transaction with changing environments that themselves are complex, 
dynamic organisations of components" (p.44). 
3.2.5. Units of analysis 
Human functioning is seen as a flowing stream always changing, always moving. 
However, for the purposes of scientific exploration it needs to be divided into 
particular chunks that we can call units of analysis. It needs to be emphasised, 
however, that trthe units chosen ... constrain what we can learn about the stream 
of life; different units represent different ways of viewing that stream of events II 
(p.52). 
Units of analysis are organised patterns and depending on the level of analysis 
they belong to, they might be less or more well-understood. For example, the 
organisation of biological aspects of humans is well-understood, whereas the 
organisation of their psychological and behavioural aspects involving a higher 
level of complexity is not so fully understood. Units of analysis on these levels 
differ very much in the kinds, amount and organisation of behaviour 
encompassed in them. They can range from simple organisations to large, 
extensive units such as reflex, schema, or panic attack. Therefore, they can differ 
. qualitatively and quantitatively from each other. In addition to these 
characteristics, units of analysis can be described in terms of their temporal and 
complexity characteristics. In order to grasp such a complexity of units of 
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analysis, CF needs to accommodate their all qualitative, quantitative, temporal 
and complexity differences. 
3.2.6. Conceptual model 
In tenns of conceptual models psychotherapies can differ in which concepts they 
emphasise simply because of their different focuses on particular aspects of 
humans. Human complexity made scientists develop categorisations useful for 
representing the generic characteristics of humans. Ford and Urban propose that 
there is a broad consensus about such categories. These categories are labelled as 
biological, psychological-behavioural and environmental. Ford & Urban claim 
that CF needs to encompass all of these categories that are inseparable parts of 
human existence. They also propose for each of these categories some basic 
characteristics that will be explained in further sections. 
Biology sees the human body as an embedded hierarchy of biological structures 
that are classified and systematised by a universally accepted taxonomy. 
Therefore, cells are organised into tissues and organs, which are then organised 
in organ systems. Consequently, humans can be viewed as organisations of organ 
systems. Structural changes and anomalies might change the entire person and 
this might have an enonnous influence on psychological and behavioural 
functioning of the person. However, only some psychotherapy models 
encompass this biological subsystem level. Most of them are usually 
concentrated on the other two levels, the psychological-behavioural and the 
environmentaL 
There are many categories used to explain the psychological and behavioural 
functioning of persons. Unlike the biological level, there is no widely accepted 
classification system of these human characteristics. For this reason, Ford and 
Urban propose a model they claim to be over-inclusive and complete. Here, 
humans are seen as complex infonnation-processing agents that acquire 
information about their intrapersonal and person-context interactions by selective 
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sensory-perceptual proccsses. Then they create representations of these many 
types of interaction. Moreover, persons are capable of other cognitive processes 
such as self-appraisal, retrospective remembering and prospective foresight. 
People also are guided by motivational processes while staying conscious and 
aware and directing their attention selectively. In this system people develop 
their personal beliefs, lmowledge and skills by pursuing particular goals within 
their personal value systems. Moreover, qualitatively different states such as 
fatigue, pain and emotions influence the flow of their behaviour which is 
pelfonned by motoric and communicative actions. 
However, humans can only function in a particular milieu. Therefore, these 
contexts need to be also understood as dynamic systems of the elements of which 
they consist. There are four recognised broad categories of environment. There 
are natural and designed environments depending whether they are created by 
human hands or not. In tenns of the extent and content of the person-
enviromnent relationship, environments can be labelled as interpersonal and 
socioculturaL Interpersonal context refers to the situations in which direct 
interactions among people are presented such as in case of families, friends and 
workmates. Sociocultural environments, however, refer to the different fonns of 
enviromnent that are designed to facilitate social group living. They are 
manifested in cultural forms such as education, religion, languages etc. They also 
create cultural differences among people and hence, need to be taken into 
consideration in psychotherapy. 
In order to integrate all three major aspects of humans Ford & Urban develop a 
model called the Living Systems Framework (LSF). It extensively explains all 
biological, psychological-behavioural and environmental features of humans that 
Ford & Urban regard as important. Furthermore, according to this model persons 
represent complex living systems that are capable of performing two essential 
types of actions: self-organising and self-constructing. Self-organising actions 
involve creating and maintaining "relatively stable patterns of organization both 
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within themselves and between themselves and their concepts If and also restoring 
!!these pattems when they are disrupted" (p.71). Self-constructing processes are 
presented in the growth and the development of humans as biological systems 
and in the development of humans as psychosocial and behavioural persons. It is 
important to emphasise that self-organising and self-constructing processes are 
intertwined and their interaction keeps the organism alive and well-adjusted. 
TIle LSF is organised around three major components called the biological 
person (life maintaining processes), the psychological person 
(information/meaning-based govemance and self-consbuction) and the 
behavioural person (person-environment transactional functions). It is proposed 
that all of these processes are continually and simultaneously occurring, creating 
the unitary coherent functioning of the organism. An extensive description of all 
tlu'ee major components exceeds the scope of this simplified CF presentation. 
Hence, I will outline only basic propositions. 
The biological level includes the structural and functional organisations of the 
human body. According to the widely accepted taxonomy, the human body is 
seen as organised in a hierarchical order with cells representing basic units. They 
are theil, because of their structural and functional differentiation and 
specialisation, combined into the paliicular types of tissues. Tissues build the 
organs, which al'e organised into organ systems (e.g. nervous system, 
cardiovasculal' system) that serve specific functions, This functional 
diversification of organ systems is essential for the integrative physiological 
functioning of the organism. 
Ford & Urball emphasise the interactional relationship between biological and 
psychological functioning that should be especially acknowledged by 
psychotherapists. Each person functions as all integrated unit in context. His/her 
psychological dysfunctioning can be caused by biological problems. Moreover, 
somatic complaints such as headaches for instance, can be reflection of 
psychological disturbance. The CUlTent extensive empirical research shows that 
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these two instances of human functioning are undoubtedly interrelated. 
Consequently, biological and psychological problems should not be considered 
independently of each other. 
The components of the psychological person include two broad groupings: 
arousal functions and cognitive functions. Arousal functions are presented in 
three forms: activity arousal, consciousness-attention arousal, and emotional 
arousal. These three types of arousal functioning serve the common purpose of 
keeping the person alert and active and also reactive toward changes in hislher 
intenlal and external worlds. Cognitive :functions represent infonnationimeaning-
based processes that include following functions: directive functions, control 
functions, regulatory functions, information processing functions and 
remembering. Diverse terms are used for the first three functions. For instance, 
concepts such as needs, purposiveness, goal setting refer to the directive function 
of cognition. Furthermore, thinking, decision-making, problem solving are terms 
that denote to the control functions. Concepts such as personal values, attitudes, 
self-efficacy represent the regulatory function of cognition. Infonnation 
processing and remembering are the cognitive functions that unite these previous 
three into a cohercnt system of cognitive functioning. 
The behavioural person is the third main component of the LSF model. It 
reflects Ford & Urban's view that hmnans are open systems and hence, "their 
existence, capacity to change and develop, and ability to function effectively all 
require continual exchanges of matter, energy, infonnation, and meanings with 
their environments II (p.107). There are two types of behaviour that can help 
people to influence and be influenced by their contexts. They are physical actions 
and communicative actions. Both of these actions affect biological and 
psychological functioning. In this way a continual exchange with environment is 
manifested through a1l three major components of the LSF model. 
In conclusion, within the context of psychotherapeutic practical work these 
biological, psychological-behavioural and environmental components cannot be 
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analysed separately from each other, because they operate as a team to produce 
unitary functioning. Therefore, in their everyday work, psychotherapists are 
always confronted with such a great diversity of phenomena that their work is 
multidisciplinary . 
3.2. 7. Propositional model 
In terms of propositional models Ford & Urban claim that all psychotherapies 
need to explain two basic phenomena: stabllity and change. Indeed, this is in line 
with their statement that "Humans must be understood as continuous and 
ongoing processes, as an existence rather than something fixed and static, as an 
essence, not just as an instance of being but as also engaged in a process of 
becoming something other than what they already are" (p.49). 
1l10ugh psychotherapists in their work might emphasise 'specific aspects of the 
clients (because of the specific school to which they belong), they need to be 
aware of the previously mentioned principle of unitary functioning. This 
principle is based on the assumption that any change in any part of a person may 
also prompt changes in other parts. Hence, though change might happen just in a 
one segment, the entire person might be affected by it. 
Unitary functioning can only be achieved through synchronous interrelationships 
between different specialised parts that characterise the person-in-context. Such 
synchronicity is determined by the two processes of change and stability. 
According to Ford & Urban, dialectics between change and stability is the 
essence of human functioning. Processes of change result from the constant 
exposure of humans to the changing influences of internal and external contexts. 
In order to survive organisms must adapt and change. On the other hand, our own 
consciousness about the uniqueness of our existence requires stability. 
Consequently both processes are essential and hence, psychotherapy theories 
need to account for "dynamics that produce stable, unitary pattems of functioning 
and simultaneously pennit and produce variability and change" (p.49). 
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Stability-maintaining processes mostly involve negative feedback processes that 
produce steady states by reducing discrepancies between current and desired or 
anticipated states. This disparity reduction through the negative feedback 
processes is presented at all three levels of functioning: the biological,. 
psychological and behaviouraL However, if only these processes were presented 
to protect homeostasis, humans would be unable to change and hence, to cope 
adaptively with changing contexts. Through evolution, humans developed 
capabilities for changing that are represented by two types of change processes: 
incremental change processes and transfonnational change processes. Ford & 
Urban (1998) propose that "incremental changes occur through successive 
differentiation and elaboration of existing patterns, thereby maintaining coherent 
organization while change is occurring" (p. 169). On the other hand the 
coexistence of stability and change is not possible in the case when 
disequilibrium is very large. In that case transfonnational changes occur in which 
organisation is restored through an extensive reorganisation of the whole system. 
According to Ford & Urban all psychotherapy theories should include 
explanations of stability-maintaining and incremental and transfonnational 
change processes. Stability-maintaining processes are equally important as 
change processes because they are responsible for the maintenance of 
psychological dysfunctional patterns that cause people to seek help from 
psychotherapists. Change processes, on the other hand underlie the therapeutic 
process and hence, psychotherapy theories need to encompass them. 
3.2.B.Procedural model 
Procedural models include assessment and therapeutic strategies and therapeutic 
methods that any psychotherapy approach employs in order ·to accomplish 
desirable behavioural changes. Procedural models of any psychotherapy are 
highly influenced by conceptual and propositional models. Psychotherapies differ 
significantly in which strategies and methods they use, because they emphasise 
different aspects of humans and propose different change paths. Consequently, in 
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order to uncover the procedural model of any therapy, it is necessary to describe 
the strategies and methods it uses. 
Ford & Urban (1998) propose that irrespective of the approach from which the 
therapeutic strategies and techniques come, there are some common elements 
that characterise all of them. For instance, they are all aimed at activating the 
clients' dysfunctional patterns in order to malce them accessible and hence 
susceptible to change. Moreover, therapeutic strategies and techniques are 
applied with the purpose of either facilitating changes in dysfunctional pattenls 
or replacing them with more functional ones. Furthermore, in order to produce 
change, which will be long lasting and generalised to other contexts of a clients' 
life, procedural models need to provide teclmiques that will facilitate this 
process. Finally, procedural models should propose a means of measurement of 
the client's progress during the therapeutic process itself and upon the tennination 
of therapy. In this way, therapists will have more accurate information as to 
whether the particular therapy was helpful for the client. 
In addition to these elements, every procedural model needs to provide basic 
information about the structure of the psychotherapy process such as, for 
example: the frequency and duration of therapeutic sessions, the duration of 
treatment and the roles of clients and therapists. 
3.3. The integrative theories analysed within the 
comparative framework 
In the following chapters the selected integrative theories will be presented in the 
fonn proposed by Ford & Urban's comparative framework. Hence, their guiding 
assumptions, conceptual, propositional and procedural models will be outlined. 
TIle process of revealing these elements was led by the following questions for 
comparative analysis proposed by Ford & Urban (1998): 
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General question: 
1) What are the underlying assumptions of the approach (ontology, 
cosmology, epistemology) 
Conceptual model questions: 
1) What levels and units of analysis are used? 
2) To what aspects of people do its concepts refer? 
(a) biological 
(b) psychological (cognition, emotion) 
(c) transactional (instrumental or communicative actions) 
(d) environmental (interpersonal, sociocultural) 
(e) complex patterns (lifestyle) 
Propositional model questions: 
1) To what extent do the theories emphasise proactive, anticipatory 
(feedforward), reactive (feedback) or other processes? 
2) To what extent do they emphasise self-organising dynamics (such 
as stability-maintaining processes) and self-constructing dynamics 
(such as incremental and transformational change processes)? 
3) What models of normal and dysfunctional development are 
proposed? 
Procedural model questions: 
1) Questions about the structures of the psychotherapy process 
(design of therapy sessions: where? how often? how long?; 
duration of the treatment?; roles of clients and therapists?). 
2) What general strategies and specific methods are proposed for: (a) 
selectively activating client patterns to be changed; (b) facilitating 
changes in or replacement of dysfunctional patterns; (c) 
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facilitating the generalisation of changes from therapy contexts to 
other relevant life contexts; (d) facilitating alterations in 
developmental pathways and (e) evaluating client progress during 
therapy and final outcomes upon termination of therapy? 
Chapter 4. 
CYCLICAL PSYCHODYNAMICS (CP) 
4.1. Introduction 
Paul Wachtel is widely regarded as a pioneer in the area of psychotherapy 
integration. His seminal work Psychoanalysis and Behavior Therapy: Toward 
Integration published in 1977, represents a major breakthrough by showing that a 
certain level of integration can happen even between two psychotherapy 
approaches that are usually regarded as completely non-complementary. Twenty 
years later Wachtel published the book Psychoanalysis, Behavior Therapy, and 
the Relational World (Wachtel, 1977) in which he combined material from his 
first book, with the new approach that he developed, called cyclical 
psychodynamics. 
These works fully illustrate the evolution of Wachtel's ideas. They began with his 
dissatisfaction with the inertia of the psychoanalytic approach (that he was 
initially trained in) which opposed any kind of active intervention claiming that 
the client!s insight is necessary and sufficient for deep change to happen 
(Wachtel & McKinney, 1992; Wachtel, 1993; 1997). For this reason he reached 
for behaviour interventions, gradually including them in his own practice and 
finding that such type of interventions had been affected by the other. As he 
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pointed out by himself "the tone and style of the behavioral interventions began 
subtly to change ". they took on a psychoanalytic 'accent' ... began to be 
themselves a source of psychoanalytic insights" (Wachtel, 1997; p. 393), whereas 
psychoanalytic interventions developed more of <behavioural "flavor", 
Interpretations began to be seen as client's exposure to forbidden material and to 
therapists' comments; instead of being considered neutral, they now were seen as 
having elements of reinforcement and direction. 
Furthennore, Wachtel added some family therapy concepts and interventions in 
order to overcome the simple linear causality that is proposed by psychoanalytic 
and behaviour approaches. He claims that individuals are functioning within 
particular contexts and as such they can act on the particular environment but 
also the environment can affect them. Therefore, it is a circular rather than linear 
relationship between individuals and the environment, which has been especially 
emphasised in family (system) approaches. 
In conclusion, cyclical psychodynamics is aimed at integrating concepts and 
propositions from psychoanalytic, behavioural and family approaches. However, 
as Wachtel pointed out "although behavioral and systemic concepts by now 
permeate the cyclical psychodynamic point of view quite substantially, the 
approach is nonetheless clearly most of all an offshoot of psychoanalytic 
thinldng, an attempt to imbue psychoanalysis with a dimension of active 
intervention and a greater consideration of context and reciprocity that 
characterise all relationships" (Wachtel, 1997; pA23). Consequently, this is an 
example of assimilative integration, though it differs somewhat from the other 
theories considered in this thesis in not having either clearly defined guiding 
assumptions or a conceptual model. This might be regarded a consequence of the 
Wachtel's opinion that integrative theory is in constant flux, changing and 
developing by continually integrating new concepts and propositions from other 
theories (Wachtel, 1997). As he pointed out "Cyclical psychodynamics does not 
seek to become still another 'school', but rather an evolving framework within 
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which the contributions of therapists and theorists of varying points of view can 
be examined and integrated" (Gold & Wachtel, 1993; p.71). 
4.2. Guiding assumptions 
4.2.1. Ontology 
Guiding assumptions cannot be easily revealed in the case of cyclical 
psychodynamics. This is especially the case with ontology that is usually 
reflected in the conceptual model of the theory. Because Wachtel operates with 
the concepts of the theories that he is including in CP rather than with his own 
originally developed integrative concepts, it is unclear whether the ontologies 
that underlie the original theories (and that conflict, as in the case of 
psychoanalytic and behaviour theories) can be regarded as ontological 
assumptions of CP. 
In my opinion, Wachtel (1993; 1997) does not stay with either of the monistic 
ontologies presented in the psychoanalytic (idealism) and behavioural 
(materialism) approaches. Because of the influence of family (system) theories, 
and his emphasis on investigating the person in current contexts, I would say that 
the ontology of CP is of a more dualistic interactive nature. However, because 
CP is still theory that is highly embedded in the psychoanalytic theoretical 
framework, mental or idealist components such as fantasies, are more 
accentuated. 
4.2.2. Cosmology 
By looking at the procedural model of CP, one can conclude that instead of 
emphasising a simple linear causality of mechanistic cosmology that is 
characteristic of the psychoanalytic and behavioural approaches, Wachtel (1993; 
1997) highlights the significance of circular causality which is characteristic of 
open system cosmology. Therefore, in my opinion though claiming that his 
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theory stays within the boundaries of the psychoanalytic approach, the proposed 
cosmology differs from the psychoanalytic one. 
4.2.3. Epistemology 
In my opinion, the epistemology of CP is empmclsm including both 
presentationist (realist) and representationist (constructivist) views. The 
following excerpt illustrates this notion to a certain extent: "There is always some 
basis in reality for our experiences. And there is always a significant contribution 
that reflects the active, constructivc nature of all perceptual processes. Our 
thoughts, our perceptions, our associations, our actions, are always a joint 
product of 'internal' and I external' influences and processes. They reflect in every 
instance our particular way of organizing, construing, and reacting to the events 
of our lives fl (Wachtel, 1993; p.55) 
4.3. Conceptual model 
4.3. 1. Levels and units of analysis 
Wachtel (1993; 1997) recognises the significance of all the psychological, 
behavioural and enviromnental variables featured by the approaches that his 
synthesis is aimed at. However, he regards these variables as intertwined with 
each other, and hence only through acknowledging their specific interactions 
therapists can get a complete picture of the client's current functioning. This is in 
line with Wachtel's further proposition that "people live in contexts, and our 
behavior, both adaptive and maladaptive, is always in relation to someone or 
something" (Wachtel, 1993; p.24). Therefore the primary unit of his analysis is 
the person-in-context. 
4.3.2. Key concepts 
It is diffieult to pinpoint which are the major concepts of CPo Wachtel does not 
create original conceptions, but rather relies on the concepts coming from the 
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tlu"ee approaches that he synthesised (Ford & Urban, 1998). In the section where 
he describes the major pitfalls of the psychoanalytic approach, he concentrates on 
its propositional and procedural downsides, claiming that he still regards the 
major psychoanalytic concepts (internal conflict, self-deception, unconscious 
wishes) to be valid (Wachtel & McKinney, 1992). 
Hence Wachtel opposes a number of psychoanalytic notions including the 
overemphasis on early. experience and insight, unclarity about the process of 
change and insufficient exploitation of Freud's revised anxiety theory, and finally 
insufficient attention to the role of social skills and the importance of active 
intervention. As can be seen these are mainly propositional and procedural ideas 
that have been scrutinised. The only exception seems to be an inadequate 
utilisation of Freud's revised anxiety theory. Anxiety seems to playa key role in 
CP propositional model of psychopathology and as such can be regarded as a key 
concept of CPo This is illustrated by the following notioil: "Anxiety, then, has its 
impact not just in creating a state of distress but in the distortions of development 
and distortions of current functioning that are introduced by the efforts the person 
makes to avoid anxiety" (Wachtel, 1993; p.32). Hence in the following section, 
Freud's revised theory of anxiety and Wachtel's further elaborations will be 
presented. 
In Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety (1959 in Wachtel & McKinney, 1992) 
Freud completely changed his view on anxiety. Previously, anxiety had been 
regarded as an "epiphenomenon of repression" (Wachtel, 1993; p.38). However, 
Freud proposed a new role for anxiety in tenns of being "the basic cause of 
repression" (Wachtel, 1993; p.38). Therefore, people do not repress inappropriate 
unconscious wishes and fantasies because of their inadequate content, but rather 
because of anxiety and tenible distress that they elicit. This, Freud's theory of 
signal anxiety, has never been accepted by his followers (Wachtel, 1993; 1997). 
However, Wachtel fmds it very useful because it bridges the gap between a 
psychoanalytic concept of repression and a behavioural concept of avoidance. 
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Interestingly, anxiety seems to play the key role in behavioural 'propositional 
models. In behavioural terms when the individual begins to perceive cues that are 
even marginally associated with a behaviour that has become a source of anxiety 
there is a strong inclination to avoid those cues. Therefore, avoidance has the 
same role as repression and hence "what is being addressed is a tendency to not 
notice, to reinterpret, to change the subject, or in other ways to avoid or attenuate 
the experience of forbidden" (Wachtel & McKinney, 1992). This is for Wachtel a 
converging point where behavioural and psychoanalytic phenomena described as 
avoidance and repression present the same type of response elicited by anxiety. 
This leads to incorporating these concepts within the same integrative theoretical 
framework. 
4.4. Propositional model 
The most distinctive characteristic of the CP propositional model is the emphasis 
put on the circular nature of both interactions between people and interactions 
between intrapsychic processes and the events of daily living (Wachtel, 1993). 
This certainly represents a big leap from the classical psychoanalytic view where 
just intrapsychic processes mattered and they represented the major forces that 
governed individuals. On the contrary, Wachtel (1993; 1997) proposes that 
individuals are proactive and self-constructing which means that they interact 
with the environment in such a way that their behaviour produces consequences 
that in turn shape their future behaviour. This illustrates the circular nature of 
causality that is the result of the family (system) theory influences on CPo 
Moreover, a psychoanalytic view that early experiences have a dominant 
influence on further development by actually preventing development and 
growth from happening in a common linear fashion, and fixating it at a particular 
stage, was rejected by Wachtel (1993; 1997). The notion that early childhood 
motives, conflicts and ties to relationships remain active in the same form and 
exert continual control over personality development, Wachtel metaphorically 
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described as a "woolly mammoth" approach to psychodynamics (Wachtel, 1977 
in Gold & Wachtel, 1993). Indeed, the following excerpt describes this metaphor 
the best: "Its image of archaic forces preserved in their original form by splits 
and layers of repression is reminiscent of those archaic creatures, so preserved in 
their original form under the protective layers of the Arctic ice" (Gold & 
Wachtel, 1993; p.60). 
In contrast to this fixation-arrest model of development, Wachtel adopts the 
"continuous construction model" proposed by Zeanah, Anders, Seifer, and Stem 
(1989 in Wachtel & McKinney, 1992), where "patterns of internal subjective 
experience and patterns of relating to others are derived from past relationship 
experiences but are continuously operating in the present" (Wachtel & 
McKinney, 1992; p.359). This theory reunites the notion of the significance of 
early life experiences with the numerous empirical findings that negative early 
experiences do not inevitably lead to psychopathology (Ford & Urban, '1998; 
Wachtel & McKinney, 1992), Early experiences are undoubtedly important in 
setting the developmental pathway but further experiences can shape their 
influence. 
As can be seen the, basic fonn of human development is interaction cycles that 
basically unwind through intention-action-consequence patterns. By constantly 
engaging in interactions with their environments according to these patterns 
humans learn the ways of dealing with particular situations. Wachtel explains 
this process by using the Piagetian terms: schemas, accOlmnodation and 
assimilation (Wachtel, 1993; 1997). Interaction cycles are influenced by schemas 
because in any situation that is novel to the person, blueprints of dealing 
previously with similar situations will affect the interpretation of the new one. 
Therefore, existing schemas will help to assimilate and interpret the current 
event, but they will also be changed in order to accommodate to the different 
aspects of it. Consequently, assimilation represents the basis of stability whereas 
accommodation produces change. 
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In terms of explaining how normal development becomes pathological, Wachtel 
uses an anxiety-avoidance model (Wachtel, 1993; 1997). As was previously 
mentioned in the conceptual model, Wachtel accepts Freud's theory of signal 
anxiety where anxiety makes people avoid the situations in which it is elicited. 
People develop throughout their life particular anxiety-avoidance patterns that 
are mostly related to interpersonal situations. Here, the circular nature of these 
dysfunctional intcrpersonal anxiety-avoidance patterns is proposed. Therefore, 
tllese vicious circles or cycles are not the result of the influence of the conserved 
forms of early experiences but they are result of "both the unconscious 
psychological forces and the way of life with which they are associated" which 
ffdetel111ine each other in a continuing cycle of confinnation and reconfirmation". 
Consequently, the causes "lie not in the distant past but in the interactive present" 
(Wachtel, 1993; p.23). 
Wachtel (1993; 1997) adopts the family-system theory notion that the solution 
becomes the problem in the final instance. This is obvious in the case of 
avoidance, which controls anxiety in the short tel1n but produces fUliher 
problems in the long term by preventing the person from behaving according to 
hislher authentic desires, aspirations and experiences. Moreover, significant 
others are involved in the vicious cycles by behaving in such a way that confirms 
over and over again the faulty patterns of interactions. These ullwitting 
accomplices act in line with the person's expectations maintaining the 
dysfunctional interactions. 
All behaviours that people use to avoid anxiety are called defenses. This is the 
good old psychoanalytic term tllat Wachtel (1993; 1997) still sticks to. Defenses 
are not just represented by behavioural avoidance, they include all other mostly 
cognitive ways of reinterpretation and self-deception. Though they are aimed at 
preventing Ulldesirable interpersonal and psychological consequences from 
occurring, paradoxically they usually produce them. This is what Wachtel calls 
"the irony of psychopathologyll (Gold & Wachtel, 1993) that replaces the 
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predominantly tragic vision of classical psychoanalysis (Schafer, 1976 in Gold & 
Wachtel, 1993). In this vision people are governed by internal psychic forces that 
they have no control over. Hence, they are being victims of repetition 
compulsion that makes them unconsciously but intentionally involved over and 
over again in the same traruua in order to master it. By contrast, the ironic view 
of CP assumes that the person "does not aim for the consequences he encounters; 
he produces them despite - yet because of - his vigorous efforts to prevent them" 
(Wachtel, 1993; p.23). Simply put, though the person is in the very search for 
new and productive interactions, he/she is successful only at creating 
dysfunctional interactional patterns i.e. vicious circles. 
4.5. Procedural model 
As can be seen vicious circles represent the core of psychopathology, and as such must 
be changed by therapy. Intervention strategies include identification and activation of 
vicious circles. This must occur under cunent circumstances that disrupt vicious circles' 
typical operation and effectiveness. As patients try to accommodate the disruption 
therapists must facilitate desirable change (Wachtel, 1993; 1997). 
Consequently, assessment is focused on the person's patterns of interactions with 
a goal of identification of all points on the vicious circles. These include "the 
inclination which may be arousing anxiety, the meanings which predicts a loss of 
security, the interpersonal context of the desire, the ways in which the person 
interacts with others to keep threatening experiences unacknowledged and 
an.L'riety minimized, the reactions of others to the person's security operations, 
and the ways in which this last event feeds back to maintain the same anxieties, 
meanings and defenses lf (Gold & Wachtel, 1993; p.63). Moreover, Wachtel 
emphasises the significance of the person's strengths assessment that needs to 
precede any balanced therapy. 
Wachtel (1993; 1997) proposes that any intervention that can break the vicious 
circle can be used in CP. He specifically highlights exposure treatment that is 
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aimed at anxiety reduction. Exposure therapy can involve the classical 
behavioural methods such as systemic desensitisation and flooding, where the 
person is exposed to external sources of anxiety. On the other hand, 
psychodynamic methods of interpretation and confrontation of anxiety-
generating inner states and of defenses can also be regarded as a type of exposure 
treatment. Finally, the interventions from gestalt and family therapy that can 
enable the person to experience the avoided aspect of hisfher life and thus 
interrupt the repetitive and ironic maintenance of anxiety are of potential use in 
CP. Wachtel is hence fully eclectic in proposing which interventions can be used 
inCP. 
Furthermore, he acknowledges the significance of insight, but regards it as 
insufficient for a full deep change to happen (Gold & Wachtel, 1993; Wachtel, 
1993; 1997; Wachtel & McKinney, 1992). In addition to insight the person needs 
to experience and control emotions and to learn to act differently. Because this is 
a long and slow process he highlights a principle of gradualism where "gradual, 
incremental change makes it easier for patients maintain a sufficiently coherent 
self-organisation while simultaneously undergoing change" (Ford & Urban, 
1998; p.503-504). 
Finally, Wachtel pays special attention to the therapeutic relationship and 
communication (Wachtel, 1993; 1997). He emphasises the safe and positive 
therapeutic relationship as an essential prerequisite for therapeutic success. 
Activation of the vicious circles demands a warm and secure environment in 
order for persons to be able to disclose and discuss their private experiences. To 
achieve this it is also necessary that therapists use facilitative and encouraging 
comments that will help clients to fmiher explore their problematic interactions 
(Wachtel, 1993). 
Chapter 5. 
PROCESS-EXPERIENTIAL 
PSYCHOTHERAPY (PEP) 
5.1. Introduction 
Process-experiential therapy (PEP) represents an amalgam of the classical 
experiential therapies, client-centered (Rogers) and gestalt therapy (Pearls) with 
the most recent findings fi'01TI cognitive psychology and emotion theory. Similar 
to Safran's claim (Safran, 1990) that his therapy works within a cognitive 
theoretical framework though includes interpersonal and experiential theories, 
Greenberg also emphasises that concepts and propositions taken from cognitive 
psychology and emotion theory are there to increase the explanatory power of the 
experiential theoretical fi'anlework that he still regards as dominant (Elliott & 
Greenberg, 1995; Greenberg, Rice, & Eliott, 1993; Greenberg & Paivio, 1997; 
Paivio & Greenberg, 1998). Moreover, well developed research in the areas of 
cognitive psychology and emotion theory implies better scientific credibility of 
such an enriched experiential theoretical framework. 
As it will be seen in the following sections PEP is based on a complex theoretical 
model that is aimed at integrating many different concepts coming from the 
extensive theoretical and empirical investigation in the area of cognitive 
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psychology and emotion theory. Moreover, its authors have developed some new 
concepts and propositions that mainly provide the rationale for emphasising the 
significance of emotional experience as a cornerstone of the experiential 
theoretical :fi:amework. Therefore, PEP can be regarded as another example of 
assimilative integration that also includes more complexity and differentiation. 
5.2. Guiding assumptions 
5.2. 1. Ontology 
PEP is organised within the humanistic psychotherapy theoretical framework. As 
such one could easily conclude that the ontology of PEP is the same as that ofthe 
entire family of humanistic psychotherapy. Indeed, Ford & Urban (1998) claim 
that all humanistic psychotherapies, including PEP, share the same monistic 
idealist ontology where human experience is major essence of the world. 
Therefore, reality does not exist per se but rather an idea of that reality is created 
by humans. 
However, in my op1111On Greenberg et al. add one more dimension to their 
theory. They emphasise the significance of human experience but they also go a 
step further in searching for the sources of that experience. They claim that there 
are "two major sources of experience, a conscious, deliberate, reflexive 
conceptual process (thinking) and an automatic, direct, schematic emotional 
process (feeling)" (Greenberg, Rice & Eliott, 1993; p.55). Feeling is the process 
that includes bodily felt senses and it arises whenever the organism encounters 
obstacles for its survival (Greenberg, Rice & Eliott, 1993; Greenberg & Paivio, 
1997). Therefore, the essence of reality is not only contained in mind but also in 
body. In my opinion, such a claim is more in line with the dualistic ontology 
called psychophysical interactionism than with the monistic ontology of 
idealism. 
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5.2.2. Cosmology 
In terms of cosmology PEP stays within the boundaries of other humanistic 
psychotherapies. The proposed ontological assumptions represent an amalgam of 
organismic and open systems cosmology. Human beings are growth and 
development oriented by themselves and therefore the change is possible to 
happen thanks to the transformation propensities of the organism itself. In 
contrast to these purely organismic cosmological assumptions Greenberg et al. 
(1993) acquire open system cosmology where humans are seen as open systems 
whose development and survival depend on the constant interaction with the 
enviromnent. Experience as a major essence of humans is thus created by "the 
dialectical interactions of an organism within itself and with the environment" 
(Greenberg et aI., 1993; p.59). 
5.2.3. Epistemology 
Greenberg at al. (1993) propose dialectical constructivism as the epistemology of 
their theory. This contrasts completely with Ford & Urban's (1998) propositions 
that all hwnanistic theories employ rationalism and intitutionism as their major 
epistemologies. In my opinion rationalism with its complete denial of experience 
as a source of human Imowledge cannot be regarded as the prevailing 
epistemology of any humanistic theory. This is because all humanistic theories 
have in common their emphasis on human experience as maj or essence of 
individuals, whereas rationalism accentuates reasoning divorced from ever 
changing experience. 
Dialectical constructivism sees people involved in the processes of continual 
constructions of the representations of themselves and the world. Moreover, such 
developed representations do not rely solely on direct experience but also on 
previously developed representations that can exert selective influence on the 
future experience. These propositions represent the major essence of 
constructivism in general. However, Greenberg et al. (1993) add a new quality to 
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this view in the form of the specific dialectics between "concept and experience, 
between reflexive explaining and direct being, between mediated and immediate 
experience" (p.SS). Dialectics is seen as "the splitting of a single whole into its 
contradictory parts" (Greenberg et aI., 1993; p.SS) where these opposing 
elements are thought and emotion i.e. reflexive conceptuallmowing that provides 
explanations and emotion schemes that supply instantaneous responses 
(Greenberg & Pascual-Leone, 1995; Watson & Greenberg, 1996). As a product 
of such continual dialectics the construction of novel outlooks of the self and the 
world emerge. 
5.3. Conceptual model 
5.3. 1. Levels and units of analysis 
As all other humanistic psychotherapies, PEP is also concerned with person-in-
context as the primary unit of its analysis. This is the reflection of the open-
system cosmology where people exist by interacting with the enviromnent. 
Moreover, apart from emphasising this interactional nature of individuals' 
relationship with enviromnent, PEP also highlights the transactional processes of 
a continual exchange with the enviromnent. This means that everything is in a 
process of moment-by-moment change and hence, people behave according to 
their current impression of what is important and salient to them. Furthermore, 
they actively construct concepts of their self and for this reason are seen "as 
being constantly engaged in actively representing themselves to others and 
themselves in images and narratives" and as "multilevel, modularly organised, 
agentic processing system" (Greenberg et aI., 1993; p.SS). 
5.3.2. Key concepts 
In terms of constructing the conceptual model key terms, Greenberg et ai. (1993) 
are led to improve a classical theoretical framework of experiential therapies by 
incorporating some chosen principles from cognitive psychology and emotion 
Chapter 5 PROCESS-EXPERIENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY 85 
theory. This is believed to be the way of overcoming a false dichotomy between 
thinking and emotion proposing that both are valuable sources of experience and 
that integrating Imowing and acting is the main means of human survival 
(Greenberg et aI., 1993). In the following sections these major points from 
cognitive science and emotion theory will be highlighted. 
Greenberg et al. (1993) accept that human information processmg IS a 
constructive process that involves perception, attention, memory, thought and 
language. Underlying internal modules that organise received information and 
outputs are called schemas. There are two types of information processing that 
depend on the level of consciousness involved including conscious or explicit 
processing and automatic, implicit processing of information. On the implicit 
level people have procedural lmowledge that automatically guides motor 
behaviour. Moreover, on this unconscious level there are tacit rules that direct the 
individual's processing of information about self, others and the world. These 
principles, supported by extensive empirical research, for Greenberg et al. (1993) 
serve to support experiential therapis view of humans. They are seen as aware 
agents who are also guided by automatic schematic processing of complex 
inf01111ation. However, that implicit material can be brought into awareness and 
be used as a basis for conscious reflection, choice and action. Therefore, the 
essence of experiential therapy awareness and experiencing gets a full 
recognition through aclmowledging these findings from cognitive psychology. 
Furthennore, some points taken from emotion theory have the same effect. 
Greenberg et aL (1993) emphasise that certain primary affects are wired~in 
responses generated automatically by appraising the situation in relation to the 
individual's needs. They also aclmowledge the schematic organisation of the 
emotion system that takes part in infonnation processing. As such, this system 
provides us with the complex meanings of the situations with feedback about our 
responses to these situations .. Moreover, it creates the rapid emotional responses 
that are fundamentally adaptive (e.g. flight/fight reaction). Finally, it has been 
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shown that affect serves as a primary mean of self-regulation and communication 
for infants and, therefore, takes an essential role in establishing the self and in 
creating the links between self and enviromnent in order to organise self-
experience. TIle previously cited notions highlight the differences and similarities 
between emotion and cognition and provide the basis for Greenberg et al.'s 
claims about the significance of a dialectical synthesis of these two major means 
of experience acquisition. 
l1lough experiential therapies emphasise the significance of emotions and 
feelings in therapy sessions, it is surprising. how little theoretical attention is 
given to these major concepts (Ford & Urban, 1998). For that reason, Greenberg 
et al. (1993) try to fill that gap by highlighting the particular functions of 
emotion. These notions are based on the extensive literature coming from the 
area of emotion theory in psychology (e.g. Frijda, 1986; Greenberg & Safran, 
1987; 1989; Izard, 1991; Lazarus, 1991; Leventhal, 1982; Oatley, 1992; Pascual-
Leone, 1991; Safi'a1l & Greenberg, 1991). 
First, the action-oriented characteristic of emotions is emphasised (Greenberg et 
aI., 1993; Greenberg & Paivio, 1997). Emotions organise us for action by 
establishing goal priorities whereas cognition and lea1ning provide us with the 
means of attaining these goals. Emotions are fundamentally adaptive because the 
emotion system is a biologically wired-in rapid-action system developed to 
enhance survival (e.g. fight/flight system). Furthermore, emotions are 
motivational in terms of motivating behaviour that will increase the probability 
of the occunence of certain emotional states. For example, fear is an aversive 
emotion a1ld as such motivates the person to avoid particular situations, whereas 
joy is a pleasant emotion that stimulates the person to open up and approach 
situations a11d other people. Finally, emotions have informative a1ld 
communicative roles. They simultaneously provide the feedback for us about our 
own behaviour a11d also provide information to others about our intentions and 
further actions. 
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However, though Greenberg et al. (1993) accept all of these propositions about 
emotion functions, they also claim that not all our emotions are adaptive 
responses. Therefore they propose distinctions between primary, secondary and 
instrumental emotions. Primary emotions are direct responses to situations and 
they occur here-and-now (e.g. fear, surprise). Secondary emotions usually occur 
when primary emotion is learnt to be an undesirable response. For example, 
people may cry and feel sad though the primary feeling is fear. Instrumental 
emotions are not in my opinion real emotions because their expression is used to 
produce a desirable response from others such as for example, expressing 
sadness when searching for comfort and caring from others. In addition to this 
distinction, Greenberg et aI. propose a division within the group of primary 
emotions depending on their adaptivity function. Primary emotions are mostly 
adaptive responses toward environmental challenges, but they can become 
maladaptive as in the case of panic where the primary emotion of fear becomes 
maladaptive. 
From giving human emotions such a significance, Greenberg et al. (1993) 
generate a unique concept called emotion scheme that functions as a basic 
psychological unit for generating emotional experience and meaning. They use 
the tenn "scheme" intentionally to avoid the representational nature of the term 
"schemalf employed in cognitive psychology (Greenberg & Paivio, 1997). The 
tenn "schemel! was used first by Piaget (Piaget & Morf, 1958 in Greenberg et aI., 
1993), in order to emphasise action-oriented aspects of schematic processing. 
This definition is further emiched by the propositions coming from the current 
neo-Piagetian view of schemes seen as "goal-directed, functional units, 
ultimately addressed to the environment to negotiate the meeting of some need" 
(Greenberg et aI., 1993; p.66). This action-oriented scheme definition accords 
very well with the proclaimed action nature of emotion. 
Furthermore, emotion schemes are defined as nonconscious mental structures 
sensitive to incoming inf01111ation in order to allow a variety of appropriate . 
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responses to new situations. Therefore, though they represent structured 
phenomena, emotion schemes are flexible modules determining both what is 
perceived and experienced and what actions the person will perform. Emotion 
schemes always represent self-in-the-world and as such they are the major targets 
of therapeutic actions. Though the word emotion in their name accentuates the 
role of emotions, cognition is also regarded as an inseparable part of emotion 
schemes in addition to motivation and relational action. Therefore, once 
activated, emotion schemes, as cognitive/affective/motivational structures, 
produce our actions in line with past experience and anticipations of the future. 
As Greenberg et al. (1993) pointed out "they produce what it is like to be oneself, 
providing a sense of an embodied self that can or cannot be attended to and 
consciously represented" (p.67). 
In summary, emotion schemes represent tacit rules (operating at the implicit 
level) that direct the person's experience of themselves and the world. Not only 
that they process incoming infonnation, they also produce responses to them. 
Therefore they can be regarded as "complex biosocial integration of cognition, 
affect, motivation and relational action" operating on an unconscious level in 
order to produce "felt meanings and action tendencies" (Greenberg et aL, 1993; 
p.71). Furthermore, they create emotional responses by an appraisal of a situation 
in relation to the person's needs and they construct emotional experience in 
moment-by-moment fashion. 
5.4. Propositional model 
TIle main assmnptiol1s of the propositional model of PEP are very similar to the major 
propositions of other humanistic therapies (Ford & Urban, 1998). The major emphasis 
is on change. Human experience is an ever-changing phenomenon, directed by the 
assimilation and acconnnodation of infOlmation coming from the ever-changing 
environment (Greenberg et al., 1993). It is in a constant flow and as such could be 
producing the sense of instability and uncertainty in hunlans. However, the self-
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organising processes that are the result of an inherent human tendency to impose or 
create order, prevent the organism being overwhelmed by enviromnental and inner 
changes. Therefore, self-organising i.e .. stability-maintaining processes are essential for 
change to happen. On the other hand self-constructing change processes are inherent to 
the human being and they are prerequisite for survivaL As can be seen, this constant 
dialectic between stability and change processes becomes an essential promoter of the 
self-development. In the following sections I am going to explain the particular 
propositions of PEP including the significance and resources of the growth tendency. 
Ilus will be followed by an explanation of the development of emotion schemes, which 
will then serve as a basis for illuminating the sources of dysfunctional development. 
As Greenbei'g et a1. (1993) point out lithe tendency to survive and grow is a fundamental 
organising prlllciple of all life" (p.71) and hence this growth tendency is an inherent 
feature of all human beings. Growth tendency is seen as shaping a developmental 
propensity that creates a sense of coherence and balance while the individual is involved 
in a continual process of exploration and development. It is a function of growth and 
change aiming at establishing self-coherence and self-enhancement through adaptive 
flexibility. 
TIle major resource that helps the organism to realise growth tendency is the emotion 
system. TIle previously mentioned charactetistics of emotions in term of their adaptive, 
motivational, infonnative and communicating roles, become essential for the organism 
to grow. Therefore, they infonn the org31usm about its progress toward its goals and at 
the same time organise it for action. However, the emotion system by itself is not 
sufficient for the growth tendency to be fully reali~ed. Two other factors 31'e equally 
impOliant; self-awareness 31ld le31ning 311d experience. Self-awareness represents the 
exclusive Imm31l capability for self-reflective consciousness that again has survival 
signific311ce. In addition to this biological hnportance, it can be said that on the 
psychological level self-awareness plays an essential role in the process of malting 
me311rng. That inherent human tendency to find a unique meaning III any emotionally 
bound experience is also 311 impOliant feature of human nature. In addition to self-
awareness, humans' leanling experience C311 also be regarded as the resource of the 
growth tendency. Acquired experiences collected along thelifethne can be accessed by 
the individual as strengths to promote change. 
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In the conceptual model of the PEP I highlighted the significance of its major concept 
emotion scheme. Greenberg et al. (1993) propose a model of their specific development. 
They claim that they are developed fi.-om bilih in order to organise the infant's 
experience. Emotion schemes are initially organised around prilnary affects that are 
evoked by paliicular stimuli in order to fulfil patiicular needs of infatlts. The need for 
relatedness and attaclmlent is regarded as the crucial need and affect, as being 
fundalllentally relational, takes pati in its realisation. Along the child's development 
his/her conceptual capacities al'e being built up. Hence apart B.-om encoding simple 
stimuli-responses patte11ls with dominant emotional component, the cognitive elements, 
beliefs atld meatungs, associated with particular events are encoded as well. 
Consequently, emotion schemes represent emotional memories of previous experiences 
that evoked patiiculat· emotions includillg fear alld threat, sadness and loss, or anger and 
violation. Therefore emotion schemes Catl be seen as integrating common charactelistics 
of a vati.ety of different instatlCes and situations that involved one of these emotional 
experiences. As such they, by combining with each other, form the beginning elements 
of the emerging sense of self. Self is ever-evolving entity that is modulat'ly organised 
alld relational in its nature. The self is in a constant constructive mode and integration 
on the relational self level is constatltly OCCUlTing. If integration fails to happen, tlns 
becomes the somce of dysfunction. 
According to Greenberg et al. (1993) dysfunction occms as a result of the lack of 
present awareness of automatically generated emotional experience that is patiicularly 
impOliant in the creation of meaning and in adaptive problem solving in human 
environments. It is argued that people behave in a way that they construe to be the best 
adaptive response given tlleil- CUlTent perceptions of tllemselves and the world. If they 
fail to pay attention to their automatic emotional responses the construction they 
develop is inaccmate atld therefore nught be maladaptive. Therefore, as they emphasise 
"problems in the creation of emotional meaning at'ecentral in dysfimction" (Greenberg 
et al., 1993; p.80). The creation of meaning is govemed by two processes: (1) a 
conscious process of meaning creation by synthesising and symbolising experience in 
awareness atld (2) atl unconscious process of activation of emotional schemes where 
expedence is automatically generated for potential synthesis in awat'eness. If the 
constructive conscious process fails to synthesise and symbolise emotional experience 
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for the organism to become fully aware of it, than created responses are maladaptive 
and non-viable for that individual. Additionally, if on an unconscious level 
dysfunctional emotion schemes developed from life experience have been activated, 
maladaptive responses can be also elicited. Therefore, a failure in both meaning creation 
processes can be a source of dysfunction. 
In tenns of the explanation of the failure of the first meaning creation process, 
Greenberg et al. (1993) recognise two different global types of information processing 
including conceptual processing and experiential processing. It is a breakdown in the 
co-ordination between these types of processing that dysfunction stems from. However, 
they do not provide the reason why emotional processing becomes abandoned and 
conceptual processing that is "rational It (Le., based on causal reasoning, analytic 
thinking that create narrative explanations) talces over. 
On the other hand, the existence of dysfunctional schemes is explained by the early 
negative experiences occurring at times when the infants' needs were not appropriately 
met. Repetition of these frustrating experiences leads to the esta?lislunent of 
dysfunctional emotion schemes that consist of negative affect and negative beliefs that 
can exert control over further processing of information coming from the external 
world. They can also be elicited by the particular situations that might be reminiscent of 
the early negative life experiences. 
However, one questio~l still needs to be answered: how these dysfunctional schemes 
remain stable and active while the organism is inherently driven to change and 
development. Greenberg et al. (1993) explain this by claiming in general that emotion 
schemes by their nature are slow to be changed and as such represent the organism's 
propensity for stability and maintaining. They mention some processes well known in 
cognitive psychology that might underlie emotion schemes resistance to change. First, 
selective attending to the infonnation that is confmnatory for already existing emotion 
schemes can result in schemes being established over and over again. Second, even the 
infonnation that has been assimilated can be distOlied in order to become congruent 
with the content of the dysfunctional scheme. Third, people actively, whether on 
conscious or lmconsciolls level, avoid experiences that might be disconfirmatory of the 
present schemes. Hence, lack of exposure to new information prevents change. Fourth, 
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in the situation where dysfunctional schemes are invoked, the dysfunctional emotional 
responses interfere with the individual's information processing. 11lis hence, prevents 
the new info11nation to be attended to. 
In conclusion, the failure of the integrative functioning of conceptual and experiential 
processing of information and activation of the dysfunctional schemes represent the 
major sources of dysfunction and as such become the main targets of psychotherapeutic 
work. The major propositions of the procedural model presented in the following 
sections will explain which therapeutic strategies can be used to overcome dysfunction. 
5.5. Procedural model 
Procedures used in the PEP are oriented toward increasing the self-awareness 
about the client's cunent functioning in order to help the client to find the words 
and images to express his or her experience (Eliott & Greenberg, 1995; Goldman 
& Greenberg, 1997). As Greenberg et a1. (1993) point out "rather than being 
guided by images of how to be, people need to attend to how they actually are 
and to respect this" (p.74). Greenberg et a1. (1993) emphasise that in order to 
behave adaptively individuals need to acknowledge their emotional experience. 
After that they need to analyse what they feel in terms of adaptability power of 
their emotional responses, finding out whether these responses are primary 
adaptive and therefore can help to detennine adaptive action or they represent 
secondary or instrumental responses in which case further exploration is required 
to get at primary responses. Moreover, primary emotional responses can be 
maladaptive per se, not helping person to perform any viable action. After- this 
identification the need associated with the emotions should be aclmowledged and 
relevant skills used to meet the need appropriately. 
111ere are two major outcomes that PEP is aimed to achieve including (1) the 
change of dysfunctional emotion schemes and (2) the creation of the new 
adaptive ones. There ru:e several procedures combined together that can prompt 
the change of dysfunctional emotion schemes. First is the interpersonal safety of 
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the therapeutic relationship that leads to an overall reduction of intrapersonal 
anxiety. This is the cornerstone of all humanistic psychotherapies including PEP. 
It is reflected in the establishment of a IIgenuinely prizing empathic relationshipJl 
(Eliott & Greenberg, 1995; p.l24) between the client and the therapist in which 
the client feels safe and hence, is able to process information with increased 
capacity. Furthermore, clients are directed to concentrate their attentional focus 
to the actual features of the emotional experience, which can produce some 
changes of the self-in-the-world experience. Moreover, schematic emotional 
memory and episodic memory are stimulated and evoked in order to provide new 
infonnation for symbolisation because specific non-verbal and motor aspects of 
these memories can evoke tacit schemes. The best marker for the therapist, that 
tacit emotion schemes are elicited and operating currently, is when the client 
actually experience emotions during the therapeutic session itself. This is the 
critical moment in the therapeutic process because lithe tacit infonnation that 
guides experience and behaviour are more available to awareness and also ... the 
scheme itself is more amenable to the input of new infonnation and to 
reorganisation" (Greenberg et aI., 1993; p.94). In this case by encouraging clients 
to contact directly anxiety provoking and avoiding stimuli in combination of 
active expression what one is feeling in the here-and-now interaction with the 
therapist, can help new experience to be generated. 
Apart from changing dysfunctional schemes therapy can create new adaptive 
schemes by synthesising elements of existing schemes which can generate new 
conscious meaning. This is done with similar methods applied for the change of 
dysfunctional schemes. The client1s attention is deliberately guided to focus on 
the particular features of the emotional experience, which can activate relevant 
schemes. The particular elements of these consciously accessed schemes are then 
integrated and new meaning is created. 
As can be seen these procedures are described in a vague and complex manner. 
However, there is an extensive manual presented in Greenberg et aL (1993), 
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which provides a full explanation and presentation of various therapeutic 
interventions used in the PEP in order to achieve partiCUlar therapeutic goals. For 
example, when the client seems puzzled or interested in the problem-relevant 
experience then empathic exploration will be used to help the client to 
reexperience and to reconstruct this experience, giving to it a particular meaning 
that can serve as the marker for further exploration. Moreover, in the case when 
the th.erapist sees the client experiencing so called self-evaluative split in which 
the client is overwhelmed by nonefficient. self-criticism, two-chair dialogue 
teclmique is used to help the client to accept himlherself. This is the role play 
teclmique in which the client is directed to have a dialogue between two opposite 
aspects of the self (e.g. the "critical" aspect that negatively evaluate the 
"experiencing" aspect of the self). This dialogue helps the client to integrate these 
opposite features of the self. 
Finally, in the last section I am going to provide some technical details about the 
structure of the therapeutic process in the PEP. First, it is an individual therapy 
though it can be practised in the group format and there is also a version for 
marital/couple therapy. Second, it is most appropriate for outpatient clients that 
suffer fi-om mild to moderate clinical distress. Third, in terms of treatment length, 
it is appropriate to use it either as a brief therapy or as a long-term therapy 
depending on the clients! needs. Fourth, treatment sessions usually last 50-60 
minutes once a week but with flexibility to change this depending on clients! 
requirements. 
Chapter 6. 
INTERPERSONAL-COGNITIVE-
EXPERIENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY 
(ICEP) 
6.1. Introduction 
This therapy represents an amalgam of three different psychotherapies including 
cognitive, interpersonal and experientiaL However, as the author himself claims, 
it needs to be seen as "a conceptual and technical refinement of cognitive-
behavioural theory and practice through the systematic integration of a number of 
concepts, propositions, and hypotheses derived from interpersonal theory" 
(Safran, 1990a; p.87). Therefore, an inclusion of the interpersonal theory is seen 
as a way for improving cognitive-behavioural psychotherapy. This process is 
two-fold including the recognition of the importance of the therapeutic 
relationship in the change process and the significance of interpersonal and 
environmental variables in the cognitive case fonnulation. 
As will be seen in the following sections, leEP is fi:om a theoretical perspective 
an example of "assimilative integration" (Safran & Messer, 1997), where some 
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chosen aspects of one theory are incorporated into another theory in order to 
improve and to refine this second theory. 
6.2. Guiding assumptions 
6.2.1. Ontology 
Guiding assumptions are not explicitly stated in this theory and hence~ need to be 
indirectly revealed. In my opinion ontological assumptions originate in 
psychophysical interactionism where body and mind both exist and interact with 
each other. This is seen in the Safran's emphasis on the significance of emotions 
in the process of the therapeutic change (Safran, 1990a; Safran, 1990b; Reeve, 
rnck, & Safi'an, 1993; Muran & Safran, 1993). Here emotions are not seen as 
postcognitive phenomena, but rather as being a fonn of "knowledge" by itself 
and providing individuals with infonnation about their interactions with the 
environment in order for them to survive and adapt. Because emotions inevitably 
include bodily felt senses, body is seen as an important milieu. Moreover, 
therapeutic work on emotional experience is very important in rCEP given the 
experiential therapy influences on it. In conclusion, from these propositions r 
draw the conclusion that the ontology ofICEP is psychophysical interactionism. 
6.2.2. Cosmology 
It is even more difficult to infer the cosmology ofthe rCEP. On the one hand, by 
claiming that he stays within a CBT theoretical framework, it is not clear whether 
Safran still sticks to its mechanistic model where a simple linear cause-effect 
relationship is established between mental phenomena and behaviour. Or, on the 
other hand, because of the emphasis put on Gibson's ecological approach where 
"humans are seen as biological organisms that live and operate in the context of 
specific environments II (Muran & Safran, 1993), the open system cosmology is 
proposed. Given that interpersonal schemas are generalised representations of 
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self-other relationships and therefore, intrinsically interactional in nature in my 
opinion, Safi'an is closer to the open system cosmology. 
6.2.3. Epistemology 
Safi'an et a1. (1993) claim that the lCEP employs a developmental constructivist 
approach (Guidano, 1987; Guidano & Liotti, 1983; Mahoney, 1990 in Reeve, 
lnck, & Safran, 1993) where clients are not thaught to acquire an objective view 
of reality, but rather they are helped to understand how they construct reality and 
how this affects their lives. The main tool in lCEP that is used for exploring 
clients' reality constructions is the therapeutic relationship, because the self-
knowledge that people gain throughout their lives is of an interpersonal nature, 
and therefore can be easily accessible within the interpersonal context of the 
therapy. 
6.3. Conceptual model 
6.3. 1. Levels and units of analysis 
As was mentioned previously, Safran emphasises the significance of 
environmental and interpersonal variables based on the Gibson's ecological 
approach (Safran, 1990a; Reeve, lnck, & Safran, 1993; Muran & Safran, 1993). 
Therefore, the key unit of his analysis is person-in-context. 
6.3.2. Key concepts 
Creating his theory within the theoretical framework of cognitive therapy, Safran 
calls his major concept interpersonal schema, The schema concept is a central 
theoretical construct in cognitive models of psychopathology and psychotherapy. 
It represents a "generic cognitive representation which mind extracts in the 
course of exposure to particular instances of a phenomenon" (Bartlett, 1932 in 
Safran, 1990a; p.89). It is a knowledge representation that guides both the 
processing of information and implementation of action. 
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Within cognitive therapy, self-schema is the most important schema concepts. 
For eXalnple, in the Beck's classical approach it is defined as a tacit rule that 
guides self-evaluation and therefore represents self-worth contingency (Safran, 
1990a). However, such conceptualisation is restricted given the narrow focus on 
how people currently see themselves. Even with the addition of the Markus and 
Nurius' model of "possible selves" (Markus, 1983; Markus & Nurius, 1986 in 
Safi:an, 1990a), where possible selves are defined as an individual's ideas about 
what they might become, what they would like to become and what they are 
afraid to become, this self-schema concept still does not explain how these 
possible selves, goals, rules, strategies can be regarded as pru.1 of a generalised 
information structure based upon past experience. . 
In order to overcome the problems of ecological invalidity of the information 
processing approach employed in CBT, Safran proposes that the Gibson's 
ecological approach Call be an appropriate alternative. This approach is based on 
three major principles including studying an individual within the context of 
his/her ecological niche, viewing lmowledge as acquired through action and for 
action alld looking at psychological processes as being functional and adaptive. 
These major principles represent for Safi:all a bridge that can facilitate the 
integration of cognitive and interpersonal perspectives. The ecological approach 
can help to find what is the most significant information that needs to be encoded 
in Imowledge representations. Given the functionality and adaptability of human 
beings, simple encoding of enviromnental features would be less important than 
survival-relevant interactions that have been experienced. Since the interpersonal 
approach regru.'ds interactions with other hUlnan beings as the most imp0l1ant 
survival-relevant event, Safran emphasises that propensity for maintaining 
relatedness plays a crucial role in the survival of human kind. This is well 
supported empilically by the research, which stems from the Bowlby's 
attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969; 1973; 1980 in Safran, 1990). 
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Bowlby emphasises the centrality of interpersonal interaction in human 
development, since the development of the self is largely achieved through 
attachment behaviour. Therefore, within the interpersonal context of the 
infant/caretaker dyad the infant fonns consistent strategies for maintaining 
relatedness that represent attachment patterns. Based on these attachment 
patterns, the infant forms cognitive/affective representations of selflother 
interactions. These representations Safran conceptualises as interpersonal 
schemas. 
Interpersonal schema is a "generalised representation of self-other relationships" 
(Safran, 1990a; p.93) and represents a program for maintaining relatedness. The 
propensity for maintaining interpersonal relatedness is regarded as a biologically 
wired~in mechanism whereas the specific strategies, information and principles 
that people employ in order to maintain relatedness are learned. Safran proposes 
that such a conceptualisation of the interpersonal schema helps in the 
clarification of the relationship between cognitive and interpersonal phenomena 
and also, it results in the further extension of the Markus and Nurius' model 
(1986 in Safran, 1990a) of the possible selves where goals, plans and strategies 
are viewed as coded infonnation acquired in interactions in order to maintain 
interpersonal relatedness. Moreover, self-worth contingencies of Beck's schema 
are presented in interpersonal schemata serving the role of implicit rules for 
maintaining relatedness. 
Finally, the important question that should be answered is "how or in what form 
is information represented" (Safran, 1990a; p.94). Safran hypothesises that given 
that relatedness infonnation is first acquired through attachment with a caregiver 
which is affect-laden, at least in part they are coded in expressive-motor fonn. 
Moreover, he proposes that interpersonal schemas partly represent procedural 
knowledge which, for the individual is not accessible in conceptual fonn but as a 
cunently felt sense. Relying on the Leventhal theory of emotions (Leventhal, 
1984 in Safran, 1990a) where the emotional synthesis process involves 
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processing at both expressive-motor and conceptual levels, Safran claims that the 
relevant information would be at least partially coded at the conceptual level as 
well. In conclusion, he defInes interpersonal schemas as "cognitive-affective 
schemas that are coded at both conceptual and expressive-motor levels ll (Safran, 
1990a; p.94). 
6.4. Propositional model 
Safi .. an does not provide directly propositions about the change and stability 
processes. However, these can be inferred from his explanations of how people 
maintain interpersonal relatedness and how this becomes a dysfunctional process 
represented by the cognitive-interpersonal cycle (Safran, 1990a; Reeve,Inck, & 
Safi'an, 1993; Muran & Safran, 1993). 
Maintaining interpersonal relatedness is not only the major survival goal for the 
infant, but continues to be present throughout the life-span. Interpersonal 
schemas shape interpersonal behaviour of the particular individual through 
specifIc interpersonal strategies in order to maintain relatedness. According to 
Safran (1990a) there are three ways of establishment of a subjective sense of 
interpersonal relatedness. First, people engage in life plan strategies designed to 
facilitate the maintenance of relatedness. These strategies originate from the 
established attachment patterns with the primary caregivers. For example, a 
person that was valued by his/her family for academic skills might be persuaded 
to become an academic. Second, the particular relatedness strategies that have 
been learnt through the relationship with the primary caregivers are employed 
throughout life whenever the person is in a situation of establishing and 
maintaining relatedness. For example, the previously described academic may 
speak intelligently when he/she wishes to establish a subjective sense of potential 
relatedness. A third way is aimed at distortion of infonnation processing such 
that any information that threatens the individual's SUbjective sense of potential 
relatedness is not acknowledged. For example, the individual who learns that the 
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maintenance of relatedness is contingent upon being warm and kind, can forget 
interactions with others in which he/she had feedback of being aloof or uncaring. 
Safran (1990a) claims that it is impOliant to recognise that the propensity for 
relatedness maintenance is not directed to a specific person in a specific 
interaction. It is rather an action-oriented process aiming at enhancing a 
subjective sense of potential interpersonal relatedness in an abstract, generalised 
sense. FUlihennore, because of such a big significance of interpersonal 
relatedness for the individual, whenever there is a situation where interpersonal 
relationship is interrupted, the individual will respond with anxiety. It is 
hypothesised that anxiety is a wired-in biological mechanism that is activated in 
any situation that represents a danger for survival (Bowlby, 1973; Greenberg & 
Safran, 1987 in Safran, 1990a). Consequently, Safran hypothesises that human 
beings always respond with anxiety when they detect any clues regarding the 
disintegration of interpersonal relationships (Safran, 1990a; Muran & Safran, 
1993). Therefore, anxiety itself can become a cue for alerting people to avoid the 
particular situations and experiences where relationships with significant others 
are endangered. At the same time people learn which experiences and situations 
are valued by the significant others and these become associated with the feeling 
of interpersonal security. Consequently, individuals develop different strategies 
that consist of behavioural avoidance and selective inattention to anxiety 
provoking stimuli such as diverting attention from anxiety provoking information 
or controlling the conversation to avoid anxiety-provoking topics. 
As can be seen, historically adaptive interpersonal schema tlrrough the learning 
process can become maladaptive ways of dealing with the current interpersonal 
situation because the individuals though exposed to the new interpersonal 
experiences that negate the maladaptive schema, still persist in behaving in the 
same maladaptive fashion. Safran explains that this pattern is a result of a self-
perpetuating cognitive-interpersonal cycle in which maladaptive interpersonal 
schemas are consistently con finned by the interpersonal consequences of the 
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person's own behaviour (Muran & Saft'an, 1993; Safran, 1990a), To elaborate, an 
interpersonal schema disposes the person to interpersonally behave in a particular 
manner. Based on interpersonal complementarity, the principle that comes fl:om 
Kiesler (1983 in Muran & Safran 1993) and according to which interpersonal 
responses are not purely random but contingent on the preceding interpersonal 
behaviour of the other person in an interaction, this behaviour tends to elicit a 
complementary response that confirms the interpersonal schema. Though all 
people have tendency to display certain consistencies in interpersonal 
behavioural patterns, psychologically maladjusted individuals tend to behave in a 
rigid manner selectively looking for the cues that will confirm their maladaptive 
interpersonal schemas. Moreover, for that reason their rigid interpersonal 
schemas malce their interpersonal behaviour more rigid and limited and therefore 
increase the probability of getting the complimentary response from the other 
person that will even further strengthen their maladaptive interpersonal schemas. 
On the contrary, better adjusted individuals engage in the variety of interpersonal 
. situations in which they do not consistently pull complementary responses fl:om 
others and therefore their interpersonal schemas and beliefs about the sense of 
potential interpersonal relatedness are more flexile and adjustable. 
6.5. Procedural model 
San'an claims that the proposed concepts and therapeutic suggestions are not 
unique for ICEP but taken directly from other theorists such as for example 
Carson (1969 in Safran, 1990b), Kiesler (1988 in Safran, 1990b) and Wachtel 
(1977 in Safran, 1990b), However, the novelty of this approach lays in the 
attempt to articulate a theoretical framework within which integration of 
interpersonal and cognitive perspectives can occur (Safran, 1990b). Citing other 
mainly cognitive authors such as for example,Guidano (1987 in Safran, 1990b) 
and Mahoney (1982 in Safran, 1990b), Safran acknowledges the presence of the 
core and peripheral cognitive structures. By changing the particular cognitive 
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structures the therapist can produce superficial and deep changes depending 
whether he/she addressed the peripheral structures or core ones. For Safran the 
core cognitive structures underlying clinical problems are interpersonal schemas. 
Therefore, in order to produce deep changes these dysfunctional interpersonal 
schemas need to be modified. 
Interpersonal schemas as the core cognitive structures cannot be assessed 
directly, but through exploration of the particular cognitive-interpersonal cycles 
I 
in which interpersonal schemas are reflected in the specific strategies and 
behaviours that people use for the maintenance of interpersonal relatedness, 
which then in tWTI evoke schema consistent responses in others. Though the 
majority of traditionally oriented cognitive and behavioural therapists discourage 
the therapeutic use of transference, Safran is in favour of the therapists that argue 
that individuals' behaviour during the therapeutic session represents a useful 
sample of their problems (e.g. Amkoff, 1983; Goldfried & Davison 1976 in 
Muran & Safi-an, 1993). He emphasises that especially in the case of the ICEP 
the therapeutic relationship provides a specific interpersonal context where the 
person's dysfunctional interpersonal behaviour can be assessed (Safran, 1990b; 
Reeve, Inck, & Sail'all, 1993; Muran & Safi'an, 1993). In the ICEP the therapist 
has a role of the participant-observer (SUlliVall, 1953 in Safran, 1990b) as he/she 
responds to the client's interpersonal pull, but has an ability to monitor hislher 
own feelings and responses and use them to generate hypotheses about the 
client's interpersonal sty Ie. Furthermore, the therapist can use hislher own 
feelings and responses to pinpoint clients' specific behaviours and 
communications that are problematic. These pinpointed behaviours are called 
interpersonal markers and they can indicate the most valuable junctures for 
further cognitive exploration. For eXalnple, if the person constantly distances 
people with his aloof voice the cognitive process that underlies this behaviour 
will most accessible when the client uses the same tone when cOlTIlTIwlicating 
with the therapist. 
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The main therapeutic aim of leEP is that the therapist teaches the client new 
adaptive and noncharacteristic interpersonal behaviours that will in turn elicit 
new responses from the client's significant others and therefore result in new 
interpersonal experiences. 1bis aim can be accomplished in numerous ways. 
First, the therapist can, by responding in the noncomplimentary way to the 
client's interpersonal maladaptive pulls, elicit new interpersonal behaviours in 
the· client providing, in that way, a corrective interpersonal experience. This is 
called "unhooking". Second, the therapist can communicate openly hislher 
particular feelings about the clienfs dysfunctional interpersonal style. This 
"metacommunication" is important for modifYing the clienfs communication 
style that the client can be completely unaware of. Moreover, the process of 
metacOlmnunication is important for the facilitation of decentering the client and 
the therapist, so they can both step out of their interaction and explore it more 
efficiently. Finally, the process of unhooking can serve as disconfrrmation of the 
clienfs maladaptive interpersonal schemas since the therapist responds to the 
client in a noncomplimentary fashion, and as such enhances their restructuring. 
Chapter 7. 
SYSTEMS PROCESS-ORIENTED 
THERAPY 
7.1. Introduction 
Systems process-oriented therapy has been developed by Vittorio Guidano and 
his collaborators as a new approach to cognitive therapy. A major difference 
between this therapy and. other cognitive therapies is in their basic 
mctatheoretical assumptions. 
Classical cognitive therapies (e.g. Beck's cognitive therapy, Ellis' rational emotive 
therapy) consider thoughts (mental phenomena) major factors in people's actions and 
the focus of therapy is directed toward modification of dysfunctional thoughts with 
therapists providing, or better, teaching the client more adaptive ones. Therefore, 
cognitive therapies' ontology is idealism, where just mind matters. In terms of 
cosmology and epistemology, cognitive therapies do not differ from behaviom 
therapies. They are aimed at explaining a simple linear, causal relationship between 
thoughts and dysfiU1ctional behavioms and emotions, which means that their cosmology 
is mechanistic. In terms of epistemology, cognitive therapies emphasise empirical 
research and objective analysis of people's self repOlis for thoroughly understanding 
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individuals. Therefore, the epistemology that these theories are based on is realist 
(represelltationist) epistemology. 
However, if we look at the systems process-oriented therapy's (SPOT) metatheoretical 
assumptions, we can see that a shift has occUl1'ed at the level of all three guiding 
assumptions. Therefore, though SPOT has stemmed from the cognitive therapy 
traditiOli, there are some core differences between this theory and cognitive theoretical 
system. 
7.2. Guiding assumptions 
7.2. 1. OntoJogy 
From my point of view, ontology of SPOT is reflected in how Guidano explains 
the relationship between explaining and experiencing, for him two of the most 
important processes occurring in human beings (Guidano, 1987; 1988; 1991). He 
proposes that explaining and experiencing continuously alternate with each other 
in order to provide an intel]xetation of the noumenal (Ford & Urban, 1998) 
reality that exists but is not directly knowable by the human mind. If we assume 
that experiencing involves body as a medium where perceptions of current 
internal and external events occur, and that explaining is the mind's operation, 
we can say that a dualistic ontology called psychophysical interactionism, where 
body and mind interact with each other, is employed in this theory. Therefore, 
Guidano does not directly provide material from which one can conclude which 
ontology guides his theory. However, if we see it in the light of constructivist 
epistemology, that is also employed in SPOT, where people are seen as active 
constructors of ideas about existing but not directly knowable reality, it can be 
clear that SPOT employs a dualistic ontology. 
7.2.2. Cosmology 
SPOT rejects mechanistic cosmology where ideas of reductionism, 
associationism, and linear deternlinism represent major assumptions. Therefore, 
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instead of viewing humans as passive recipients of environmental effects, SPOT 
emphasises the self-organising paradigm (Guidano, 1988; 1991; 1995a; 1995b) 
where humans are presented as self-organising systems capable of subordinating 
"all changes to the maintenance of its own organisation" (Guidano, 1988; p.308). 
This maintenance is characterised by "an ongoing and generative process of self-
renewal in order to assimilate incoming information and to cope with 
perturbations arising from its exchanges with the enviromnent" (Guidano, 1988; 
p.308). Guidano sees the human mind as a self-organising system, which is 
autonomous. As such, it is concerned with its own ,self-maintenance and self-
renewal with possessing individuality and uniqueness that rest on an active and 
ongoing differentiation between self and non-self. 
As in an organismic cosmological model, development is seen as a senes of 
system transformations of human knowing processes in the direction of 
progressively more complex patterns of their organisation. However, unlike that 
model no predetermined outcome is proposed because the change processes are 
open-ended. Moreover, the relationship between the system and enviromnent is 
reciprocal and transactional where both systems are affected by each other. 
Therefore, there is no linear causal relationship but rather a circular multicausal 
relationship between these two entities. 
7.2.3. Epistemology 
Epistemology is concerned with how people comprehend themselves, others and 
the enviromnent in terms of proposing particular relationships among three basic 
ideas: experience, lmowledge or lmowing, and reality. SPOT is based on 
constructivism, an epistemology that has rejected the positions of realism or 
presentationism where experience corresponds with the reality the person 
encounters and as such can provide objective lmowledge. On the contrary, 
constructivism considers experience insufficient by itself to explain reality 
because experience is changeable, specific to particular time and place and non-
recurring. Moreover, it is built up on the input coming from the humans' 
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sensory /perceptual system, which is limited and selective in tenns of the aspects 
ofthe observable event. As such, experience is for the constructivists a necessary 
but insufficient tool for establishing knowledge. Hence, knowledge is constructed 
by specific mental processes that utilise but go beyond direct experience. 
Therefore, each person is the primary agent of hislher knowledge creation and 
hence, reality cannot be objectively explained. When this is translated in the 
clinical practice of SPOT, it means that clients need to recognise that their 
knowledge about realities are their constructions and as such can be subjected to 
continual revision and replacement. This view, also, implies that there is no value 
judgement put on clients' current functioning, and their current representations 
(thoughts, beliefs) are not labelled as dysfunctional and irrational. 
Guidano (1988; 1991) adds one more dimension to the constructivist 
epistemology called evolutionary epistemology. This IS an approach that 
integrates data ii-om cognitivc, biological and cvolutionary science claiming that 
"human lmowledge and ways of knowing undergo evolutionary development 
analogues to biological evolutiontl (Ford & Urban, 1998; p: 513). Therefore, 
Guidano (1991) sees knowledge as a constantly changing phenomenon that 
develops along a continuum, ranging from simple early exploratory behaviour to 
human self-consciousness. Furthermore, evolutionary epistemology brings one 
more quality to the SPOT and that is adaptation. Adaptation is the ability to 
transfonn disequilibrium, arising from interaction with environment, into 
meaningful information for the person. However, maintaining adaptive 
fimctioning is not a process of simply corresponding to the perccived world, but 
rather a process of transfonnation and selection of that world's representations. 
For that reason the viability or adaptive utility of these representations becomes 
the most important selection criterion. Finally, hwnan life-span development is 
not seen as a smootl1 curve of cumulative acquisition of lmowledge, but as a 
discontinuous curve in which stability and change of knowledge are tightly 
intertwined. Therefore, stability phases are unexpectedly interrupted by episodes 
of whole system perturbations "in which major reorganisations (personal 
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revolutions) emerge to become the next 'tacit base-campi of viability (Mahoney, 
1991)" (Guidano, 1991; p.10). 
7.3. Conceptual model 
7.3. 1. Levels and units of analysis 
As could be seen from the ontological and cosmological assumptions of SPOT, 
humans are seen as open self-organising systems where biological and mind 
aspects are interdependent and inseparable. Therefore, human systems are 
characterised by unitary functioning which always occurs within a particular 
context. Unitary functioning means that focal unit of analysis is the person-in-
context. Not only that people and their contexts are related, people also function 
as interpretations of these contexts, extemal and intemal. 
7.3.2. Key concepts 
This section is aimed at presenting the major concepts and their organisation that 
characterise SPOT. However, because of the reasons cited below, conceptual 
issues are not clearly presented, which makes the task of creating a conceptual 
model of SPOT difficult. Firstly, in terms of the key concepts and their 
relationships, Guidano is not consistent in his writing. If we look at the two core 
references (Guidano, 1988; 1991), one can see that his terminology varies. 
Therefore, in the first reference he uses the following tenns II mind II , "human 
lmowing system", "~elf-Imowledgelf, "self-identity", "self-esteem", which I think 
represent key concepts. However, in the second reference Guidano mostly talks 
about "selfhood", two major self concepts the liMe" and the "I", and "personal 
meaning". Furthermore, he uses the tenns "self-Imowledge" and II self-identity II , 
but it is not clear whether these terms represent the same phenomena described in 
his first reference. Moreover, his writing, as Ford & Urban (1998) pointed out, is 
an illustrative example of the "high level of abstraction, complexity, and 
vagueness often found in constructivist's writing II (p.5l6). Nevertheless, by 
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taking the risk of mak:ing some not well-grounded assumptions, in the further 
sections I will try to, at least, provide the major framework of conceptual model 
of the SPOT. 
Though the term "self' is £:equently used in his work, Guidano does not provide 
a direct explanation of the self. However, according to the theories that he uses to 
support his own propositions it seems that the tenn self is coming from studies of 
the development of social cognitions in which the major process can be described 
as "lmowing about others and one's self in relation to others" (Corsini, 1994). 
Guidano uses the "looking glass" metaphor claiming that human beings acquire 
self-Imowledge through interaction with other people. However, the self is not 
just a simple product of interacting with others but rather a complex concept that 
results fi'om the basic feature of the human lmowing system, that is, the ability to 
create models of self and the world. Therefore, the human mind is not seen as a 
passive collector· of sensations coming from the objectively apprehensible 
environment and an active constructor of actions performed on that environment. 
By accepting a constructivist epistemology, the observer-observed relationship is 
not clear-cut any more, which implies that any observation is always self-
referential. The human mind is therefore seen as an "active, constructive system, 
capable of producing not only its output but also to a large extent the input it 
receives, including the sensations that lie at the base of its own constructions" 
(Guidano, 1988; p.309). In conclusion lmowledge is always self-detennined and 
hence; the mechanisms of self are interwoven with the mechanisms of lmowledge 
and this interaction and interdependence is the essential factor in the 
development of an individual. This development unfolds "by means of 
progressive construction of the selfhood structures along increasingly complex 
and integrated levels oflmowledge ll (Guidano, 1988; p.311). 
As can be seen, the concept of self is the core concept of the SPOT. Ford and 
Urban (1998) use the tenn "self construct" which unites all the previously 
mentioned terms used by Guidano such as self-knowledge, selfhood, self-
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identity. They describe self-construct as stemming from the continually revised 
flow of human experience. When elaborately and coherently organised, self-
construct co-ordinates and integrates human overall cognitive growth, 
development and emotional differentiation. 
Guidano proposes the specific organisation of self-Imowledge alias self-
constl1lct, based on his acceptance of the two basic levels of the human lmowing 
system including tacit, unconscious processes and explicit, conscious processes. 
Because he sees mind as a self-organising, complex system capable of deriving 
abstractions by itself, not only on the basis of perceptions, tacit or unconscious 
processes are seen as the higher hierarchical level that govern the explicit, 
conscious processes without appearing in them. They represent "hierarchically 
arranged sets of ensembled schemata" (Guidano, 1988; p.316) that work as "sets 
of deep rules" (Guidano, 1988; p.316) through which a person can construct self-
perceptions of the world. There are two main functions of the tacit level of 
knowledge organisation that can be briefly outlined as follows. The first function 
is the continual elaboration of progressively more abstract tacit rules which are 
then inserted and manipulated in explicit lmowledge structures. Secondly, tacit 
knowledge level is responsible for the direction and co-ordination of the 
individual's emotional and imaginative life providing specific patterns for 
decoding one's own feelings that happens on the conscious level. As can be seen, 
tacit processes organise and control hierarchically lower Imowledge level that 
includes explicit knowledge processes. 
This level consists of explicit models of self and reality. The self model (personal 
identity) represents the whole set of beliefs, memories and thought procedures 
about the self. It creates a coherent self-image characterised by a sense of 
personal uniqueness and continuity in time. There are two structures that 
personal identity consists of. A structured self-identity provides a set of basic 
expectations that govems a personal perception of oneself accompanied by 
evaluation of oneself when compared with the selected self-image. This 
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evaluation of one's owns emotions and behaviours when compared with beliefs 
about one's own value corresponds to the second structure of personal identity 
called self-esteem. Guidano states that self-esteem "entails the 'theory of 
emotions' to which we adhere in the relationship we establish with ourselves" 
(Guidano, 1988; p.317). This theory provides the range of emotions that we can 
recognise, label and control, and also express in the particular way in the 
particular circumstances. Therefore, any feelings that cannot be recognised and 
labelled, are likely to be experienced as strange phenomena and labelled as, for 
example, somatic complaints. 
The second model at the explicit structural level is the reality model(s). It 
consists of representations of the outside world that are constantly regulated by 
personal identity structures in order to create outside world's images consistent 
with the self-image. The coherence and stability of the reality models rest on the 
basic set of rules including rules that co-ordinate the assimilation of experience 
and rules that co-ordinate problem-solving procedures. The first rules detennine 
which parts of experience to be considered significant and how the significant 
domains of experience will be integrated into already existing knowledge 
structures. The second set of rules is aimed at providing logical problem-solving 
procedures that are essential for defining the problem and dealing with it. 
Models of reality are controlled by self-identity structures through two basic 
structural relationships including attitude toward oneself and attitude toward 
reality. Attitude toward oneself defines the relationship between the explicit self-
identity and tacit self-Imowledge. This is actually the dynamic relationship 
between the elements of tacit knowledge including, for example, invariant tacit 
rules and emotional schemata and the cognitive abilities located at the explicit 
structural level including, for example, concept formation, decentering, 
distancing. Attitude toward reality represents the way by which personal identity 
regulates construction of outside's world representations in accordance to self-
image. Therefore, structuring the attitude toward reality is hierarchically 
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dependent on attitude toward oneself, i.e., how we see reality and ourselves in 
that reality, depends essentially on how we see and conceive ourselves. 
As can be seen from the previous section the relationship between the particular 
knowledge levels is hierarchically based, but not only a "feedforward" 
relationship characterises this model. Guidano emphasises that there is a 
complementary feedback system exercised by the structured personal identity 
that controls which tacit self-knowledge will be incorporated in reality models. 
Indeed, though deep (tacit) knowledge can already exist, only personal identity 
structures with a developed sense of self-awareness can allow these abstract deep 
structures to be accessible at explicit (conscious) levels. 
By emphasising a systems, process-oriented approach to his theory, Guidano sees 
human knowledge as progressively developing along the life-span (Guidano, 
1988). Therefore, human knowledge is a self-determined but open-ended 
process with developmental characteristic strongly ingrained in its basis. It 
develops through interactions with other people and for that reason, Guidano 
regards Bowlby's attachment theory as being a relevant framework to explain the 
development of self-Imowledge within interpersonal context (Guidano, 1988; 
1991). The propositions of the development of self-lmowledge and human 
change and stability processes will be the major topic of the next sections. 
7.4. Propositional model 
In terms of the propositional model, Guidano gives more explicit view how the 
previously analysed concepts are put within developmental context, and how he 
sees stability-change processes. A possible reason why the propositional model 
seems easier to unveil, might be that two well-lmown and well established 
theories are at the basis of his propositional assumptions. The first theory is 
Bowlby's attac1nnent theory and the second is Izard and colleagues' emotion 
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theory. Both of these theories have considerable empirical support, which 
certainly makes them more credible. 
Why did Guidano reach for Bowlby's attachment theory? For a,very simple 
reason, because this theory emphasises the importance of the child-caregiver's 
early dynamics, which for Guidano has a crucial importance for the development 
ofself~knowledge (Guidano, 1988; 1991). Attachment is seen as a process where 
the infant actively seeks the caregiver for meeting its needs for proximity and 
emotional support. It is also the process through which an infant learns to 
recognise itself as a unique entity. This process of self-recognition is the crucial 
starting point for the development of self-identity. It unfolds through the two 
different but interdependent processes including the "development of a sense of 
self as a subject ('1') and as an object ('Mel)" (Guidano, 1991; p.19). The self-
feeling (i.e. seeing yourself as a differentiated entity) comes from the infant's 
ability to COlU1ect diffuse basic feelings to perceptions and memories drawn from 
the regularities of the caregiver's behaviour. Therefore, the quality of the 
attachment reciprocity between the infant and the caregiver directs this process. 
On the other hand the process of seeing oneself like other sUlTounding persons 
(i.e., differentiation of the "Me") goes through anticipating the other's perception 
of one's action that involves empathic ability to take the attitudes of others onto 
oneself. "Others" represent the main attachment figures and their representations 
are closely intertwined with early vague representations of the self. These 
representations have a major effect on everyday thinking and behaviour that 
stretches throughout the life-span. 
Growing cognitive abilities and emotional differentiation skills that unfold 
through the child's further development affect attachment representations, 
making them more stable and better outlined. In parallel these processes provide 
increasingly complex infonnation about the self and the world, but attachment 
remains the essential organising construct because of its integrative power. 
Chapter 7 SYSTEMS PROCESS-ORIENTED THERAPY 115 
In the following section I will outline the interplay between emotional 
differentiation and cognitive growth that takes shape within the unitary 
framework provided by attachment and identification processes. In tenns of 
emotional differentiation Guidano uses major propositions from the theories of 
Izard, Giblin and Pribram in which there is emphasis on the clear differentiation 
between emotion and feeling (Giblin, 1981, Izard, 1980 & Pribram, 1971 in 
Guidano, 1988). A feeling is diffuse and vague and also hard to recognise and 
control whereas an emotion represents a structured phenomenon that can be 
labelled and controlled. For a feeling to be transformed into a specific subjective 
emotional experience, it has to specifically connect with perceptions and actions. 
Children are born with the ability to have feelings and express them. However, 
the identification processes that have been acquired through attachment 
reciprocity provide a powerful tool for shaping these feelings into emotional 
schemata. These represent tacit rules that bias available cognitive abilities toward 
selecting a specific interaction with the world. In that way emotional schemata 
influence the content of self-knowledge. However, the relationship between 
emotional schemata and cognitive abilities is not only one of feedforward 
processes because the content of cognitive processes can change the intensity or 
quality of emotional experience influencing further emotional differentiation. 
As call be seen, early development is characterised by a continuous interchange 
between emotional and cognitive processes. This results in the construction of 
the basic patterns of emotional schemata, cognitions and behaviour that provide a 
set of tacit abstract rules fbr interaction with the enviromnent. However, though 
the developmental attachment history of the individual determines emotional 
schemata and the set of abstract rules integrating them, only through the 
emergence of the higher cognitive skills, the individual will start to recognise 
him/herself as an independent subject on an explicit conscious level. 
The development of self-lmowledge can be considered as a "progressive series of 
qualitative transformations begiIming with the structuring of elementary patterns 
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of self-recognition and ending with the emergence of a structured self-
development" (Guidano, 1988; p.314). These processes unfold in parallel with 
the emergence of the particular cognitive abilities labelled in Piagetian tenns as 
preconcrete, concrete and formal operational thinldng that in turn characterise 
particular stages of development, i.e. infancy and pre-school years, childhood 
and adolescence and youth. According to Guidano, self-knowledge in infancy 
and the pre-school years is characterised by a basic set of deep tacit relations that 
affect sel:f/world recognition and bias further self-lmowledge development. 
During childhood the concrete operational thinldng permits the child to 
realistically understand the enviromnent and hence to see hislher self as an 
object, whereas adolescence and youth, because of the development of f0n11al 
operational thinldng, are the periods where the "self' needs to be rediscovered 
through a process of self-reflection. 
However, Guidano does not see self-knowledge as a finished product of youth. 
For him, self-lmowledge is an open generative system, which develops further in 
the direction of increased order and complexity. This is achieved through 
assimilation of disequilibriums (fluctuations) encountered in interaction with the 
enviro1Ullent. Therefore, change and stability processes are closely intertwined 
though stability processes are continuous whereas change processes are 
continuous only as possibilities but their occurrence is discontinuous. Because of 
this human life-span development is not seen as linear but rather as discontinuous 
and step-like. 
Guidano recognises two types of change. Surface changes happen regularly, 
producing revisions of reality models according to ongoing experience. They are 
expressions of the flexibility and plasticity of individuallmowledge organisation. 
However, deep changes are not continuous, because they are the expression of 
the modification of the explicit self-image elicited by the disequilibrium that 
oversteps the existing stability range. The deep changes range from a limited 
reconstruction of personal identity to extensive changes of personality. They 
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correspond to changes in patterns of attitude to oneself, which will produce the 
modification of personal identity. The change in this explicit structure will affect 
attitudes toward reality through which the world will be seen and dealt with in a 
different maImer. 
There are two processes that characterise deep changes. Their direction (whether 
they are regressive or progressive) will govern the consequences impeded on 
self-knowledge organisation. They are self-awareness and experience 
assimilation. Self-awareness is the essential mechanism underlying deep changes. 
and represents the switch to a meta level of lmowledge representation. Self-
awareness is progressive in the case of labelling and decoding of emotions 
related to the deep changes but it can be regressive if the person labels and 
controls emotions by creating external theories in order to explain 
overemotionality without changing self unage. On the other hand experience 
assunilation is achieved by the manipulation of more sophisticated reality 
models. However, in the case of a regressive shift in experience assimilation, 
reality models do not change but stay linked to the stereotyped self-inlage 
representations. This regressive shift in self-awareness and experience 
assimilation can be a source of the development of psychopathology. 
7.5. Procedural model 
Guidano conceptualises psychopathology as a "science of personal meaning" 
(Guidano, 1991; p.112) because the human way of being-in-the-world is seeking 
and creating meaning. His construct of a personal meaning organisation 
(P.M Org.) is organised around patterns of early reciprocity, self-boundary 
organisation and "I"/"Me" dynamics and systemic coherence. According to 
Guidano's clinical experience, there are four most typical and frequent 
P.M.Orgs., including the "depressive', the "phobic", the "obsessive-compulsive", 
and the Heating disorders". The major function of the P.M.Orgs. is to achieve 
coherence of the self in a dynamic environment in a way that is consistent with 
Chapter 7 ~ SYSTEMS PROCESS-ORIENTED THERAPY 118 
its experience of living. These pathological P.M.Orgs. originate from different 
types of insecure attachment which then affect further personal identity 
development. For example, fI depressive " P.M.Org. is characterised by the 
avoidant insecure attachment that implies structuring the selfhood around 
repetitive themes of loss, failme, rejections accompanied by negative self-
appraisal and internal causal attribution. Though P.M.Orgs. are labelled by the 
diagnostic names coming from DSM-IV nosology, Guidano claims that they 
should not be regarded as these diagnostic entities. They should be seen as lIa 
unitary and self-organised ordering of meaning" (Guidano, 1991; p.99) that 
differs from person to person. The therapist's task dming the assessment is to 
find out which P.M.Org. characterises the client's functioning and to use that for 
further collaborative exploration of the client's problems. 
The major aim of Guidano's therapy is to produce deep changes in clients by 
modification and transfonnation of the deep tacit structures. He sees clients 
having problems because of their inability to assimilate disequilibriums 
encountered in their interaction with the world. In that way clients are stuck and 
they cannot reach more integrated levels of lmowledge. The therapist is seen as a 
collaborator that helps clients to recognise, understand and better conceptualise 
their own personal truth. In contrast to classical CBT, the therapist does not 
persuade clients to adopt other standards of truth. Guidano considers it even 
dangerous because it completely invalidates the client's current models of the 
self and reality because a clinical syndrome is seen as an unsuccessful deep 
change .. 
Guidano proposes two general principles about the relationship between 
emotions and therapeutic change. For him having feelings and emotions is of the 
same importance for the development of personallmowledge as having cognitive 
abilities. He proposes that IIno change seems possible without emotions" 
(Guidano, 1991; p.97) and that "while tliinking usually changes thoughts, only 
feeling can change emotion" (Guidano, 1991; p.97). This means that only change 
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in the core emotional themes can affect self-regulation and modifY self-
perception and thus facilitate change of deep tacit structures. The second 
principle is related to self-awareness, an ability that Guidano sees as crucial for 
successful deep changes. Firstly, clients are trained through self-observation 
techniques to differentiate between immediate self-perceptions and conscious 
beliefs and attitudes. Moreover, they are gradually exposed during the 
therapeutic process to some affect-laden events in which they exercise with the 
help of the therapist more flexible and plastic self-awareness. Finally, the 
therapeutic relationship itself and its emotional aspects serve as a tool for 
facilitation of assimilation of disequilibrium. 
The therapeutic approach that Guidano proposes consists of three main phases 
following in sequence: 
• Phase 1: Preparing clinical and interpersonal context 
• Phase 2: Construing the therapeutic setting 
• Phase 3: Undertaking developmental analysis 
The first phase that lasts 2-3 initial sessions (depending on the client this can 
sometimes be 6-8 sessions) is assessment based. Th:is means that therapists 
conduct the interview with the purpose of establishing the hypothesis of the 
possible P.M.Org. that lies at the base of the symptomatology. By knowing 
which meaning organisation clients use to comprehend themselves and reality, 
the therapist can establish the interpersonal context of further therapeutic 
sessions in a such way to avoid incongruence between his/her attitudes and 
assumptions with the client's. In that way, the therapist creates a secure place for 
the client and provides a healthy climate where refonnulation of the client's 
problems would be seen as congruent with the client's current needs. 
The second phase of SPOT is the central phase of the therapeutic process, which 
lasts around 8 months. It consists of two stages including: 1) focusing and 
reordering immediate experiencing and 2) the reconstruction of the client's 
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affective style. The first phase begins with a request from the therapist that 
clients focus themselves on the particular events of the week that are for them 
meaningful in the light of the initial reformulation of their problems. These 
events are then analysed by the specific self-observation technique that Guidano 
(1991; 199 5c) calls moviola technique in which clients are taught to look at the 
event by going back and forth in slow motion, zooming in/out etc. Guidano 
claims that in this way clients can be taught to distinguish immediate 
experiencing and their explanation of it during and after the scene. At the end of 
this stage clients become capable of seeing themselves differently and 
recognising feelings that were previously neglected and excluded from 
consciousness. In the second stage clients are asked to focus on the affective 
relationship experienced as essential to their present life. This means exploring 
the structured image of the cuo-ent attachment figure, which will for sure be 
changed by the already achieved changes in clients. This stage also employs the 
moviola setting technique, but this time the entire clients' affective history is 
analysed working with the client's ability "both to differentiate between 
immediate experiencing and explicit restructuring, and to reconstruct the 
different aspects of a given SUbjective experience II (Guidano, 1991; p.l46). The 
major outcome of this stage is that the client becomes capable of perceiving 
emotional states as self-organised procedures that can combine and recombine 
themselves when going through an affectional relationship. Moreover, the 
perception of significant others change with the change of personal meaning 
organisation. This is accompanied by the total disappearance of the original 
disturbances with the development of the new levels of self-referring and 
different attitudes toward reality. Guidano claims that more than 50% of clients 
prefer to stop therapy at this point, maintaining a relationship with the therapist 
through check-up sessions (Guidano, 1991). 
The third and final phase of SPOT, which is focused on developmental analysis, 
lasts between a minimum of 3 months to maximum of 6 months. This phase 
begins when clients are interested in continuing self-exploration despite the 
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disappearance of their initial clinically expressed problems. Firstly, the therapist 
and the client reconstruct the client's developmental history from the earliest 
memories to the current developmental stage. The main thread of this analysis is 
again the interdependence between attachment and selfhood processes and self-
observational technique is used in the same way as in the previous phases. This is 
aimed at refi:aming memory through attaining more exhaustive comprehension of 
the particular memorised events with consequent changes in the whole memory 
frame with recombination of whole sets of memory frames. When the wanted 
outcome is achieved the therapist gradually prepares clients for the tennination of 
therapy. 
Chapter 8. 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
In previous chapters four selected integrative theories were presented within the 
structure proposed by CF. Now, that their guiding assumptions and conceptual, 
propositional and procedural models are uncovered, they can be compared and 
their similarities and differences can be found. 
In order to provide results of comparative analysis in the fashion that is more 
accessible for the reader, the tables will be presented down below. These tables 
include the main elements of each integrative theory for their guiding 
assumptions, conceptual, propositional and procedural models. Such a 
presentation gives a better overview of the theories and makes their similarities 
and differences more accessible. 
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8.1. Similarities and differences in guiding 
assumptions 
GUIDING ASSUMPTIONS 
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ONTOLOGY COSMOLOGY EPISTEMOLOGY 
• Constructivism 
SPOT • Psychophysical Open system interactionism • • Evolutionary 
epistemology 
• Psychophysical • 
Empiricism 
CP interactionism • Open system 
(including realist 
and constructivist (dualist view) 
notions) 
• Psychophysical • 
Developmental 
ICEP • Open system constructivist interactionism 
approach 
PEP • Psychophysical • Organismic and • Dialectical interactionism open system constructivism 
Table l: Guiding assumptions 
8.1.1. Ontology 
As is clearly visible all selected theories share a similar ontology. This is a 
dualist ontology of psychophysical interactionism where body and mind are 
recognised as important elements that interact with each other. I drew this 
conclusion from looking at how each of these theories deals with emotioll. 
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Because each of them emphasises to a lesser or greater extent the significance of 
emotional experiences that include bodily sensations, r inferred that body is a 
recognised entity in these theories. 
However, the extent of body importance differs from theory to theory, ranging 
from having a very subtle role in the Wachtel's cyclical psychodynamics to the 
very emphasised importance of emotional experience in the theory of Greenberg 
et aL This difference can be explained by acknowledging which original theories 
are most influential for cyclical psychodynamics (CP) and process-experiential 
psychotherapy (PEP). For instance, CP is organised around a psychoanalytic core 
that certainly acknowledges the significance of body but is still more focused on 
mind phenomena such as fantasies, repressed memories, and unconscious 
conflicts. On the other hand, PEP is aimed at improving an experiential 
theoretical framework and given that emotions play the key role in this type of 
therapy, the body component is more emphasised than in the case of CPo The 
other two theories, Safran and Guidano's ones crCEP & SPOT), place a 
somewhat moderate importance on body. As can be seen the mind still has 
significance in all of these theories but the significance of body is not 
undermined or erased totally. 'Therefore, in my opinion all of these theories share 
a common ontology with the difference being in the degree of emphasis of body 
elements. 
8.1.2. Cosmology 
The cosmology of these theories is also similar. It is an open-system cosmology 
where transactional relationships with the enviromnent and a multifactorial and 
circular nature of causality are the main features. Such a cosmology is based on 
the assumption, which all of these therapies have in common, that a simple linear 
cause-effect relationship is not substantial enough to explain the complexity of 
the real world. 
Chapter 8 - COMP ARA TIVE ANALYSIS 125 
8. 1.3. Epistemology 
Epistemology seems more diverse in these theories. One can say that it is mostly 
empiricism that characterises these theories though they differ in the degree to 
which they emphasise the presentationist (realist) and representationist 
(constructivist) views. For instance SPOT and PEP have a clear constructivist 
epistemology with an addition of new epistemological stances that are 
consecutively evolutionary epistemology and dialectical constructivism. 
On the other hand, CP and ICEP's epistemology is empiricism but with more 
adherence to the realist view, although some constructivistic influences are fully 
acknowledged. 
8.2. Similarities and differences in conceptual 
models 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
MAIN LEVEL OF KEY CONCEPTS ANALISYS 
SPOT • Person -in-context • Self-construct 
CP • Person-in-context • No original concept 
leEP Person-in-context • Interpersonal • schema 
PEP • Person-in-context • Emotion scheme 
Table 2: Conceptual models 
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8.2.1. Main levels of analysis 
"Person-in-context" is the main level of analysis characteristic of all of the 
selected theories. Therefore, not only are integrative theories aimed at a thorough 
presentation of the complexity of persons (by including various psychological 
variables in their conceptual models), but also they all fully acknowledge the 
significance of the person's embeddings in contexts. Hence, the relationship 
between persons and enviromnent is transactional, where both sides influence 
each other. 
8.2. 2. Key concepts 
As can be seen fi.'om the table, CP is the only theory that does not propose any 
original concepts. The other three theories (pEP, IeEP, and SPOT) propose the 
following concepts: emotion scheme, interpersonal schema, and self-construct. 
Emotion scheme represents a basic psychological unit that generates emotional 
experience and meaning. It is action-oriented and includes emotion, cognition, 
motivation, and action. Interpersonal schema is a general representation of self-
other relationships and includes affect and cognition. The self-construct co-
ordinates and integrates overall human cognitive growth, development and 
emotional differentiation. As can be seen though these key concepts differ 
significantly from each other, although in my opinion they also share some 
common characteristics. For example, they are created to be inclusive as much as 
possible by including at least cognition and affect, though the emotion scheme is 
even more extensive because it includes motivation and action. 
The acknowledgement of the significance of the two basic psychological 
variables cognition and emotion is further extended by the inclusion of the 
findings coming from cognitive psychology and emotion theory. Therefore, the 
influence of cognitive psychology is reflected, for example, in the 
aclmowledgement of the existence of implicit and explicit levels of knowledge. 
For instance, PEP acknowledges the existence of non-conscious mental 
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structures. It proposes that the emotion schemas themselves provide tacit rules 
that govenl human behaviour. In IeEP, interpersonal schemata are coded partly 
on the procedural and partly on the conceptual level of knowledge. SPOT also 
emphasises this conscious/non-conscious dichotomy by claiming that self-
constructs operate on both the explicit and implicit levels of lmowledge. 
Moreover, if we look at all three concepts, we can see that they are all schema-
like organised because of their representationist nature, though they are also, all 
action-oriented in tenns of providing the functioning rules. 
Emotion theory is most influential in the PEP. Its key concept emotion scheme is 
organised around emotions as a core element based on their proposed adaptive, 
action-oriented and infonnative functions. Moreover, it is emphasised that the 
emotion processing of infonnation is equally important as cognitive processing. 
This dialectic is essential for human existence. IeEP uses Leventhal's theory of 
emotion, which is based on infonnation processing, whereas SPOT also 
acknowledges the significance of emotional schemata that operate on the implicit 
level. 
From this overinclusive nature of the key organisational concepts stems their 
common purpose which is to guide, co-ordinate or generate a sense of self, a 
sense of unity and composure despite the disturbances coming from ever-
changing contexts. In order to neutralise these interferences all key concepts are 
proposed to have a flexible nature; they are modules which can assimilate new 
infoll11ation into an existing framework and accommodate themselves to the new 
qualities brought by this new Imowledge. 
In terms of influences coming from the psychotherapies that these theories claim 
to integrate, apart from IeEP, no other theories include concepts from other 
psychotherapies. Even in IeEP the concept of the interpersonal scheme rests on 
the basic assumptions of cognitive therapy whilst an interpersonal component is 
added to this major theoretical framework not directly :from interpersonal therapy 
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but through ac1mowledgement of Gibson's ecological theory and Bowlby's 
attaclunenttheory. 
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8.3. Similarities and differences of propositional 
models 
PROPOSITIONAL MODEL 
• Stability-maintaining and change processes in dialectical 
relationship 
• Surface and deep changes 
• Human development: discontinuous, step-like 
SPOT • N01111al development: self-construct develops through early 
attachments and affect regulation with later addition of cognitive 
abilities; tIns results in the development of self-awareness and 
experience assinnlation 
• Dysfunctional development is a result of regressive shift in self-
awareness and experience assimilation 
• Stability-maintaining and change processes acknowledged 
• Nonnal development: "continuous construction model"; CP interaction cycles through which people develop into adaptive 
and flexible persons 
• Dysfunctional development: "vicious circles" 
• Stability-maintaining and change processes aclmowledged 
• SUliace and deep changes occur at the levels of peripheral and 
core structures consecutively 
ICEP • N onnal development: based on the maintaining interpersonal 
relatedness (development of interpersonal schema) 
• Dysfunctional development: self-perpetuating cognitive-interpersonal cycles which strengthen dysfunctional interpersonal 
schemas 
• Dialectical relationship of stability-maintaining and change processes emphasised 
• SUliace and deep changes acknowledged 
• Normal development based on growth tendency which resources PEP are emotion system, self-awareness and leaming and experience; 
development of emotion scheme 
• Dysfunctional development: the lack of self-awareness, problems in the creation of emotional meaning and activation of 
dysfunctional schemas. 
Table 3: Propositional models 
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Propositional models provide diverse views of stability-maintaining and change 
processes and also nonnal and dysfunctional development. Nevertheless, as in 
the previous section it is possible to highlight some similarities among them. 
In terms of stability-maintaining and change processes, all theories acknowledge 
either directly or indirectly that these processes are both essential and that their 
dynamic interactions are crucial for nonnal development. However, in terms of 
the pattems in which these interactions unfold they differ significantly. For 
example, PEP sees stability~maintaining and change processes happening 
continuously throughout life, whilst SPOT highlights a discontinuous pattem of 
their interactions where stability maintaining processes persist for some time and 
then change processes take place and alter the existing structures, with stability 
maintaining processes consolidating them. Furthermore, as could be seen in the 
section on conceptual models, all theories acknowledge the existence of core and 
peripheral structures. Consequently, they make distinctions between surface and 
deep changes with deep changes occurring only in the case of core structures' 
metamorphosis. Surface changes, however, result fi'om changing the peripheral 
structures. 
Nonnal development is seen differently from theory to theory. Some of the 
theories do not propose their own models but rather acquire models from other 
theories. For example, CP accepts the continuous constmction model of nonnal 
development in order to reject the fixation-arrest model characteristic of its 
psychoanalytic framework. On the other hand, theories such as, for example, 
SPOT or PEP strive to be more extensive and propose models of the nonnal 
development of their key concepts, self-construct and emotion scheme. Hence, 
they both acknowledge the significance of the emotion system and cognitive 
development in the process of development of these two concepts. Furthennore, 
they recognise the importance of self awareness that is a main maintaining factor 
of normal personal development. If there is a lack of self-awareness (PEP) or a 
regressive shift in it (SPOT) development becomes dysfunctional. 
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In the case of other two theories (lCEP and CP), dysfunctional development 
results from the repetition of dysfunctional patterns. This is presented in the form 
of vicious circles in CP and cognitive-interpersonal cycles in rCEP. Therefore, on 
the one hand we have theodes (PEP and SPOT) that highlight a failure of a 
particular process as causing dysfunctional development. On the other hand ICEP 
and PEP propose that repetitive involvement in dysfunctional interactions 
strengthens ah'eady existing non-viable deep structures. 
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8.4. Similarities and differences of procedural 
models 
PROCEDURAL MODEL 
• Assessment ofPersona1 Meaning Organisations 
• 3 phases of the therapeutic process: 
1. preparing the clinical and interpersonal context 
SPOT 2. construing the therapeutical setting 
3. undertaking developmental analysis 
• Therapeutic relationship very important 
• Original therapeutic techniques ("moviola technique") 
• Assessment is aimed at identifYing all points of vicious 
circles 
CP • Any intervention can be used if it can break vicious Circles 
• Exposure treatment specifically emphasised 
• Therapeutic relationship very significant (facilitative and 
encouraging COlmnents impOliant) 
• Indirect assessment of interpersonal schemas through 
exploration of cognitive-interpersonal cycles 
ICEP 
• Any therapeutic technique can be used 
• Therapeutic relationship is used as a major therapeutic tool ("unhooking", metacommunication) 
• Assessment of dysfunctional emotion schemes 
• Therapy aimed at the change of dysfunctional schemes and 
the creation of the new ones 
PEP • The significance of a therapeutic relationship which should provide safety, empathy and support 
• Individual therapy that can be practised also in groups and 
with couples, 1110st appropriate for outpatient clients (mild to 
moderate problems), a high flexibility in tenns of treatment 
and therapy session's length 
Table 4: Procedural models 
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Comparative analysis on this level seems less valid because of limited 
information that I could access about a ICEP and Cprs therapy process design. 
Moreover, as is general knowledge in psychotherapy, practice always changes 
theoretical notions in an unpredictable fashion counting for the large diversity of 
clients and therapists. Nevertheless, though COlmnon themes were not easy to be 
teased out as in the previous models, it is still possible at least to highlight a few 
common tunes. 
First, like any other psychotherapy, these therapies start with the assumption that 
particular dysfunctional structures or patterns should be changed and become 
functionaL Hence, in CP these patterns are vicious circles, in ICEP these are 
interpersonal schemas, in PEP a dysfunctional emotion scheme should be altered 
and finally in SPOT it is the self-construct that is undergoing change. 
Furthermore, all theories propose that the structures to be changed should be 
assessed thoroughly, and then activated in order to become accessible. 
The techniques that are used for these purposes differ significantly from theory to 
theory, though a COlmnon element is the insistence on the empathic, collaborative 
and accepting relationship between therapists and clients. A superficial glimpse 
at the assessment strategies implies that the theories stay within their original 
theoretical fi:ameworks. However, they propose varying amounts of therapeutic 
eclecticism. For example, CP is open to any therapeutic strategy, irrespective of 
which psychotherapy orientation it comes if it can break non-viable vicious 
interaction circles. ICEP claims to be open in the same way, though if we look at 
the main strategies it employs, (unhooking, metacOlmnunication) it is still very 
cognitively oriented. In my opinion, PEP has a similar attitude by proposing 
specifically developed techniques that rest on the basic assumptions of 
experiential therapies. SPOT is also striving to be original in this sense by 
proposing some original methods such as the flmoviola" technique. 
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8.5. Summary of the findings 
Now that comparisons have been made and some common themes have been 
found, a summary of these findings will be presented. This summary will start 
with conceptual models and finish with guiding assumptions, respecting the logic 
by which I was led in revealing the metatheoretical guidelines. As is well known, 
guiding assumptions are mostly implicit and they are accepted as givens and 
hence, I inferred them from the conceptual, propositional and procedural models. 
As could be seen all theories have in common the same main level of analysis, 
which is the person-in-context. This is directly related to their integrative and 
overinclusive nature where the emphasis is put on the interplay between persons 
and contexts. Their key concepts represent original conceptualisations that are 
based on the findings from cognitive psychology and emotion theory. However, 
these concepts are still very much in need of further development because their 
descriptions are vague, they include different phenomena (at least cognition and 
emotion) but how these phenomena are interrelated camlot be inferred from these 
theories .. 
In terms of propositional models all theories emphasise the necessity of the 
existence of stability-maintaining and change processes. With respect to the latter 
they also acknowledge the specific structural organisation where surface 
structures are governed by deep structures that mostly exist on implicit levels. 
Fmihermore, changes on these two levels consecutively produce surface and 
deep changes. In order for positive changes to persist, deep structures should be 
altered though surface changes usually precede these deep alterations. Nonnal 
development is seen as either a continuous or discontinuous process, which in 
general leads to the creation of increasingly complex and better organised 
structU1'es. On the other hand dysfunctional development is either seen as the 
result of the failure of some essential processes that take part in the development 
of the key concepts or as the result of the repetitive involvement in dysfunctional 
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interactions that strengthen non-viable deep st11lctures. The development of the 
key concepts is mostly explained by relying on attachment, emotion and 
cognitive theories, whilst the influence of the other psychotherapy models is very 
scarce on this level. 
Based on the propositions of change processes, procedural models are aimed at 
changing dysfunctional patterns of interaction or failed processes by employing a 
different level of eclecticism. As could be seen, some of the authors claim to be 
very open to any strategies whilst others are more cautious and prefer their own 
therapeutic methods. Moreover, all of these theories emphasise the significance 
of the therapeutic relationship, which is certainly based to some extent on the 
findings that come from the common factors approach of psychotherapy 
integration. 
Finally, infened :fl:om these concepts and propositions come guiding 
assumptions. As could be seen, integrative theories share common 
1l1etatheoretical assumptions. This is, in my opinion, the result of the integrative 
orientation of their authors. They strive to create explanatory models that will be 
overinclusive and open to the new integration. Consequently, dualistic ontology 
where mind and body are seen as equally important and interacting with each 
other, seems to be an adequate ontology to guide these integrative attempts. 
Furthermore, the open-system cosmology overcomes the simplicity and 
inelevance of the simple mechanistic cause-effect relationship. Instead, 
1l1ulticausality and circularity of causality is favoured by integrative authors. 
Epistemology seems to vary in terms of favouring the realist andconstmctivist 
notion, though const11lctivis1l1 is the main epistemology in PEP and SPOT. 
Constructivism is an attempt at combining realistic epistemology with idealist 
ontology, which as such can contribute to the reconciliation of the opposing 
philosophical ideas that underlie psychotherapies. Their incommensurability is 
usually regarded as a core obstacle to successful integration. 
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8.6. Conclusions and future implications 
As was emphasised in the rationale, this thesis is aimed at shedding light on the 
process of theoretical integration by comparatively analysing currently existing 
integrative theories. For that purpose, the selected theories were presented within 
CF and their similarities and differences were revealed. In this way it was 
possible to uncover at which level their similarities and differences were greater. 
Moreover, some aspects of integrative assimilation were unveiled by highlighting 
which concepts and propositions were assimilated. Furthermore, I proposed that 
on the basis of these findings, I would be able to create some guidelines that will 
be helpful in future attempts at theoretical integration. All these issues will be 
addressed in the following paragraphs. 
In terms of the similarities and differences between integrative theories, it could 
be seen that there is a very little variation at the guiding assumptions level. In my 
opinion, these metatheoretical guidelines reflect an integrative attitude that is 
characteristic of all theorists in this area. Psychophysical interactionism, with an 
emphasis on the equal importance of mind and body that constantly interact with 
each other, open-system cosmology that highlights multi causality and circularity, 
and empiricism with realist and constructivist notions, are highly congruent with 
the basic idea of psychotherapy integration. Similarly, the main level of analysis, 
which is "person-in-context", mirrors the· all-embracing and comprehensive 
essence of the integrationist movement. 
However, as could be seen a significant amount of variability and pluralism 
characterises the conceptual, propositional and procedural models of these 
theories. 111is is an expected outcome of theoretical integration that Carere-
Comes (in press) links to the process of assimilation which Jlrepresents the 
movement towards emancipation-differentiation" (p.6). As could be seen 
assimilation of concepts and propositions from psychological theories 
accompanied by assimilation of some perspectives and practices of other 
psychotherapy schools into the favoured system of psychotherapy, characterises 
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all four selected theories. Interestingly, assimilation of elements from 
psychological theories is presented mostly at the conceptual level and partially at 
propositional level, whereas assimilation of elements from psychotherapy 
schools is significant at the propositional and especially the procedural level. 
Such a pattern of assimilation results from "a finn grounding" (Messer, 1992) in 
one system of psychotherapy, which makes assimilation of elements of 
psychological theories far easier than assimilation of elements from other 
psychotherapy approaches at the conceptual level. This statement is not intended 
to undermine the significance of this "cross-fertilization" (Neimeyer, 1993) 
between psychotherapy and psychological theories, but rather to point the nature 
of the preferred mode of assimilation in these integrative theories. Obviously, 
this type of assimilation can improve the original theoretical frameworks 
significantly and give them more empirical credibility. Furthennore, any value 
judgement made about these analysed theories will preclude treating them as 
finished products, which they are certainly not. I regarded them as evolving 
fi'ameworks tllat need to have a fluid organisation that will allow further 
assimilation. However, in my opinion their future development can significantly 
benefit from taking into account the guidelines that I present in the following 
sections. 
The first recommendation that naturally comes to mind if one views theoretical 
integration as a tool of theory development, is that IDly attempts at this type of 
integration should be informed by findings of the philosophy of science. 
UnfOliunately, however, philosophy of science does not offer much on this topic. 
An exception is a Kalmar & Stemberg's (1988) paper on the "theory-knitting" 
approach. They propose that instead of favouring "a segregative approach to 
theory development" where "one theory is pitted against another" (p.l53) an 
integrative approach should be used. In this approach theories are not ftenemies" 
but "partners" fi'om which concepts are integrated "with one's own ideas 
regarding the domain under investigation" (p.l53). Therefore, a new theory is 
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knitted from the best elements of the selected theories with the addition of the 
new features that can bridge the gaps between existing elements. 
In my opinion, theoretical integration, by its willingness to look 110ver the fence fl , 
has already overcome the disadvantages of the segregative approach. However, it 
can still benefit by acquiring the proposed methodology of theory-knitting 
approach. Therefore, authors that pursue theoretical integration in the future need 
to be aware of which elements at which level they assimilate. They need to be 
familiar with the guiding assumptions, conceptual, propositional and procedural 
models of the theories they want to integrate. By lmowing the organisational 
structure of the theories to be integrated, they can lmit more tightly particular 
elements into the original fi-amework, and see more clearly where are the I1holes l1 
that need be filled by the novel elements. In my opinion the main source of these 
novel elements comes from psychological theories. In this way cross-fertilisation 
between psychotherapy theories will be significantly enhanced by the findings 
fi'om psychological theories. In summary, the necessity of incorporating the 
growing psychological knowledge into psychotherapy integrative theoretical 
fi-ameworks with the full awareness of the organisational structures of 
psychotherapies whose concepts and propositions are integrated, represents a 
major guideline that stems from the findings of this thesis. In my opinion, such 
an integrative attitude gives the authors more control over the process of 
assimilation, in addition to a better understanding of how the evolution of the 
given integrative model can be fuliher enhanced. 
However, as Carere-Comes (in press) points out the emphasis on assimilation as 
an exclusive mean of theoretical integration does not create well-balanced 
models. On the basis of the Piaget's statement that "every assimilation is 
accompanied by an accommodationfl (piaget, 1967 in Carere-Comes (in press)), 
Carere-Comes claims that only positive dialectical tension between assimilation 
and accommodation could prove fertile for further psychotherapy integration. In 
my Op1l11On, this dialectical relationship between assimilation and 
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accommodation should direct further integrative attempts by creating the 
possibility of designing better lmitted psychotherapy models. Yet, this 
recommendation needs to be further explored and elaborated. Similarly to 
assimilation, we do not lmow how accommodation is to be perfonned and on the 
basis of which criteria concepts and propositions should be 
assimilated/accommodated. 
As can be seen, we are left with many unanswered questions. Moreover some 
new avenues for future research in this area are unveiled. For this reason, I treat 
these guidelines as some provisional starting points that will at least elicit some 
useful questions and debates in the future. I, myself, start this debate by 
questioning the eligibility of this comparative analysis to provide such 
guidelines. This is because this analysis includes just four theories selected on the 
basis of more or less SUbjective criteria and hence, one does not 1m ow whether or 
not other integrative theories will "behave" in the same fashion. Moreover, as I 
proposed in the rationale, I intended to comparatively analyse guiding 
assumptions, conceptual, propositional and procedural models of psychotherapy 
theories whose concepts were claimed to be integrated, with the same elements 
of integrative theories. Furthermore, I wanted to iook at the metatheoretical 
congruence of starting theories. These tasks were too extensive to undertal(e in 
this thesis. However, I think that such analyses are worth pursuing in the future 
because they might further elucidate the process of assimilation. 
In conclusion, this thesis was aimed at providing sQme guidelines for future 
theoretical integration and this has been achieved. However, the proposed 
guidelines should not be regarded as set in concrete because as Bernstein (1992) 
pointed out "any answer is always open to further questioning" (p.31l). In my 
opinion this is how these "prescriptions" should be treated; as a springboard for a 
further exploration of a complex and promising enterprise such as theoretical 
integration. 
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